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INTRODUCTION
"For the Murdochs and the Disneys, sports is no game. It's a hot, global
entertainment product-and that's changing all the rules."' I
In both the United States and Australia, sports programming is a major
component of contemporary television content. Each year, media companies
spend billions of dollars for the television rights to major sporting events.2
Since Americans and Australians avidly watch professional sporting events,
securing a stable supply of professional sports programming is now more than
ever a top priority for many firms seeking to attract consumers. 3
An examination of professional sports leagues and the media industry in
the United States and Australia reveals an interesting market situation. An
increasing number of mega-media companies are seeking to purchase the
transmission rights of the established professional sports leagues in each
country.4 A mega-media company has no long-term assurance of obtaining
professional sports programming since leagues auction their transmission
rights to the highest bidder approximately every four to eight years. In
addition, a mega-media company's supply of sports programming may be
suspended in the short run if an internal league matter, such as a labor dispute,
cancels part of the playing season.
Recent experiences in Australia suggest that mega-media companies may
create "media leagues" instead of purchasing the television rights of
1. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998 (front cover) (Magazine).
2. Richard AIm, Flat Ratings Don't Support Television Spend-a-Thon, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 12,
1999, at C1I (noting that media companies have spent over $29 billion for exclusive television rights
to sporting events over the past two years), available at 1999 WL 6304258.
3. MICHAEL J. WOLF, THE ENTERTAINMENT ECONOMY 4 (1999) ("Entertainment - not autos,
not steel, not financial services - is fast becoming the driving wheel of the new world economy. ")
(emphasis in original).
4. The established professional sports leagues in the United States are the National Football
League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), and National
Hockey League (NHL). In Australia, the most popular professional sports leagues are the National
Rugby League (NRL), Australian Football League (AFL), and the Super 12 rugby union competition
involving teams from Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Established, but less popular,
professional sports leagues in Australia are the National Basketball League (NBL) and the National
Soccer League (NSL).
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established professional sports leagues. A media league is a mega-media
company's in-house production of a professional sports league. For example
in 1994, News Ltd., the Australian branch of Rupert Murdoch's News
Corporation, desired the pay television rights to professional rugby league in
order to boost subscriptions to its nascent cable television venture. News Ltd.
could not obtain these rights from the established league because they had
already been sold to another mega-media company that was involved in a
competing cable television enterprise. 5 To obtain rugby league programming,
News Ltd. decided to start and operate a new professional rugby league
competition in which it owned several of the teams.6
This work is a study of the media league concept and its relation to the
structure of professional sports leagues and the viability of rival professional
sports leagues. Almost all professional sports leagues presently operating are
organized along horizontal lines. Traditional professional sports leagues are,
generally speaking, associations of independently owned and operated clubs.7
For a traditional league to produce a product, the independent clubs must
cooperate extensively with one another. A media league, on the other hand, is
organized vertically. The sole producer of a media league is a mega-media
company, which ultimately controls every aspect of the enterprise including
the individual teams. In a media league, the need for cooperation between
independent entities that may not have mutual economic objectives is
substantially, if not entirely, eliminated.
In the last several decades, the vast majority of rival professional leagues
have either succumbed to insolvency or merged weakly with the established
league in the sport.8  These historical experiences have led many
commentators to conclude that the market is incapable of producing a rival
professional sports league that can compete effectively against the established
league in any given sport.9 The hypothesis presented here is that with the
5. MIKE COLMAN, SUPER LEAGUE: THE INSIDE STORY 34-38 (1996).
6. Id. at 62-63.
7. MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO & MARK S. LEVINSTEIN, SPORTS LAW 20 (1997).
8. Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports: A Contribution to the
Theory of the Firm in Sporting Competition and in Market Competition, 78 Q. J. ECON. 1, 7 (1964)
(noting that merger of the established and rival leagues and bankruptcy of the rival league are the
historically observed outcomes involving rival leagues). See generally TERRY PLUTO, LOOSE BALLS:
THE SHORT, WILD LIFE OF THE AMERICAN BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 432 (1990) (detailing the
merger between the NBA and the rival American Basketball Association); DAVID S. NEFT &
RICHARD M. COHEN, THE FOOTBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL
NFL FOOTBALL FROM 1892 TO THE PRESENT 412 (1991) [hereinafter THE FOOTBALL
ENCYCLOPEDIA] (describing the circumstances leading to the merger between the NFL and the rival
American Football League).
9. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 718-22 (1989)
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integration of the telecommunications and media industries this conclusion
about the feasibility of market-generated rival leagues needs to be re-
examined. Though not yet conclusive, 10 evidence from both the United States
and Australia supports the proposition that the market can produce a viable
challenger to an established professional sports league and that a media league
could be such a firm.
The first chapter of the article examines the development and structure of
professional sports leagues. This chapter also sets forth the similarities and
differences between traditional leagues in the United States and Australia.
Chapter two reviews problems currently plaguing traditional leagues due, at
least in substantial part, to their structural design. With this background, the
media league concept is discussed in chapter three. The structural
organization of a media league is contrasted with that of a traditional league;
factors favoring media league formation are highlighted; the ability of a media
league to address the problems associated with traditional leagues is
examined; and the challenges to media league formation in the United States
and Australia are analyzed. Chapter four considers whether a media league
can be a viable rival to an established professional sports league. This chapter
compares the most recent major rival professional sports league experience in
the United States, which did not involve a media league, with the most recent
such experience in Australia, in which a mega-media company played a
prominent role. The work concludes with an analysis of the prospects for
media league creation in both the United States and Australia.
(discounting the probability of the creation of a rival professional sports league other than through the
forced divestiture of the American established professional sports leagues, particularly the NFL and
MLB); Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocations from
Private Law and Public Lav Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy,
and the Need for a Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REV. 57, 95-96 (1997) ("The formation of a rival
league does not present a viable threat to an established league...").
10. As of this writing, no major sport in the United States or Australia has more than one
professional sports league. In the United States, the NBA, NFL, MLB, and NHL are the major
professional sports leagues. In Australia, the major professional sports leagues are the NRL, AFL,
NBL, and NSL. The other two major Australian sports played professionally are cricket and rugby
union. Competitions in these two sports consist of contests between teams from different Australian
states (e.g., the Pura Milk Cup domestic cricket competition) or between Australian teams and teams
from other countries (e.g., international Test cricket matches), rather than a series of games involving
clubs from different Australian cities. The factors favoring the creation of media leagues transcend
all sports. Consequently, this work is not sport specific.
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CHAPTER ONE
DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE OF TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
LEAGUES: THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION AMONG INDEPENDENT CLUBS
I. TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Barnstorming Teams
The precursors of traditional professional sports leagues in the United
States were the "barnstorming teams" of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.11 A barnstorming team was basically a road show. A
promoter hired a team of players that went from town to town playing local
squads. 12 A barnstorming team's source of revenue was generally its share of
the gate receipts for each game, 13 though a few teams could command a
guaranteed fee for their appearance. 14 In addition to playing local teams, the
best of the barnstorming teams usually scheduled games against one another in
larger venues. 15 Though initially successful, barnstorming tours proved to be
too unstable to generate a long-term revenue stream for all but the most
entertaining of teams. 16
B. Traditional Professional Sports Leagues
In the United States, traditional professional sports leagues developed after
barnstorming teams proved insufficiently popular with consumers to be
profitable. 17 The owners of the early professional teams realized that a more
11. See, e.g., THE OFFICIAL NBA BASKETBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 15-26 (Zander Hollander &
Alex Sachare eds., 1989) [hereinafter NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA] (discussing the American barnstorming
basketball teams of the early 1900s).
12. Id. at 18 (noting that Jim Furey, "a New York promoter," helped organize the Original
Celtics, one of the greatest barnstorming basketball teams in the United States after World War I).
13. Id. at 27 (noting that the New York Renaissance Five "usually was paid a percentage of the
gate").
14. Id. at 26 (stating that the Original Celtics, prior to the Depression, "would never book an
appearance for a guarantee of less than $400 ...).
15. Id. (reporting that "as many as 15,000 customers" would turn up to watch the Original Celtics
play the Renaissance Five).
16. Id. at 39 (noting that the instability of early barnstorming teams and professional basketball
leagues hindered their ability to attract a popular following).
17. John C. Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition
[Vol. 12:703
MEDIA LEAGUES
stable competition structure was needed to attract spectators and sustain
revenues.1 8 The solution that the team owners devised was to form leagues in
which teams would systematically play one another.
19
Though the early years of American professional sports saw the creation
of several professional sports leagues, over time one league in each sport was
able to gain the public's allegiance and dominate its rivals. Baseball was the
first American sport in which leagues developed. The National and American
Leagues, the two major professional baseball leagues in operation today, were
created in 187120 and 1901,21 respectively. The two leagues were rivals until
1903, when the owners of the clubs in each league entered into an agreement
to work cooperatively.22 In recent years, the two leagues have substantially
integrated their operations to the point where a single "Major League
Baseball" (MLB) office oversees and directs the clubs in each league.
The National Football League (NFL), the dominant professional football
league in the United States, originated from a meeting of team owners in
Canton, Ohio in 1920.23 The NFL has withstood challenges from several rival
leagues since its inception. The most significant competitor was the American
Football League. In 1966, all of the AFL teams joined the NFL pursuant to a
merger agreement between the two leagues.
24
A dominant league did not develop in professional basketball until 1949
when two rival basketball leagues, the National Basketball League and the
Basketball Association of America merged to form the National Basketball
Association (NBA).25 The NBA faced a serious challenger to its supremacy in
1967 when the American Basketball Association (ABA) was formed.26 Nine
years after the ABA's inception, four of its teams joined the NBA pursuant to
a merger agreement between the two leagues.
27
and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1064 n.171 (commenting that
professional sports leagues developed out of economic necessity because of the unprofitability of
barnstorming teams); 1 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS
INDUSTRIES 1 (1986) (noting that touring basketball teams were not very successful and that
professional basketball did not become firmly established in the United States until the creation of a
stable professional league).
18. NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 11, at 39-55 (describing the development of the NBA).
19. Id.
20. TOTAL BASEBALL 10 (John Thorn & Pete Palmer eds., 1989).
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id.
23. THE FOOTBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 8, at 20.
24. Id. at 404, 412.
25. NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 11, at 49.
26. PLUTO, supra note 8, at 23.
27. Id. at 427-28.
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Traditional professional sports leagues in the United States basically have
the same organizational framework.2 8  Individual teams enter into a
contractual agreement establishing the relationships between the clubs and
between the clubs and the league.29 This agreement is usually embodied in a
"League Constitution and By Laws." 30  The League Constitution gives
ultimate authority over league management decisions and policies to "an
executive committee or board of governors, a body composed of one voting
representative from each member club. 31  In addition, the Constitution
provides for the creation of a "league office," directed by a president or
commissioner. The league office is responsible for the league's day-to-day
operational decisions and performs central tasks such as scheduling games and
disciplining clubs and players for violation of league rules. 32
The clubs in a traditional professional sports league are legal entities
separate from the league itself.33 Most clubs are for-profit entities. 34 A club
may be a sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation, though the
League Constitution may prohibit in word or affect certain forms of club
ownership. 35 Clubs control most of their daily operations and affairs such as
making "decisions concerning ticket prices, player acquisitions and salaries,
the hiring of coaches and administrators, the terms of [their] stadium lease[s],
and the local radio broadcasting of [their] games." 36
28. Roger G. Noll, Alternatives in Sports Policy, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BusINEss
411, 420 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974) ("All sports have essentially the same governing structure ....
[A] single commissioner who together with a committee of owners, decides upon the operating rules
of the sport."); COZZILLIO & LEVINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 20 (discussing the characteristics of a
traditional professional sports league in the United States).
29. Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV. 751, 757
(1989) ("The basic relationship between clubs within a league is defined by contract.").
30. Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to
Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 259 n.143 (1984) (discussing
provisions of the NFL's and NHL's Constitutions and By Laws).
31. Gary R. Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act: An Alternative View, 60 TUL. L. REV. 562, 573 n.29 (1986).
32. Id. ("Day to day operational decisions are made by the league office's administrative
personnel, headed by the president or commissioner.").
33. Goldman, supra note 29, at 757 ("The clubs are separate legal entities ... .
34. David M. Van Glish, The Future of Sports Broadcasting and Pay-Per-View: An Antitrust
Analysis, I SPORTS LAW J. 79, 90 (1994) ("According to NFL bylaws, the National Football League
is an unincorporated association of independent, for profit football clubs.").
35. Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Comment, Community-Based Ownership of a National Football
League Franchise: The Answer to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of NFL Teams, 18 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 589, 604 (1998) (noting that the Rules in the NFL Bylaws relating to new members are "so
burdensome that it is a practical impossibility for a public corporation to own a franchise").
36. Goldman, supra note 29, at 757.
[Vol. 12:703
MEDIA LEAGUES
II. TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES IN AUSTRALIA
Professional sports leagues developed somewhat differently in Australia
than they did in the United States. Unlike in the United States, the founders of
professional sports leagues in Australia were not individual entrepreneurs.
37
Rather, the organizers were representatives from community social clubs that
sponsored sports teams. 38 Consequently, professional sports leagues were not
created for pecuniary reasons in Australia like they were in the United
States. 39 The process by which Australian leagues were created, however, was
very similar to how American leagues were formed. Representatives from
each of the social clubs attended a meeting at which they decided to cooperate
with one another to develop a league competition.
40
Though analogous in some respects, there are differences between the
structure of the major Australian and American traditional leagues. While a
typical American league is a non-profit unincorporated association of
individual for-profit clubs, an Australian league is generally a non-profit
corporation whose "members" (i.e., shareholders) include representatives from
incorporated non-profit clubs.41 In Australia, the members elect the Board of
Directors that governs the league. 42 The number of directors is substantially
less than the number of clubs in the league.43 In the United States, each club
37. The development of professional sports leagues in Australia from local club competitions
relates primarily to the Australian Football League (AFL) and Australian Rugby Football League Ltd.
(ARL), a forerunner to the National Rugby League. A thorough discussion of each established
professional sports league in Australia is beyond the scope of this paper. The material in the text is
presented to provide background for later discussions in the work.
38. News Ltd. v. Australian Rugby Football League Ltd., (1996) 58 F.C.R. 447, 1996 WL
33110742, at *20 (Austl. Fed. Ct. March 11, 1996) (noting that the clubs in the New South Wales
Rugby Football League, the first professional rugby league competition in Australia, were non-profit
institutions).
39. Thomas Keneally, Innocence, in LEAGUE OF A NATION 71, 71 (David Headon & Lex
Marinos eds., 1996) (noting that "questions of social justice for players rather than the desire for
proliferation of codes or for commercial reward, were the... trigger" for the formation of the New
South Wales Rugby Football League).
40. News Ltd. v. Australian Rugby Football Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. 1, at *18 (Austl. Fed. Ct.
Oct. 4, 1996) (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) ("The beginnings of rugby league in Australia can be
traced to a meeting attended by about 50 people at Bateman's Hotel, George Street, Sydney, on 8
August 1907.").
41. Id. at *21 (noting that members of the NSW Rugby League Ltd. who were to constitute the
general committee included "two representatives from each club").
42. Id. at *25 (referring to the NSW Rugby League Ltd.'s articles of incorporation that provide
for members to elect four of the nine directors on the board); Daryl Timms, John Gets the Nod,
NEWS.cOM.AU (Nov. 16, 1999) (reporting that the AFL club presidents had elected a new
commissioner to the AFL Commission at the league's directors meeting), available at
http:llsport.news.com.au/news/4303869.htm.
43. AUSTRALIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE, AUSTRALIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE 102 ANNUAL REPORT
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owner is represented on the league's "executive committee" so that the
governing body of an American league is much larger than one in an
Australian league.
As for individual clubs, in Australia a board of directors, not a single
wealthy individual, has ultimate decision-marking authority over a team's
affairs.44  Members/shareholders have the right to vote on issues that
profoundly affect the club, such as whether to merge with another club in the
league, relocate the team to a new location, or change the team's logo or
colors.45 Members do not have any voting rights with respect to player or
coaching personnel or other like matters regarding the team. Members do not
receive any financial return on their investment in the club since the
corporation does not pay dividends; club memberships are not publicly traded;
and upon winding up of the club, no surplus is distributed to shareholders. 46
Individuals purchase memberships in a club to support financially their
favorite team and to receive benefits such as the right to buy season tickets,
access to a special social area at the playing facility, and the opportunity to
meet the players after the game.47
A unique aspect of traditional Australian professional sports leagues
relative to American leagues is the relationship between a "sports club," which
enters a team in the sporting competition, and a "leagues club," which is an
incorporated social club.48 A leagues club offers its members amenities such
as bar, restaurant, entertainment offerings, and, in some Australian States,
poker machines (i.e., slot machines).49 The sports club and the leagues club
1998 14-15 [hereinafter AFL ANNUAL REPORT] (highlighting the eight AFL commissioners who
govern the AFL's sixteen team competition) (on file with author).
44. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *28-*30 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (detailing
provisions of a NSW Rugby League club's articles of incorporation).
45. Steve Mascord, Tigers and Magpies Vote to Pack Down Together, SMH.COM.AU (July 28,
1999) (reporting that the members of the Balmain Tigers and Western Suburbs clubs voted to form a
joint venture that would enter a team in the NRL), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/sports/league/news/199907/28/28league1 
.html.
46. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *29 (AustLlI.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (noting that the
income or property of a NSW Rugby League club "must be applied solely towards the objects of the
company and no portion thereof is to be paid by way of dividend, bonus or profit to members").
47. Interview with Roy Masters, Chief Editor for Rugby League, The Sydney Morning Herald in
Sydney, Australia (June 15, 1999) [hereinafter Masters Interview].
48. Though not a part of every Australian established professional sports league, this "leagues
club"-"sports club" relationship is prevalent in the NRL and AFL, the two most popular
professional sports leagues in that country. In the Australian vernacular, one would speak of a "footy
club" (i.e., a team in the league) and its "leagues club." A detailed examination of the relationship
between each sports club and leagues club in Australia is beyond the scope of this paper.
49. Since they are legal in New South Wales and Queensland, pokies, as they are commonly
called in Australia, are found in the leagues clubs of the NRL, the most popular league in these two
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are separate legal entities with each having a distinct board of directors. 50 A
leagues club typically subsidizes its sports clubs operations such as providing
funds for signing players or renovating playing facilities. 51
Another distinction between American and Australian professional sports
leagues is the geographic scope of a league's operations. The most popular
American leagues operate in all geographic areas of the country and have a
national following of fans. In Australia, the two most successful professional
sports leagues, the National Rugby League (NRL) and Australian Football
League (AFL), have limited geographic popularity.5 2 The NRL-the rugby
league competition-is followed principally in New South Wales, the
Australian Capital Territory, and Queensland; while the AFL-the Australian
rules football competition-is popular in Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania,
and Western Australia. These leagues have limited appeal because the sports
of rugby league and Australian rules football developed in Sydney and
Melbourne, respectively, and the NRL and AFL have grown out of local club
competitions played in those two cities. For an Australian league to have
teams from more than one state, or for that matter one city, was unheard of
twenty years ago.53 Both the NRL and AFL are actively trying to expand
nationally.54
III. COOPERATION AMONG INDEPENDENT CLUBS IS THE CORNERSTONE OF
TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
AUSTRALIA
Traditional professional sports leagues in the United States and Australia
are built upon cooperation among individual clubs.55 Clubs must agree on a
states.
50. Masters Interview, supra note 47.
51. KEN ARTHURSON, ARKO: MY GAME 44 (1997) (noting that "Leagues clubs.., have
underwritten football for years"); News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *36-*39 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl.
Case Law) (noting the grants six leagues clubs made to their respective NSWRL clubs in 1991-94).
52. Warren Lee & Brendan Moylan, Hosepipes and Footballs: How Sports Coverage went down
the Gurgler, 2 MEDIA AND ARTS REVIEW 93, 99 (1997) ("The ratings analysis performed by the
ABA showed that viewing figures were strongly affected by regional interest in the sport being
broadcast. Based on its analysis the ABA concluded that 'it is difficult to talk about sports that are of
national significance or cultural significance to a majority of Australians." (quoting AUSTRALIAN
BROADCASTING AUTHORITY, REPORT TO THE MINISTER FOR COMMUNICATION & THE ARTS: PAY
TELEVISION SIPHONING INVESTIGATION, Attachment C, at 2 (May 13, 1994)).
53. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *18 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) ("In 1982, Canberra
and Illawarra became the first non-Sydney clubs to join the competition.").
54. AFL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 18 ("Progressing the AFL game as a national code
or sport is one of the AFL Commission's key strategic objectives .... ").
55. Daniel S. Mason & Trevor Slack, Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Practice?
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vast range of issues, from the seemingly simple, such as scheduling games, to
the very complex, such as revenue sharing. According to many commentators,
this feature of a traditional professional sports league distinguishes its
structure from all other forms of business organization. 56
The need for collective action among clubs is not as great in a traditional
Australian league as it is in a traditional American league. The independent
clubs in an Australian league have delegated substantial decision-making
authority to the league's "central competition organizer." In the United States,
each club has retained its right to vote on significant league issues through its
representative on the league's executive committee. Though clubs in
American leagues have delegated some responsibilities to the "league office,"
the power of a "league office" of an American league is not as great as the
power of the central competition organizer of an Australian league. For
example, in Australia, a central competition organizer usually has the power to
decide unilaterally based on objective criteria whether to increase or reduce
the number of clubs in the league. 57 In the United States, to admit another
team into a league generally requires the affirmative vote of a super-majority
of the club owners. 58
Having a central competition organizer, however, does not eliminate the
requirement of collective action among the independent clubs and between the
clubs and the competition organizer in a traditional Australian league. Clubs
must agree to abide by the competition organizer's decisions. Though
adherence to the final authority of the Board or Commission is a condition
upon entering the league, 59 it is not uncommon for a club to challenge, either
informally or legally, a decision of the competition organizer that negatively
Stakeholder Theory. Ethics, and the Franchise Relocation Issue, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 399, 413
(1997) ("Without the cooperation of the other league members, teams could not produce the league
product, and do not have any function outside of their arrangement with the league.").
56. Roberts, supra note 30, at 238-60 (demonstrating that traditional sports leagues are different
from any other type of business organization); BERRY & WONG, supra note 17, at 3 (noting that it is
difficult to pigeonhole a professional sports league into a particular business organization form).
57. Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby Football League Ltd., (1985) 180 C.L.R. 459, 1985 WL
514185, at *7-*8 (Mason, A.C.J., Wilson, Deane, & Dawson, JJ.) (Austl. Oct. 17, 1985) (concluding
that the NSWRL's articles of incorporation gave the league's Board of Directors the authority to
eliminate the Western Suburbs club from the league if it honestly believed that decision was in the
best interests of the game).
58. Christian M. McBurney, Note, The Legality of Sports Leagues' Restrictive Admissions
Practices, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 925, 926 (1985) (noting that American professional sports leagues
typically require three-fourths of the club owners to vote in favor of admitting a new team to the
league).
59. Neivs Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *28 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (noting that the form
for application into the NSWRL required the applying club to agree to "abide by... decisions of the
Board of Directors of the League").
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affects it.60  The ultimate recourse the clubs have against the central
competition organizer is exercise of their political power through the election
of the directors or commissioners who operate the league.
The AFL's recent expansion efforts evidence the necessity for clubs in an
Australian league to cooperate with one another for the league to be
successful. The AFL is trying to establish a second team in New South Wales
by moving a club, the North Melbourne Kangaroos, from Melbourne, home of
ten clubs, to Sydney. To accomplish this objective, the AFL Commission
underwrites the Kangaroos' games in Sydney while the club attempts to make
the transition. 61 Though the other clubs are suspicious of any favorable
treatment a particular club may receive from the Commission, all sixteen clubs
in the league understand that they must cooperate with one another for the
development of the game nationally, which promises to increase the revenues
of all the clubs. Thus, the clubs have asked the Commission to determine how
many teams the Melbourne market can sustain and, if necessary, to formulate
plans in conjunction with the clubs to relocate teams to other Australian
States. 62
IV. PRODUCTS OF A TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUE
The "products," or commodities, of a professional sports league are: (1)
live sporting contests between two teams in the league;63 (2) rights to transmit
images or descriptions of the league's sporting contests (e.g., television and
radio broadcasting rights);64 and (3) merchandising and sponsorship rights.65
60. Jake Niall, AFL Fails to Convince Clubs on Lions'Share, THEAGE.COM.AU (Nov. 12, 1999)
(discussing AFL Commission's attempt to pacify clubs protesting the Commission's decision to grant
the Brisbane Lions a $400,000.00 salary cap bonus), available at
http:1203.89.231.1061ageO23.asp?medialD=10847.html; See generally Wayde, 1985 WL 514185
(deciding Western Suburbs' legal challenge to the NSWRL's Board of Directors' decision to kick the
club out of the league).
61. The Kangaroos played five of its twenty-two games in Sydney in 1999, and plan to play five
games there in 2000 and six games there from 2001-03. The AFL has agreed to underwrite these
games to a maximum of $500,000.00 in 1999 and 2000 and $600,000.00 for the 2001-03 period.
AFL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 19.
62. Power Svitch Within League, THEAGE.COM.AU (noting that all 16 clubs in the league "have
spoken with one voice" to the AFL Commission about the long term prospects of maintaining 10
clubs in Victoria), available at http://203.89.231.106/age.023.asp?mediaID=5417.htrnl (last visited
June 21, 1999).
63. Neale, supra note 8, at 3.
64. Id. This category includes all platforms from which a mega-media company may transmit
images or descriptions of a league's games such as free-to-air television, cable television, satellite
television, pay-per-view television, radio, or the Internet.
65. Simon Davidson, The Single Economic Entity Theory and Sports Leagues in Australia, 2
COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 171, 197 n.117 (1994) (noting AFL revenues from the sale of
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A professional sports league also produces the pennant race or "league
standing effect," a stream of utility to consumers who enjoy following their
favorite teams' efforts to win the league championship. 66
Of these products, the sale of media transmission rights is the greatest
revenue-producer for a league. 67  For this reason, "[t]elevision [is] the
salvation of modem professional sports." 68 In its transaction with a mega-
media company, however, a traditional league exchanges more than its
transmission rights. It also parts with some of its autonomy in operating the
league. That is, a mega-media company will want some control over a
league's affairs in order to protect its investment in the league's transmission
rights. The amount of control a league relinquishes to a mega-media company
depends on the relative bargaining strength of the parties during negotiations
for the sale of the league's transmission rights.69
A mega-media company's influence over a league can manifest itself in a
variety of ways. A mega-media company may dictate the starting times for a
league's matches. Or, a league may change its playing rules to make its
sponsorship and merchandising rights). See also Stephen Corones, Super League: A Victory for
Competition and Free Markets, 25 AusTL. Bus. L. REv. 150, 154 (1997) (noting that the products of
an Australian professional sports league were the matches sold to spectators, transmission rights sold
to free-to-air and pay TV operators, and sponsorship rights sold to corporations); Mason & Slack,
supra note 55, at 413. Mason and Slack contend that:
The product itself is a series of sporting contests that each league produces and sells to distinct groups: 1)
fans who pay to attend games, and consume facility-related products such as concessions and parking; 2)
television and cable networks who bid for the right to televise league games; 3) corporations who seek
increased revenues through either the synergy of owning sports teams as part of a larger entertainment
empire, or through affiliating their own products with that of teams or a league; 4) purchasers of
league-licensed apparel; and 5) cities, represented by sports authorities, who bid for the right to host
league games in their communities and venues. Thus, although producing a single league product-a
series of games with an uncertain outcome-leagues sell this product in a variety of ways to a variety of
different consumers.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
66. Neale, supra note 8, at 3 (discussing the league standing effect). Only a league, not an
individual club, can produce the league standing effect. HENRY G. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF
PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 1, 14 (1973) (noting that the pennant race "is primarily external to the
production process of any individual club...").
67. Kevin E. Martens, Fair or Foul? The Survival of Small-Market Teams in Major League
Baseball, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 323, 355 (1994) ("Broadcasting revenues currently account for
approximately 50% of the total revenues in Major League Baseball.").
68. BERRY & WONG, supra note 17, at 61.
69. Peter Brewington, MLS Abandons Shootout, Shortens Season, USATODAY.COM (noting that
Major League Soccer (MLS), the top American professional soccer league, was able to negotiate its
preferred time for the transmission of its games with the Walt Disney Co. in its most recent television
contract), available at www.usatoday.com/sports/soccer/mls/fs/mlsfs30.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
1999).
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contests more attractive to television viewers. 70  Conflicts between a
traditional league and the mega-media company that purchases the league's
transmission rights over control of the league are not uncommon. For
example, in 1999 MLB and The Walt Disney Co. ("Disney") were embroiled
in a heated controversy over Disney's shifting of telecasts of MLB games
from its primary sports programming cable channel, ESPN, to its secondary
sports cable channel, ESPN2. Disney made this decision because it wanted to
air NFL rather than MLB games since telecasts of NFL contests attract more
viewers than MLB contests.71 On the eve of the commencement of litigation
between the parties, MLB and Disney entered into a new agreement where
MLB consented to Disney's shifting of games to ESPN2 in exchange for
increased coverage of MLB games on Disney's media outlets, including ESPN
and ESPN2.72
Though its most lucrative commodity is its transmission rights, the
underlying determinant of a traditional league's success is the magnitude of its
league standing effect. The interest consumers have in a league is directly
proportional to the uncertainty in the outcome of the on-the-field competition
among the individual clubs.73 Since the sale of any of its products (e.g.,
spectator tickets, licensed merchandise, or transmission rights) is dependent on
consumer interest, a traditional league can thrive only if there is competitive
balance among the clubs in the league. 74
70. ARTHURSON, supra note 51, at 29 (commenting that the elimination of traditional serums in
rugby league was done in order to make the game faster, open, and more entertaining for fans); id. at
168 (noting the need for the ARL to eliminate rough play in the league since in a "time of vast colour
TV coverage, rugby league could no longer carry a 'thug' tag if it was to thrive"); JIM MCKAY ET AL.,
Americanisation, Globalisation and Rugby League, in LEAGUE OF A NATION, supra note 39, at 215,
221 (noting that the commercialization of rugby league has caused the sport to shed its working class
image in order to appeal to middle class spectators and television viewers); Greg Boeck, Rules
Changes Aimed at Improving Play, USATODAY.COM (Nov. 1, 1999) (discussing the NBA's rule
changes for the 1999-2000 season designed to make its games more enjoyable to watch), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketba/99pre/full07.htm.
71. Rudy Martzke, Venturi Valued on CBS Golf Team, USATODAY.COM (Apr. 9, 1999) (noting
that "[i]n 1997, TNT's Sunday [night] NFL game ratings topped ESPN's baseball 9.1 to 1.7"),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/commentlcomart.htm.
72. ESPN Boosts Annual MLB Coverage, ESPN.COM (reporting on the new agreement between
MLB and Disney), available at http:llespn.go.comlmlb/news/1999/1206/216862.html (last visited
Dec. 7, 1999).
73. Neale, supra note 8, at 2-3; Weistart, supra note 17, at 1018 n.17 ("A point that has never
been substantially disputed, even by critics of league practices, is that the success of a league requires
that clubs field teams that are relatively evenly matched in terms of their playing ability.").
74. DEMMERT, supra note 66, at 31 ("The existence of a severe and prolonged imbalance among
teams could conceivably threaten the stability of the league by destroying an essential aspect of the
product (uncertainty of outcome), and by creating sporting and financial losers among member
clubs.'); John P. Morris, In the Wake of the Flood, 38 LANV & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 88 (1973) ("The
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Though differences exist between them, professional sports leagues in the
United States and Australia share a basic organizational structure and generate
similar products. Traditional leagues in each country depend on cooperation
among the individual clubs to maintain the value of their transmission rights.
When this cooperation is absent, the league is likely to face problems that
reduce competitive parity among the teams and lower the value of its products.
The next chapter examines a number of the problems currently affecting
American and Australian leagues owing to their structural organization.
CHAPTER Two
PROBLEMS AFFECTING TRADITIONAL AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN LEAGUES
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THEIR STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION
Problems in American and Australian traditional leagues arise when
league members cannot agree on a particular course of league action.75 A
typical situation is one where a minority of clubs in the league (often a single
club) wants to take an action that is in its-but not the league's-best
economic interests. 76 An examination of some of the most pressing problems
success of a franchise and, in the long run, the success of a league depend upon continued fan
support, which will be forthcoming only if the basic concept of equalization of playing strengths is
preserved."). But see generally TERRY M. ALCHIN & HENRY W. TRANBY, DOES THE Louis-
SCHMELLING PARADOX EXIST IN RUGBY LEAGUE MATCH ATTENDANCES IN AUSTRALIA 14
(Working Paper in Economics No. WP95/09, 1995) (concluding that price, income, and market size,
but not uncertainty of outcome, significantly affected attendances at rugby league matches in
Australia) (on file with author). Researchers have yet to determine the optimal level of competitive
balance for a professional sports league. Dennis Zimmerman & William A. Cox, The Baseball Strike
and Federal Policy: An Economic Analysis, H.R. DOC. NO. 95-152 E, at 2 n.4 (1995). Zimmerman
and Cox find that:
The optimal level of competitive balance (presumably the level that maximizes factor incomes) is not
known. It is certainly not represented by equal team winning percentages. In fact, some evidence
suggests that large-market teams should have higher winning percentages over time than small market
teams, but not so high to remove uncertainty and drama from the pennant races.
Id.
75. Goldman, supra note 29, at 776 (noting that co-ventures can have "mixed motives, and their
decisions can have dual effects").
76. Id. at 780 ("As a result of their separate ownership and profits and losses, individual league
members' economic interests sometimes conflict with the league's interest."); COZZILLIO &
LEVINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 30 ("[O]wners of the teams in a traditional model league simply do not
have anything approaching the complete unity of interest prompting them to act together with only
the best interests of the league at heart."). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLuM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 9 ("To the extent joint ventures are
composed of individual profit-maximizing entities, the incentives of members may deviate
substantially from the best interests of the venture as a whole, with 'best interests' defined as the
outcome that maximizes venture-wide profits.").
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in American and Australian leagues shows the causal relationship between the
lack of cooperation and conflict in a traditional league.
I. PROBLEMS RELATED TO ACHIEVING COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN A
TRADITIONAL LEAGUE
To achieve competitive balance, playing talent must be distributed
relatively evenly throughout the league.77 Since disparity between "rich
clubs" and "poor clubs" with respect to talent level is the primary cause of
competitive imbalance, parity in a league can be achieved only by reducing the
inequality of financial resources among clubs.78 A system of revenue sharing
among the individual clubs and a cap on players' salaries are the most recent
means American and Australian leagues have used to try to achieve
competitive balance. 79
A. Lack of Competitive Balance in Major League Baseball
The first step in creating a revenue sharing arrangement in a traditional
professional sports league is for the individual clubs to agree that such an
arrangement is necessary for the success of the league as a whole and for each
club. As the current situation in MLB demonstrates, clearing that hurdle is not
always easy.80
Individual clubs have not taken affirmative steps to achieve a proper level
of competitive balance in MLB. Though they share equally the revenues from
the sale of league-wide transmission and sponsorship rights and licensed
merchandise, individual clubs in MLB do not share any "club-generated"
revenues. In particular, an individual club retains almost all of the revenues
77. Morris, supra note 74, at 87 ("Equalization of the competitive playing strengths of the teams
comprising a professional sports league is achieved by controlling the distribution of player talent
within the league.").
78. Zimmerman & Cox, supra note 74, at Summ. ("Should a market failure exist in baseball ....
it is due to inequality of financial resources among teams. Any policy that reduces that inequality will
improve competitive balance and reduce the market failure.").
79. Noll, supra note 28, at 417 (commenting that revenue sharing and a salary cap provide
balanced competition, greater financial security for weaker teams, and more equitable player salaries).
80. The remarks of George Steinbrenner, leader of the New York Yankees, a "rich" MLB club,
aptly reflect the difficulty in persuading "rich" clubs to share with "poor" clubs: "There's disparity in
the world and in this country. There's disparity between General Motors and some little company.
You can't say, 'Well, let's all share everything equal,' or else we should be over in Russia. And it
didn't work over there." Hal Bodley & Erik Brady, Baseball's New Caste System, USA TODAY, Apr.
2, 1999, at 1C. See also Sean McAdam, Lookingfor Ansvers, ESPN.coM (Feb. 6, 1999) (noting the
disagreement between "poor" and "rich" club owners over whether a competitive imbalance problem
exists in MLB), available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/state/solutions.html.
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from both its sale of the rights to televise its regular season games in its local
area and from its playing facilities. 81 Consequently, the revenues of clubs that
are in large media markets or that play in state-of-the-art playing facilities 82
are substantially greater than the revenues of clubs playing in smaller media
markets or facilities lacking revenue-enhancing attractions. 83 Since MLB does
not have any restrictions on the amount a team can spend on player salaries,
the "rich" teams outbid the "poor" teams for the best playing talent. 84 The
sharp increase in player salaries over the past several years has exacerbated the
on-field effects of the revenue disparity between individual clubs in MLB. 85
Though a club's spending large sums to acquire players does not
guarantee it a winning season, recent MLB seasons have demonstrated that not
having a large player payroll is a guarantee of not winning. 86 Prior to the start
of each season, the clubs with little or no chance of winning the World
Series-the championship in MLB-are easily identified by their payroll
figures.8 7 Similarly, the club winning the World Series in each of the past
seven seasons has been in the top five with respect to player payments for that
particular season. 88
81. Jeffery A. Rosenthal, The Football Answer to the Baseball Problem: Can Revenue Sharing
Work?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 419, 424 & n.15 (1995) (noting that MLB clubs share gate
receipts approximately 85%-15% between the home and visiting teams and that a small percentage of
the revenues from the sale of local cable transmission and superstation rights is shared among the
clubs).
82. MARTIN J. GREENBERG & JAMES T. GRAY, THE STADIUM GAME 18-20 (1996) (describing
the features of a state-of-the-art playing facility, all of the attributes of which should .'"either directly
or indirectly return revenue to the owner' (quoting Ron Turner, noted sports architect)).
83. Bodley & Brady, supra note 80 (noting that MLB clubs that receive large media revenues or
have "cash-machine ballparks" earn significantly more revenue than other MLB clubs), available at
http:llespn.go.com/mlb/state/solutions.html; Edward Mathias, Squeeze Play: Will Baseball's
Economic Problems Cause More Legal Headaches for the National Pastime?, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 249,
255 n.33 (1998) (noting that the New York Yankees and Milwaukee Brewers, the MLB clubs with the
greatest and least local media revenues in 1996, received $59 million (U.S.) and $4.3 million (U.S.),
respectively, from this source).
84. Mathias, supra note 83, at 255 ("Teams in the biggest markets have been able to secure more
lucrative local television contracts, allowing them to outspend so-called 'small-market teams' for
talent.").
85. Sean McAdam, The Rich Get Richer and ..., ESPN.cOM (Feb. 4, 1999) (noting that the
removal of player mobility restraints in 1976 and the corresponding increase in players' salaries have
heightened the effect of revenue disparity between MLB clubs on competitive balance in the league),
available at http:l/espn.go.com/mlb/state/daythree.html.
86. Id.
87. Bodley & Brady, supra note 80 (noting that "for most teams" the 1999 MLB season was over
before it began), available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/state/solutions.html.
88. Bob Klapisch, Root for the Underdog? Only if There Was One, ESPN.cOM (Feb. 3, 1999)
(showing the payroll rankings for the World Series teams from 1990-1998), available at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/features/01082162.html; 1999 Team Payrolls, USATODAY.COM (showing
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Due to its competitive imbalance problem, MIB has lost the interest of
many fans, which has had a negative financial impact on individual clubs as
well as the league as a whole.89 A comparison of MLB's television contracts
with those of the other American established leagues shows that the lack of
competitive balance in MLB has had a deleterious effect on the league. Under
their television contracts, the NBA, NFL, and NI-L, which have greater
revenue sharing among their individual clubs than MLB does, receive a fixed
sum in exchange for their television rights.90 Though it used to receive a
guaranteed sum from its television rights purchasers, MLB's current television
contracts do not promise the league a fixed sum.91 Rather, MLB receives a
fixed percentage of the advertising revenues the media companies receive
during MLB telecasts. 92 Hence, MLB's return from its sale of television
rights is more closely indexed to consumer interest in the league than the
returns other leagues receive from the sale of their television products.
Because its popularity has dwindled in recent years, MLB has lost bargaining
power with mega-media companies and has had to shoulder more of the risk of
attracting television viewers than the other American established leagues have
had to bear.93 Given the effect the lack of competitive balance has had on the
league, it is not surprising that the commissioner of MLB-the head of its
"league office"--has identified the disparity between "rich" and "poor" clubs
as the most troubling problem currently facing the league.94
MLB has tried to address its competitive imbalance problem. In 1994, the
owners proposed adopting a revenue sharing agreement on the condition that
the players accept a salary cap. The owners and players could not agree on
this issue with the result being a labor dispute that caused the cancellation of
that the New York Yankees, victors in the 1999 World Series, had the largest payroll for the 1999
season, $91,990,955 (U.S.)), available at http://www.usatoday/sports/baseball/salary/99team.htm (last
visitedNov. 10, 1999).
89. Rob Neyer, Wait 'Til Next Year, ESPN.CoM (Feb. 5, 1999) (noting that the declining
attendances at MLB games in Kansas City, Montreal, Pittsburgh, and Minneapolis, all "poor" clubs,
reflect the loss of interest in MLB by the fans in those cities), available at
http:llespn.go.comlmlb/state/neyer.html.
90. In re Implementation of Section 26 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 9 F.C.C.R. 3440 33 n.47 (1994) [hereinafter Anti-siphoning Final Report]
(noting that the NBA's and NFL's television contracts guarantee the leagues fixed amounts).
91. Id. 33 & n.40 (noting that MLB's television contracts no longer guarantee it a fixed sum).
92. Id. 28 (describing MLB's television contracts).
93. Id. 33 (noting that MLB's television contracts illustrate "that MLB has been forced to
accept more risk than other professional sports leagues").
94. David Schoenfield, Success, but at What Price?, ESPN.COM (Feb. 2, 1999) (noting that the
MLB Commissioner has established a 'Blue Ribbon Task Force" to study the league's competitive
imbalance problem), available at http:llespn.go.com/mlb/features/01079734.html.
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the remainder of the 1994 season and delayed the start of the 1995 season.95
This disagreement among the owners and players upset many MLB fans.96 As
a result, attendance at MLB games in 1995 decreased by twenty percent and
league revenues dropped by more than $900 million in 1994-95. 97 Ultimately,
the owners and players agreed to a "luxury tax" arrangement. Under this
agreement, the top six teams in revenue each year contribute funds to a
common pool that the league office then distributes to the six teams that have
the lowest revenue.98 According to most observers of MLB, the luxury tax
has done little, if anything, to decrease the disparity in revenues and team
quality between the "rich" and "poor" clubs.99
The reason an individual club is unwilling to enter into a revenue sharing
agreement in a traditional league is because the costs of competitive imbalance
are largely external to the club distorting league parity. 100  As one
commentator has explained:
The situation is analogous to the traditional production externality
problem. The improvement of a better than average team results in
diseconomies which are external to the club in question but internal to
the league. Likewise, the improvement of a poor team results in
benefits to the league as a whole over and above those that accrue to
that individual club. It cannot be expected that the club will consider
these external effects of its decisions in determining the level of its
team quality.'10
Though MLB's competitive imbalance problem is worsening, 10 2 whether
the league can devise an effective solution is not certain. Because of the
ineffectiveness of the luxury tax, MLB owners decided in January 2000 to
delegate to the commissioner of the league the task of increasing parity among
95. Mathias, supra note 83, at 258-59.
96. Id. at 258 (noting that many fans were upset about the industrial dispute in MLB in 1994).
97. Id. at 258-59 (reporting the effects from the industrial dispute in MLB in 1994).
98. Bodley & Brady, supra note 80 (describing the "luxury tax" system in MLB), available at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/state/solutions.html.
99. Id. ("'The luxury tax has had no effect at all, far as I can tell."' (quoting Bill Giles, owner of
the Philadelphia Phillies)).
100. DEMMERT, supra note 66, at 14 (noting that the pennant race "is primarily external to the
production process of any individual club..
101. Id.at29.
102. McAdam, supra note 85 (stating that the commissioner of MLB, in his own words, realizes
that the league's disparity problem is "'getting worse"'), available at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/state/daythree.html; Associated Press, McClatchy Declares Progress for Plan,
ESPN.COM (Nov. 30, 1999) [hereinafter McClatchy] (noting that in 1999 the eight teams in the
playoffs were "among franchises with the 12 highest payrolls, while teams with the lowest payrolls
finished with losing records"), available at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/1999/1129/203456.html.
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the teams. 103 The owners unanimously requested the commissioner, pursuant
to his authority to act in the "best interests of the game," to "'take such action
as he deems appropriate to ensure an appropriate level of long-term
competitive balance."' 104  The commissioner's power to act in the best
interests of the game now trumps all league rules, including the one that
requires three-fourths of the owners to agree to any revenue sharing.
10 5
Actions the commissioner can take to further competitive balance in the league
include blocking player trades and redistributing league revenues in favor of
poor clubs.106 In addition to increasing the commissioner's power, the owners
agreed to transfer to the commissioner's office all of their Internet
transmission rights.'0 7 The commissioner has complete discretion to distribute
revenues from the sale of Internet transmission rights to promote competitive
balance in the league. 10 8
The owners' unanimous agreement to these provisions shows a greater
degree of cooperation than has been present in past years. 10 9 By delegating
resolution of this issue to the commissioner the owners have effectively
conceded, however, their inability to reach an agreement among themselves as
to the precise means to implement revenue sharing.110 In effect, the owners
have agreed that they cannot work together to solve the greatest problem
facing the league.
Whether empowering the commissioner with the authority to override the
owners' individual interests for the best interests of the game will improve
parity in MLB is questionable. The commissioner's new powers are temporal
and voidable upon agreement of the owners. "Until January 1994, the
commissioner could use his 'best interests' authority for virtually anything"
including estopping an owner from taking action that harmed competitive
balance. 111 At that time, however, the owners "gutted" 112 the commissioner's
103. Associated Press, Selig Can Block Trades, Redistribute Wealth, ESPN.CoM (Jan. 25, 2000)
[hereinafter Selig], at http:llespn.go.comlmlblnews/2000/0119/300929.html.
104. Id. (quoting owners' resolution to increase commissioner's authority to act in the best
interests of the game).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (noting that the owners' agreement to these propositions would have been
"'inconceivable 10 or 12 years ago' (quoting Bud Selig, MLB commissioner)).
110. Id. (noting that the owners' action showed that they were "unable to save themselves").
111. Id. (noting that commissioner Bowie Kuhn precluded Charlie Finley, owner of the Oakland
club, from selling top players to other clubs for cash); Charles 0. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569
F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that Kuhn's best interests authority as MLB commissioner gave
him the power to block Finley's transactions as a means to promote competitive balance in the
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power because they were concerned that some previous commissioners were
not sufficiently solicitous of their interests. 113 Prior to the owners' decision in
January 2000, the commissioner could not use his best interests authority "on
any matter subject to a vote by [the] owners." 114 Since the commissioner's
authority, not to mention his continued employment, depends on maintaining
the support of a majority of the owners, he may be unwilling to take drastic
steps to improve competitive balance. To succeed, the commissioner must act
in favor of the poor clubs, while simultaneously sustaining a consensus among
rich clubs who may very well be harmed by his actions. Balancing the
interests of the various owners is likely to be particularly difficult if the
commissioner decides to grant poor clubs a disproportionate percentage of the
league's revenues.
In addition to ultimate oversight by the owners, the commissioner's
actions are likely to attract scrutiny from the players. The players can
challenge any decision of the commissioner with respect to revenue
distribution that touches upon their collective bargaining agreement with the
owners. 115 The players are not likely to agree to any activity that reduces
competition between the clubs for players' services or that depresses players'
salaries.
The significance of the owners' agreement to transfer their Internet
transmission rights to the commissioner is also unknown. Currently, revenues
from the sale of Internet rights are miniscule compared to the revenues from
the sale of television rights. The future value of Internet rights cannot be
measured with any accuracy. If the league ever receives substantial revenues
from the sale of Internet rights, then a distribution of this income in favor of
the poor clubs may rectify the competitive imbalance problem in MLB. The
expectation of large future revenue streams from Internet transmissions does
not, however, ameliorate the negative effects of financial disparity currently
present among clubs in MLB.
The plight of MLB illustrates that the structure of a traditional
professional sports league is not conducive to the creation of a system
designed to promote competitive balance. Recent experiences in other
established American leagues show that even where a traditional league has
league), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
112. Selig, supra note 103, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2000/0119/300929.html.
113. Hal Bodley, Selig About to Get Bigger Bat, USATODAY.COM (Jan. 18, 2000) (noting that
MLB owners had "'concern about some previous commissioners' (quoting Drayton McLane Jr.,
owner of the Houston Astros)), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/mlbfs45.htm.
114. Selig, supra note 103, at http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2000/0119/300929.html.
115. Id.
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implemented a system to promote parity the need for cooperation among
league participants may retard the effectiveness of its efforts. Moreover,
attempts by individual clubs to circumvent the league's competitive balance
system often spawn new, and often unforeseen, problems.
B. Franchise Free Agency in the NFL
Unlike MLB, the NFL has implemented a comprehensive system to
achieve competitive balance. The individual clubs share equally all revenues
from the sale of television rights and league merchandise. 116 The club hosting
a regular season game splits its gate receipts 60%/40% with the visiting
club.117 "As a result, upwards of ninety percent of all NFL revenue is shared
equally among all its . . teams."1 18 In addition, the league has a salary cap to
which the players' association has given its approval. 119 The salary cap "set[s]
each team's total payroll at a fixed percentage of its equal share of the
League's revenues .... "120 The salary cap promotes competitive balance by
giving each club the same resources to fund player payments and stabilizes
player costs by indexing players' salaries to the league's principal revenue
streams. 121 Because of its revenue sharing and salary cap arrangement, the
NFL, unlike MLB, does not suffer from extreme disparity in playing ability
among the individual clubs. 122
The NFL's system for achieving competitive balance, however, is not
perfect. In fact, a new problem-franchise free agency, where individual
clubs relocate, or threaten to relocate, from one city to another in search of
"sweetheart" stadium deals 12 3-is a direct result of the league's revenue
116. Sanjay Jose Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: Franchise Free Agency and the New Economics
of the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 12 (1996) (detailing the NFL's revenue sharing arrangement).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 13 (discussing the NFL's salary cap).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 13-14.
122. Id. at 12 (noting that the NFL's revenue sharing arrangement has "eliminated the extreme
competitive inequities that exist in sports without such extensive revenue sharing"); Greg Garber, On
Any Given Sunday... Who Knows?, ESPN.COM (Aug. 31, 1999) (noting that 33.6% of the games
halfway through the NFL's 1999 season had been decided by three points or less), at
http://espn.go.com/nfl/midseason/garber.html.
123. Katherine C. Leone, Note, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National
Football League, 97 COLuM. L. REV. 473, 474 n.8 (1997) ("The term 'franchise free agency'
describes the recent tendency of owners to move their teams to cities offering the best financial
package."). A "sweetheart deal" typically allows the relocating club to receive all stadium related
revenues and use of the stadium rent free. Id. at 486-87 (describing the agreements between the city
of Baltimore and Art Modell, owner of the former Cleveland Browns/Baltimore Ravens, and the city
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sharing and salary cap arrangement. 124 Individual NFL club owners seek
favorable agreements from stadium owners because non-ticket revenues from
a club's stadium (e.g., sale of luxury suites, concessions, parking) are excluded
from the league's revenue sharing arrangement. 125 Club owners want to
maximize their stadium revenue not only to increase the return on their
investments in purchasing NFL clubs, but also to procure a steady supply of
cash with which to pay large signing bonuses to star players. 126 Paying a
player a large signing bonus is the principal means used to circumvent the
NFL's salary cap since under the collective bargaining agreement a signing
bonus is prorated over the life of the player's contract. 127 Through the use of a
signing bonus, a club can offer a player a more lucrative contract and have
more room under the salary cap to sign other players. 128
Though the NFL currently enjoys great consumer support from live
spectators and television viewers, 129 franchise free agency threatens the
continued economic viability of the league. One commentator notes the harm
from franchise free agency:
A sports league has a strong interest in franchise stability and is
collectively harmed by its member teams' exercise of opportunistic
behavior and franchise free agency. This conduct breaks down the
symbiotic relationship between teams and their host communities.
Eventually, city taxpayers may be unwilling to provide publicly
owned and subsidized playing facilities for teams that can casually
relocate despite a history of fan support that has enabled the franchise
to be profitable. Without taxpayer subsidies, leagues may be unable to
field competitive teams in optimal geographical locations.
Opportunistic relocation also hurts a league's good will and fan
loyalty, especially if it disrupts geographical balance and causes the
elimination of traditional rivalries among teams. Game attendance
may decline and reduce the league's overall gate revenues and
of Nashville and Bud Adams, owner of the former Houston Oilers/Tennessee Titans).
124. Id. at 477 (noting that franchise free agency ".may be the biggest problem the league has
ever faced' (quoting the late Pete Rozelle, former commissioner of the NFL)).
125. Mullick, supra note 116, at 15-16 (discussing the non-ticket stadium revenue excluded from
the NFL's revenue sharing arrangement).
126. Id. at 14-19 (discussing the reasons why NFL owners desire the cash flow from playing
facilities).
127. Id. at 14 (discussing the treatment of signing bonuses under the NFL's salary cap).
128. Id. at 15 (noting that clubs able to pay large signing bonuses have a better chance to acquire
the best playing talent in the NFL).
129. Garber, supra note 122 (noting that game attendance and television ratings are higher for the
NFL in 1999 than they were in 1998), at http://espn.go.com/nfl/midseason/garber.html.
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prestige, particularly if a team has committed to relocate to another
city in the future. Franchise relocations may also adversely affect
league media exposure. Television networks will offer less money for
rights to an unstable product, particularly if franchises transfer out of
major market areas, cumulatively reducing the nationwide viewing
audience. 130
Franchise free agency may also cause a professional sports league in the
United States to lose substantial expansion fees, which are shared equally
among all the clubs, if a club presently in the league moves to a city that could
have supported an expansion team. 131 Though a league may charge a club
moving to a new city a "relocation fee," this amount is usually much less than
the "expansion fee" a new entrant is required to pay. For example, the
relocation fee when the Rams moved from Los Angeles to St. Louis in 1995
was $71 million (U.S.); 132 however, in 1999 the expansion fee for the newest
NFL franchise was $700 million (U.S.). 133
Traditional American leagues are not very effective in preventing
individual clubs from relocating. "Because of the importance of maintaining
stable franchises and preventing unwarranted team movements, leagues
require super-majority de jure approval before a franchise is permitted to
relocate; however, this is often a meaningless requirement de facto., 134
"[F]reely permitting franchise movement enables all member teams to use the
threat of future relocation to enhance their bargaining power in stadium
130. Mitten & Burton, supra note 9, at 103 (citations omitted). Though the NFL did not have a
club in Los Angeles, see Mason & Slack, supra note 55, at 416 (noting that before the 1995 season
the Los Angeles Rams moved to St. Louis and the Los Angeles Raiders moved back to Oakland), the
league was still able to negotiate substantial increases for its television rights in its most recent
television contracts. See also Rick Churchill, Sports Rights Scorecard: Who Pays What to Bring the
Big Games to the Little Screen, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 12, 1999, at 27 (noting that the
NFL's current television contract is the richest in the history of professional sports leagues). The
NFL's large television contracts can be attributed in part to its having a club in each of the top 25
television markets in the United States, except for Los Angeles, which is the second largest television
market. Mason & Slack, supra note 55, at 416 n.72 (noting that but for Los Angeles, the NFL "has
clubs in the twenty five largest centers in the US"); Houston Gets Expansion Franchise, ESPN.coM
(reporting the NFL's award of an expansion franchise to Houston, the eleventh largest television
market in the United States, instead of Los Angeles), at
http:/espn.go.com/nfllnews/1999/1005/98576.html (last visited Oct. 7, 1999).
131. Mason & Slack, supra note 55, at 416 (noting that a drawback to a league from
"unwarranted franchise movement" is that "the league will forego any expansion fees that would be
obtained by an expansion franchise in the new location").
132. Mullick, supra note 116, at 7 (noting the Rams' $71 million relocation fee).
133. Houston Gets Expansion Franchise, supra note 130 (reporting that the expansion fee for the
new Houston franchise was $700 million), at http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/1999/1005/98576.html.
134. Mitten & Burton, supra note 9, at 103.
2002]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
negotiations with their host cities." 135 Moreover, an individual club may be
hesitant to vote against another club's proposed relocation for fear that the
club denied relocation may object to the movement of other clubs in the
future. 136 Rather than a concern for the overall financial health of the league,
personal animosity towards the owner of the moving club and other political
factors are the basis for most majority attempts to block a club's relocation. 137
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n v.
NFL138 that the NFL and its members "violated the antitrust laws by voting
against the proposed move of the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles"'139 also
deters traditional leagues from challenging a club's relocation. 140
The NFL employs two tactics to prevent franchise relocations. First, the
NFL lobbies local governments to provide public financing to build a new
stadium for the club in its existing market.141 Despite overwhelming evidence
that the expenditure of public monies to construct a playing facility is an
unsound investment, 142 the NFL effectively uses the threat of a club's
relocating to convince state and local governments to contribute substantial
sums to fund stadium construction. 143 The NFL's lobbying efforts are now
particularly intense after the public backlash following the move of the
Cleveland Browns to Baltimore in 1995.144 Though it may temporarily stop
some clubs from relocating, arguably the NFL's lobbying efforts do not
represent a long-term solution to the franchise free agency problem since they
do not touch upon the causes of the dilemma. Even if a club obtains a new
stadium, the NFL cannot guarantee that the club will not later vacate the city
in response to a better offer.
Second, the NFL provides partial backing for the private financing a club
135. Id. at 103-04.
136. Id. at 104.
137. Id.
138. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
139. Mitten & Burton, supra note 9, at 104.
140. Leone, supra note 123, at 499 (noting that the NFL has read Los Angeles Coliseum Comm 'n
broadly and taken a passive stance toward franchise relocations).
141. Greg Garber, New Stadiums Are Works of Art, ESPN.COM, at
http://www.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/garber/O 1221688.html (last visited Apr. 23, 1999).
142. Joseph L. Bast, Sports Stadium Madness: Why It Started, How to Stop It, HEARTLAND
POLICY STUDY ("All available data suggest that continued public investment in sports stadiums is
madness."), available at http://www.heartland.org/sprtsstad.htm (last visited June 11, 1999).
143. Garber, supra note 141 (noting that the NFL has effectively used the threat of a club's
relocation to pressure local governments into providing funds for stadium construction), at
http://www.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/garber/0 1221688.html.
144. Id. (noting the NFL's remarkable success in the past three years in obtaining public
financing for stadium construction or renovation for its member clubs).
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acquires to help fund stadium construction. 145 The NFL supplies collateral for
up to 50% of private financing for clubs in the top six television markets and
34% of private financing for all other clubs.146 By providing more collateral
to clubs in the top six television markets, the NFL appears more concerned
with preventing clubs from moving out of the top media centers than with
precluding relocations in general. 147 Some NFL owners object to the league's
policy on the grounds that it unreasonably favors large market clubs. 148 The
effectiveness of this part of the NFL's policy in deterring franchise relocations
is questionable. 149 The policy merely aids a club in obtaining private funds at
a lower interest rate for the construction of a new stadium, irrespective of
where the new stadium is built. The policy does not speak to the underlying
causes of franchise free agency such as the league's unwillingness to require
increased revenue sharing of non-ticket stadium revenues and does not
proscribe or punish the movement of a club to another geographic location.
Since traditional leagues are not preventing franchise free agency, many
commentators believe that the United States Congress should address this
issue.150  According to these commentators, congressional action is
appropriate because a municipality, which has expended scarce public
resources to build a playing facility for a privately owned club in an
established league, suffers great harm when the club relocates prior to the
expiration of its lease.151 A city cannot recoup its losses from a club's
relocation by a breach of contract suit because an award of damages would not
include the non-rent direct economic benefits (e.g., a club's payment of taxes),
indirect economic benefits (e.g., jobs created from the club's presence in the
community), or intangible benefits (e.g., increased prestige) for which the city
145. Associated Press, Stability Goal of New NFL Policy, ESPN.COM (May 26, 1999) (detailing
the NFL's stadium collateral policy), at
http://www.espn.go.com/nfl/news/1999/990526/01277298.html.
146. Id. (detailing the NFL's stadium collateral policy).
147. Id. ("'It's a crucial policy for the league to have strong footing in the largest media
markets."' (quoting Jeffery Lurie, owner of the NFL's Philadelphia franchise, a beneficiary of the
NFL's policy)).
148. Id. ("'It's a tax on all the teams that won't benefit. Never before in the history of the league
have the poor given to the rich."' (quoting Al Davis, owner of the Oakland Raiders)).
149. For example, despite the NFL's collateral policy, Robert Kraft, owner of the New England
Patriots, was planning on moving his club to Connecticut until the State of Massachusetts agreed to
spend $70 million on roads and other improvements for a new stadium at the club's current location.
Id. (discussing the proposed move of the New England Patriots).
150. Leone, supra note 123, at 510-11 (advocating congressional action); Mitten & Burton,
supra note 9, at 128 (arguing that congressional legislation is necessary to solve the problem of
franchise free agency).
151. Leone, supra note 123, at 523 (noting that Congress should act to protect the cities that are
victims of franchise free agency).
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bargained when it agreed to build the playing facility for the club. 152
Many of the legislative proposals to solve the franchise free agency
problem focus on granting traditional leagues a limited exemption from the
antitrust laws to control relocations. In exchange for a limited antitrust
exemption, the league would be required to apply objective criteria in
determining whether to allow a club to relocate, block any move prior to a
city's retiring its debt for building the playing facility, reserve the relocating
club's logos and trademarks for the new team the city will receive when the
league decides to expand, and allow public ownership of clubs. 15 3 Other
proposals call for Congress to mandate the expansion 154 or divestiture 55 of
American established professional sports leagues in order to increase the
supply of professional sports teams. To date, Congress has not enacted any of
these proposed legislative solutions.
Like with other issues involving the creation or maintenance of
competitive balance in a traditional professional sports league, franchise free
agency involves a situation where an individual club is not forced to
internalize the externalities of unilateral action. 156 The NFL's inability to
address adequately franchise free agency is further evidence that the
organizational structure of traditional leagues impedes the resolution of
competitive balance problems. 157
II. LABOR MARKET PROBLEM: MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENT IN THE NBA
The current controversy surrounding the NBA's efforts to establish a
minimum age restriction for incoming players also demonstrates that the
structure of a traditional league can adversely affect a league's operation.
152. Id. at 491-92 (discussing the direct and indirect economic and intangible benefits a
municipality receives from hosting a club in an established professional sports league).
153. Id. at 523 (discussing conditions for limited antitrust exemption in exchange for league
control over franchise relocations); Mitten & Burton, supra note 9, at 137-38 (same); Hartel, supra
note 35, at 592 (noting bill in Congress concerning public ownership of professional sports clubs).
See also infira notes 483-94 and accompanying text (discussing the public ownership of clubs as a
means for a media league to avoid the franchise free agency problem).
154. Mullick, supra note 116, at 33 (proposing that in exchange for an antitrust exemption
Congress should require professional sports leagues to expand when their television revenues increase
by a certain percentage or dollar amount).
155. Ross, supra note 9, at 748-49 (arguing for Congress to break up both the NFL and MLB
into three separate rival leagues).
156. Mitten & Burton, supra note 9, at 102 (noting that an individual club internalizes only a
fraction of the harm from its relocation to another geographic area); Mullick, supra note 116, at 29
(same).
157. Mason & Slack, supra note 55, at 424 (predicting that the negative effects of franchise free
agency will continue in the future because of the "unique structure of professional sports leagues").
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The number of players entering the NBA prior to their graduation from, or
even matriculation into, college is rapidly increasing. 158 The NBA is currently
trying to slow or eliminate this influx because of the detrimental effects it is
having on the league. 15 9 With more young players on teams, the overall
quality of play in the league is decreasing. 160 Many of the "early entry"
players lack the skills needed to perform competently at the highest
professional level.161 The NBA also suffers from bad publicity about its
employment rules, which tarnish its image with purchasers of its products.
Many critics claim that the NBA is tempting young players to eschew the
opportunity of a university education for the allure of riches from a
professional career. 162 Others blame the NBA for the tragic accounts of young
players who enter the league only to learn that they lack the life skills needed
to cope with being a professional basketball player. 163 Finally, the NBA's
employment policy strains its relationship with the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA provides the NBA with most of its
players at little or no direct cost to the league. The early exodus of the best
college players reduces the quality of the NCAA's basketball competition, 164 a
158. Greg Collins, NBA Life Closer Than Ever, ESPN.COM (July 27, 1999) (noting that the
number of college underclassmen and high school players entering the NBA has more than doubled in
the past four years), at http:llespn.go.comlncb/preppro/main.html; Scott R. Rosner, Must Kobe Come
Out and Play? An Analysis of the Legality of Preventing High School Athletes and College
Underclassmen from Entering Professional Sports Drafts, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 539, 539-40
(1998) ("Over the last several years, the number of high school graduates and college underclassmen
applying for early, entry into the rookie drafts of the various professional sports leagues has reached
nearly epidemic proportions. Especially noteworthy has been the mass exodus of college athletes into
the [NBA] and [NFL].").
159. Jay Bilas, A Legal Look at Early Entry, ESPN.coM (July 26, 1999) (noting the NBA's
efforts to stop the flow of young players into the league), at
http:l/espn.go.comlncb/prepprolbilasage.html. The commissioner of the NBA believes that the
acceleration of young players into the league is "'one of the [NBA's] most difficult' issues. Tom
Weir, NBA Worried Draftees Are Too Young, USATODAY.COM (June 30, 1999) (quoting NBA
Commissioner David Stem), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ccovwed.htm. See also
Rosner, supra note 158, at 550.
160. Rosner, supra note 158, at 542 n.18 ("Many NBA coaches and players feel that the
increased number of early entrants is already harming the league.").
161. Id. (noting NBA coaches' and players' concern with the skills of early entry players).
162. Id. at 542 (noting the criticism the NBA has received for "enticing" athletes with million
dollar contracts).
163. Mike Lopresti, Smith's Broken Dream Sends a Warning, USATODAY.COM (Dec. 6, 1999)
(noting that the "NBA draft.., exposes teen-agers to the live ammunition of money and fame, before
many are emotionally ready"), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/comment/collopo.htm.
164. Bilas, supra note 159 (noting that the increase in the number of college underclassmen
going to the NBA has had a "clear detrimental effect" on the overall level of play in college
basketball), at http:llespn.go.com/ncb/prepprolbilasage.html.
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key revenue source for the association. 165
The NBA has not always allowed college underclassmen and high school
players to play in the league. "Prior to 1971, the NBA By-laws prohibited the
drafting of an athlete until four years after his high school graduation."'166
Spencer Haywood, three years out of high school, successfully challenged the
NBA's rule in federal court, however, after the league barred him from
playing for a NBA club during the 1970-71 season. 167 The court held that the
NBA's rule was a group boycott and per se illegal under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 168 According to the court, the NBA and its teams conspired to
create "an arbitrary and unreasonable restraint upon the rights of Haywood and
other potential NBA players to contract to play for NBA teams .... -169 Other
courts have followed this precedent and held the entry rules of other traditional
leagues, whether based on a player's particular age or on the number of years
since a player's class graduated from high school, to be illegal under the
Sherman Act.170 As a result of these rulings, the NBA's currently policy
permits any player whose high school class has graduated to sign with an
individual club in the league. 171
Due to its organizational structure, the NBA faces a formidable task in
trying to restrict the flow of young players into the league. Though the
commissioner of the NBA supports a rule requiring all players to be at least
twenty years of age,172 such a change would most likely have to be
incorporated into the league's collective bargaining agreement. 173 Despite the
significant influence of the present NBA commissioner on league affairs, 174
165. Michael Hiestand, CBS Keeps NCAA Men's Tournment [sic], USATODAY.COM (Nov. 19,
1999) (reporting that CBS agreed to purchase the transmission rights to the NCAA's men's basketball
tournament for $545 million (U.S.) per year through the year 2013), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/sfri 12.htm.
166. Rosner, supra note 158, at 550.
167. Id. at 551 (discussing Haywood's suit against the NBA).
168. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1049, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1971)
(declaring the NBA's employment rule to be illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
169. Id. at 1056.
170. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1323 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding the
WHL's rule requiring all players to be at least 21 years of age to be a group boycott and per se
illegal); Boris v. United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cases 66,012, 1984 WL 894, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) (concluding that the USFL's eligibility rule restricting a player from
entering the league until all his college football eligibility had expired was a group boycott and per se
illegal); Rosner, supra note 158, at 553-55 (discussing Linseman and Boris).
171. Rosner, supra note 158, at 553.
172. Weir, supra note 159 (noting David Stem's support for a 20-year-old entry age limit for the
NBA), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ccovwed.htm.
173. Bilas, supra note 159, at http://espn.go.com/ncb/preppro/bilasage.html.
174. Bruce Schoenfeld, David Stern's Full-Court Press, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998 (Magazine),
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the increasing employment of young players by individual clubs, irrespective
of the effect on the overall health of the league, indicates that some owners
may be less than willing to agree to a new player entry rule. 175 Further, the
fear of antitrust liability deters the NBA from unilaterally imposing a new
early entry rule. 176 Before implementing any new entry rule, the NBA needs
the agreement of the NBA Players' Association in order to shelter the rule
from antitrust attack under the nonstatutory labor exemption. 177
The nonstatutory labor exemption immunizes from antitrust scrutiny a
provision of a collective bargaining agreement that "primarily affect[s] only
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, concern[s] a mandatory
subject of bargaining, and [is] a product of bona fide arm's length
bargaining." 178 Assuming good faith negotiations between the NBA owners
and Players' Association, an early entry rule included in a collective
bargaining agreement would likely survive antitrust attack.179 Collective
bargaining is the only effective means for a traditional league to implement
player eligibility restrictions. 180 To date, the NBA Players' Association
refuses to support a fixed age restriction on incoming NBA players, primarily
because the owners have not offered any substantial concessions in exchange
for the union's consent. 181
Because the individual clubs are unwilling to grant the Players'
Association a concession in exchange for its support of a minimum age
restriction, the NBA is trying to rectify the effects of the early entry problem
by means other than formulating a new early entry rule. In particular, the
at 96 (noting David Stem's extensive control over the NBA's affairs).
175. Collins, supra note 151 (noting that individual clubs have reaped rich fmancial returns from
signing early entry players), at http:llespn.go.com/ncb/preppro/main.html.
176. Rosner, supra note 158, at 572 (concluding that a traditional professional sports league's
unilateral imposition of an early entry rule would most likely run afoul of § I of the Sherman Act,
even under a rule of reason analysis).
177. Id. at 563 (noting that inclusion of an early entry rule in the collective bargaining agreement
between a league and the players' association gives it the protection of the nonstatutory labor
exemption).
178. Id. (discussing the requirements of the nonstatutory labor exemption).
179. Id. at 563-67 (answering in the affirmative the question of whether the "non-statutory labor
exemption would apply to an agreement by the players' association and management to include draft
eligibility rules in the collective bargaining agreement and thereby avoid antitrust scrutiny").
180. Bilas, supra note 159 ("The only plausible way for an age restriction to survive legal
scrutiny would be for the rule to be included as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and
agreed upon by the players union."), at http://espn.go.com/ncb/preppro/bilasage.html.
181. Rosner, supra note 158, at 570 (noting that "[tihe owners would have to make a sizeable
concession in another area for" the players' association to agree to a new early entry rule); Bilas,
supra note 159 (noting that the NBA has yet to offer the players' association anything in return for its
support of a minimum age restriction), at http://espn.go.com/ncb/preppro/bilasage.html.
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NBA now enforces more strictly its playing rules prohibiting a defensive
player from making body contact with an offensive player. 182 Through this
policy, the NBA hopes to quicken the tempo of the game, reduce physical play
and reward finesse over power. 183 The NBA's ultimate goal is to make games
more exciting and entertaining, which usually correlates with high scoring
contests. 184 A less physical, finesse-oriented style of play is generally better
suited for early entry players, many of whom lack the physical maturity of
older NBA players. 185 This program to offset the effects of increasing
numbers of early entry players-instructing referees, over whom it has direct
control, to enforce rules more closely-is one of the few actions the NBA can
perform unilaterally without the approval of a majority of the clubs or the
Players' Association. Whether the NBA's strategy lessens the need for future
negotiation with the Players' Association on the minimum age issue is
uncertain. Continued decreases in television ratings for NBA telecasts (down
16% and 23% for free-to-air and cable telecasts, respectively, from the 1998-
1999 to the 1999-2000 season) calls into question the effectiveness of the
league's solution. 186
The NBA's difficulty in addressing the early entry problem highlights the
imperative for cooperation among the individual clubs and between the clubs
and the players' association for the resolution of labor market issues in a
traditional league.
1II. CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL CLUBS AND A CENTRAL COMPETITION
ORGANIZER: REDUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL CLUBS IN THE NATIONAL RUGBY
LEAGUE
Like in traditional American leagues, many problems arise in Australian
leagues because league participants pursue their own agendas rather than work
cooperatively for the best interests of the league. The reduction of clubs in the
NRL illustrates the conflict that often exists between the central competition
organizer and individual clubs of a traditional Australian league.
182. Boeck, supra note 70 (discussing the NBA's rule modifications for the 1999-2000 season),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketba/99pre/fulO7.htm.
183. Id. (reporting on the objectives of the NBA's rule changes).
184. Id. (noting that the NBA Commissioner hopes that the rule changes will make the league's
product more "enjoyable to those absorbing it").
185. Pacers' Bender May Debut vs. Spurs, ESPN.COM (Dec. 7, 1999) (noting the physical
attributes of young players in the NBA), at http://espn.go.com/nba/news/1999/0804/39601.html.
186. Rudy Martzke, Kellogg's Close-Game Forecast On Target, USATODAY.coM (noting drop
in television ratings for NBA games), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/comment/colmart.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2000).
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The genesis of the NRL was a meeting on December 19, 1997, in Sydney,
Australia, involving the Australian Rugby Football League Ltd. (ARL), the
established central competition organizer, and the individual clubs in the ARL
(the "ARL clubs"). 187 The ARL's goal at this meeting was to convince the
ARL clubs to accept the terms of a proposed merger agreement with News
Ltd., the central competition organizer of Super League, a rival rugby league
entity. At this time, the ARL had twelve clubs, eight of which were from the
Sydney metropolitan area, and Super League had ten clubs, three of which
were Sydney-based. 188
The merger proposal established a framework to reduce the number of
clubs in the combined league. Specifically, twenty, sixteen, and fourteen clubs
would play in the 1998, 1999, and 2000 seasons, respectively. 189 Moreover,
for the 2000 season, "there would be no less than 6 teams and a maximum of 8
teams from Sydney" and "no less than 6 teams, and a maximum of 8 teams
from regions outside Sydney."'190 Consequently, by the 2000 season the total
number of clubs fielding a top grade professional rugby league team would
drop from twenty-two to fourteen and the number of Sydney clubs would be
reduced from eleven to no more than eight.
To determine the composition of the merged league, each club seeking
entry would have to apply for a license from a new central competition
organizer, NRL Co., created from a partnership between News Ltd. and the
ARL. 191 NRL Co. would formulate criteria to be used to determine which
clubs would receive licenses to play in the league, assuming that more than
fourteen clubs sought admission. 192 NRL Co. would pay a $2 million (Aud)
grant annually to each club receiving a license to play in the league. 193
At the December meeting, ten of the twelve ARL clubs voted in favor of
187. South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd. v. News Ltd., [1999] FCA 1710, at
*5 (Austl. Fed. Ct. Dec. 9, 1999) (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) [hereinafter South Sydney]
(discussing the meeting between Super League and the ARL). Details on Super League and the
events leading to the merger of the two rival rugby league organizations are presented later in this
work. See infra notes 846-959 and accompanying text.
188. South Sydney, at *5 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (noting the number of ARL and
Super League clubs); News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *27 (listing Super League and ARL clubs ).
189. Rugby League Proposed ARL/Super League Merger, at 17 [hereinafter Proposed Merger
Agreement] (stating the number of teams for the 1998, 1999, and 2000 NRL seasons) (on file with
author); South Sydney, at *5, (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (same).
190. South Sydney, at *5 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
191. Proposed Merger Agreement, supra note 189, at 17 ("NRLC will grant licences to
participate in the NRLC competition.").
192. Id. ("Applicants must satisfy licence criteria determined by NRLC Co.").
193. South Sydney, at *5 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) ("A licence entitles the licensee to an
annual grant of $2 million.").
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the merger proposal. 194 Two clubs-South Sydney (Souths) and Balmain-
voted against the proposed merger. 195 News Ltd., which controlled Super
League, 196 directed its clubs to approve the merger with the ARL.
In its inaugural season in 1998, the NRL had twenty clubs. Eleven of
these teams were former ARL clubs (including Souths and Balmain), eight
were former Super League clubs, and one was a newly formed club, the
Melbourne Storm. 197 Early in the 1998 season, the ARL asked Souths to
agree to participate in the 1998 season and to a fourteen-team competition for
the 2000 season. 198 Souths agreed to play in the 1998 season, but reserved its
right to challenge legally "any aspects of the rules of the NRL ... particularly
in relation to Souths' rights to participate in the NRL competition from the
year 2000 onwards." 199
In September 1998, NRL Co. distributed to each club the admission
criteria for determining the teams for the 2000 season.200 Each club selected
for the 2000 season would receive a license to play in the NRL for five
seasons. Under the admission process, if the number of applicants satisfying
the criteria exceeded the number of available licenses, then the order of
priority for awarding licenses was (in order of preference) "merged clubs"
(i.e., a club formed from the merger of two previously separate clubs),
"regional clubs" (i.e., clubs located outside the Sydney metropolitan area), and
"stand alone Sydney clubs" (i.e., clubs located in the Sydney metropolitan area
that had not joined forces with another club in the league). The admission
criteria were divided into three parts: basic criteria, qualifying criteria, and
selection criteria.20 1
The basic criteria applied to every club seeking a license and covered the
areas of playing facilities, administration, solvency, and development. 20 2 The
qualifying criteria established additional licensure requirements for three
194. Id. (noting voting results of ARL clubs).
195. Id. (noting the negative votes of South Sydney and Balmain).
196. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *35-*36 (noting News Ltd.'s control over Super
League); Interview with David Kennedy, Solicitor, Colin Love and Co. (Sydney, Australia, Nov. 26,
1999) [hereinafter Kennedy Interview].
197. South Sydney, at *6 (AustLIl.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (discussing the 1998 NRL season).
198. Id. (noting the request of the ARL to Souths).
199. Id.
200. Id. at *7 (noting NRL Co.'s publication of admission criteria).
201. A Summary of the NRL Admission Criteria, NRL.COM.AU (summarizing the admission
criteria for the rationalization of NRL clubs), available at
http://www.ntworldhost.com/14teams/criteria.html (last visited Dec. 10, 1999).
202. Id. (discussing basic criteria).
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particular clubs, Newcastle, Brisbane, and Auckland, New Zealand.203 The
selection criteria pertained to each "stand alone" club that had not already
obtained a license under the qualifying criteria or was not a participant in an
approved joint venture.204 The selection criteria measured "crowd support,
competition results, sponsorship support and finances." 20 5 In the situation
where, after application of the basic and qualifying criteria, the number of
clubs seeking a license exceeded fourteen, the selection criteria would be used
to rank the clubs with the top fourteen clubs receiving admission into the
league. October 1, 1999 was the deadline by which each club had to meet the
basic criteria,206 and NRL Co. would announce the clubs receiving five-year
licenses on October 15, 1999, assuming application of the selection criteria
was necessary. 207
NRL Co. preferred to reduce the number of clubs in the Sydney area
through the combination of two or more existing clubs since this would avoid
the negative effects (e.g., fan backlash, challenges to the reduction process) of
forcibly eliminating a club from the league through application of the selection
criteria. 20 8 NRL Co. encouraged amalgamation in a number of ways. The
admission criteria gave preference for entry into the league to merged clubs
and exempted them from the selection criteria. In practice, a merged club, to
receive a five-year license, only had to meet the basic criteria and present a
five-year business plan showing that it could generate $8 million (Aud)
annually in revenue. 20 9 Furthermore, the proposed merger agreement offered
a $4 million (Aud) grant for the 1999 NRL season to any "joint venture club"
(i.e. merged club) created before December 1998.210 The merger deadline was
203. Id. (discussing qualifying criteria).
204. Id. (discussing selection criteria).
205. Id.
206. NRL Media Release-Basic Criteria, NRL.COM.AU (Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Basic
Criteria] (discussing application of the admission criteria), available at
http://www.ntworldhost.com/asp/story/asp?id=312.
207. A Brief History of the Issues, NRL.COM.AU [hereinafter Brief History] (noting that the final
decision on which clubs would play in the NRL's 2000 season was announced on October 15, 1999),
available at http://www.ntworldhost.com/14teams/timeline.html (last visited Dec. 10, 1999).
208. Steve Mascord et al., Deadline Set: News Must Pay to Get its Way, SMH.CoM.AU (noting
that NRL Co.'s preferred scenario to reach fourteen clubs for the 2000 season would be three joint
ventures), available at http://www.smh.com.au/league/newsf1999907/19/19league2.html (last visited
July 19, 1999).
209. Roy Masters, Blowin' In the Wind, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 14, 1999, at 21
(noting the admission requirements for ajoint venture club).
210. Proposed Merger Agreement, supra note 189, at 18 (noting financial incentives for joint
ventures before December 1998).
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later extended to July 31, 1999.211
With respect to the 1999 NRL season, the final merger agreement between
News Ltd. and the ARL stated that no less than sixteen, but no more than
twenty clubs could play in the league that year.212 Prior to the start of the
1999 season, two clubs withdrew from the league,213 and the first merged club
in the NRL was created from the St. George and Illawarra clubs.214 Though
the merger agreement promised only a $4 million (Aud) grant to a merged
club, the NRL Partnership upped the ante to $8 million (Aud) for this initial
merger.215 Thus, seventeen teams played in the 1999 NRL competition.
As the July 31, 1999 deadline for creating joint venture clubs loomed ever
closer, individual clubs, especially those in danger of being excluded from the
2000 season, frantically investigated joint venture possibilities.216 Despite this
activity, only one merger occurred before the deadline. On July 28, 1999, the
Balmain and Western Suburbs clubs merged after the NRL agreed to provide
the new club with $8 million (Aud) in funding-its previous grant for the St.
George/Illawarra joint venture.217 Despite indications from NRL Co. that the
July 31, 1999 deadline was a fixed cut-off for mergers, 218 two clubs-North
Sydney and Manly-merged after this date.219  The impetus for this
transaction was North Sydney's failure to meet the basic solvency criteria by
October 1, 1999, resulting in NRL Co.'s decision not to extend the club a
211. Mascord, supra note 45 (reporting the merger of Balmain and Western Suburbs on July 28,
1999, three days before the deadline for joint ventures), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/sports/league/news/199907/28/28leaguel .html.
212. South Sydney, at *6 (AustLII.edu.au, Austi. Case Law) (noting the agreement between the
ARL and News Ltd. for the number of clubs in the NRL for the 1999 season).
213. Id. at *7 (noting the withdrawal of the Gold Coast and Adelaide clubs from the NRL).
214. Brief History, supra note 207 (noting the NRL's approval of the St. George/lllawarra
merger), available at http://www.ntworldhost.com/14teams/timeline.html.
215. Steve Mascord, Show Us the Money, Munk Tells NRL, SMH.COM.AU (July 12, 1999)
(noting that the NRL promised the St. George and Illawarra clubs $8 million (Aud) in loans and
grants "to get their merger going"), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/league/news/199907/12/12league3.html; Masters Interview, supra note 47
(describing the details of the NRL's financial package for joint ventures).
216. Masters, supra note 209 (describing the various joint venture discussions among NRL clubs
as the joint venture deadline approached).
217. Steve Mascord, Frykberg Calls for Lifeline on Deadline, SMH.COM.AU (July 27, 1999)
(noting the NRL's approval of $8 million (Aud) for the merger between the Balmain and Western
Suburbs clubs), available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/league/1999907/27/27league.html.
218. Greg Prichard, Clubs in Deadline Panic, SMH.COM.AU (July 18, 1999) (noting that the
CEO of NRL Co. stated that the July 31, 1999 deadline was a firm date for mergers), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/league/1 99907/18/18league3.html.
219. Peter Frilingos, It's Northern Eagles, NEWS.COM.AU (reporting that the Northern Eagles is
the name for the North Sydney/Manly club), available at http://www.news.com.au/nws/nrl91112.htm
(last visited Nov. 12, 1999).
[Vol. 12:703
2002] MEDIA LEAGUES
license for the 2000 season.220 To support the North Sydney/Manly merger,
News Ltd. loaned the North Sydney club $2.8 million (Aud) to pay their
players, the club's largest creditors, on the condition that the club merge with
Manly. NRL Co. also provided the merged club with the now standard $8
million (Aud) in funding.221
By October 15, 1999, the deadline for determining the clubs in the 2000-
04 NRL seasons, ten clubs were seeking the nine remaining five year
licenses.222 After applying the selection criteria, NRL Co. announced that
Souths ranked last among the ten clubs and failed to qualify for admission into
the league.223 Souths and its supporters were outraged by NRL Co.'s
decision,224 though they knew well before the decision was announced that
Souths was likely to be ranked last among the clubs subjected to the selection
criteria.225 In fact, a few days before NRL Co.'s announcement, Souths
supporters had organized a march with approximately thirty thousand
participants through the streets of downtown Sydney to protest the NRL's
reduction process. 226 The elimination of Souths from the NRL sparked the ire
of many rugby league fans since the club was a founding member of the first
Australian professional rugby league competition in 1907 and was the most
successful club in the history of Australian rugby league. 227
220. Stuart Honeysett, Rebels Say They Can Clear $4m Debt, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 6, 1999)
(stating that the NRL's decision to kick North Sydney out of the league for insolvency "precipitated
the action of Norths agreeing to a joint venture with Manly"), available at
http://www.news.com.au/nws/nrl9lll2.htm; Id. (reporting on a meeting of creditors of the North
Sydney club for the purpose of approving an administrator).
221. Paul Kent et al., Bears Told to Marry for Money, SMH.cOM.AU (Oct. 22, 1999) (reporting
the financial support News Ltd. provided for the North Sydney/Manly merger), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/league/199910/22/22eaguel.html.
222. Basic Criteria, supra note 206 (listing the ten clubs seeking the nine NRL licenses),
available at http://www.ntworldhost.com/asp/story/asp?id=312.
223. NRL Media Release, NRL.COM.AU (Oct. 15, 1999) (announcing the fourteen clubs receiving
licenses for the 2000-04 seasons), available at http://ntworldhost.com/14teams/mediarelease.html.
224. Philip Comford, The Fatal Rabbit Chop That Felled a Proud 92-Year-Old, SMH.COM.AU
(Oct. 16, 1999) (reporting the reaction of Souths' supporters to NRL Co.'s decision), available at
http:l/www.smh.com.au/news/league/199910/16/16Ieague3.html.
225. George Piggins, Surely, This Is a Bad Dream, SMH.COM.AU (Dec. 13, 1999) (stating that
Souths always knew that they were likely to be the club NRL Co. would decide to eliminate from the
league), available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/league/199912/13/13]eague2.html. George
Piggins is president of Souths.
226. Paul Kent, Souths Put on The Passion Play, SMH.COM.AU (Oct. 11, 1999) (reporting on the
protest march through Sydney), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/league/199910/22/22eaguel.html.
227. Comford, supra note 224 (noting that Souths' 20 league championships were the most of
any club in rugby league history), available at
http:/www.smh.com.aulnewslleague/199910/16/16league3.htinl.
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In addition to public protests, Souths initiated legal proceedings
challenging NRL Co.'s decision not to grant the club a license to play for the
2000 NRL season.228 In its suit, Souths claimed that the provision of the
merger agreement between the ARL and News Ltd. restricting to fourteen the
number of clubs in the NRL was an exclusionary provision as defined in
section 4D(1) of the Trade Practices Act, and that enforcement of that
provision was per se illegal under section 45 of that same statute.229 Under
Australian competition law:
A provision [in] a contract, arrangement, or understanding... [is] an
exclusionary provision... if[ ] the contract or arrangement was
made.., between persons any [two] or more of whom are competitive
with [one another] and [ ]the provision has the purpose of preventing,
restricting, or limiting [ ]the supply of goods or services to, or the
acquisition of goods or services from, particular persons or classes of
persons. 230
Section 45 of the Trade Practices Act prohibits a corporation from giving
"effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding... if that
provision ... is an exclusionary provision."231
According to Souths, the purpose of the fourteen club provision in the
merger agreement between the ARL and News Ltd.-allegedly two competing
rugby league central competition organizers-was to limit the supply of
competition organizer services to Souths and Souths' acquisition of
competition organizer services from News Ltd. and the ARL. News Ltd.232
defended on the grounds that the ARL and News Ltd. were not competitive
with one another with respect to providing competition organizer services for
the 2000 season since they had agreed to produce a single rugby league
competition and that the purpose of the fourteen-team provision in the merger
agreement was the proper one of producing a rugby league club competition of
consistently high standards. 233
Souths' other significant claim was that NRL Co. improperly applied the
selection criteria in breach of the contract that Souths entered into with the
228. South Sydney, at *8 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (noting Souths initiation of legal
proceedings).
229. Id. (discussing Souths' amended statement of claim).
230. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 4D(1) (Austl.) (defining exclusionary provision).
231. Id. § 45(2)(b).
232. Though Souths also named the ARL and NRL Co., along with other NRL clubs, as
defendants, News Ltd. presented the primary defense to Souths' claims. See generally South Sydney,
[1999] F.C.A. 1710 passim (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
233. Id. at *10, *12 (stating News Ltd.'s defense).
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ARL and News Ltd. when the club agreed to play in the NRL in 1998 and
participate in the rationalization process.234 In particular, Souths alleged that
NRL Co. wrongly included in the profitability category of former Super
League clubs the monies these clubs received from News Ltd. when Super
League and the ARL merged, and wrongly excluded from Souths' sponsorship
category the money paid to the club by South Sydney Junior Rugby League
Club Ltd. (Souths Juniors).235 Absent these categorizations, the Penrith club
would have ranked last in the selection criteria and Souths would have
received a license to play in the NRL for the 2000-04 seasons.
236
News Ltd. argued that NRL Co. properly applied the selection criteria.
News Ltd.'s expert witnesses testified that under current Australian
Accounting Standards the payouts to Super League clubs were properly
included in the profit and loss accounts of these clubs.237 Moreover, Souths
had recorded in its accounts the funds from South Juniors as a "grant," akin to
a leagues club grant, rather than as sponsorship revenue.
238
Since a full trial and decision on Souths' claims could not be completed
prior to the commencement of the 2000 NRL season, a hearing for
interlocutory relief was held in December 1999 with a final hearing scheduled
for later in 2000.239 The relief that Souths sought was a mandatory injunction
requiring NRL Co. to include the club in a fifteen-team competition for the
2000 NRL season.240 Under Australian law, for a court to grant an
interlocutory injunction, the complainant must "satisfy the Court that there is a
serious question to be tried" and "that the balance of convenience favours the
grant of an injunction.... In considering the balance of convenience, [the
court may appropriately] take into account the apparent strength of the
applicant's case." 241
234. Id. at *15 (discussing Souths' breach of contract claim).
235. Id. at *16 (discussing the details of Souths' contract claim).
236. Id. (noting that NRL Co. would have to rectify both of these alleged mistakes for Souths to
receive a license to play in the 2000-04 seasons).
237. South Sydney, at *17 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (noting the testimony of News
Ltd.'s expert accountants).
238. Id. at *18 (noting Souths' recording of funds received from Souths Juniors).
239. Id. at *8 (noting the impracticability of a full hearing on the merits before the start of the
2000 NRL season).
240. Id. at *8-*9 (discussing Souths' requested relief). Assuming that the court granted an
injunction requiring the club's inclusion in the league, Souths also asked the court to order NRL Co.
to pay the club the $2 million (Aud) grant promised to the other 14 clubs for the 2000 NRL season.
Id. at *8 (noting Souths' claim for funding from NRL Co.).
241. Australian Rugby Union Ltd. v. Hospitality Group Pty. Ltd, [1999] F.C.A. 1136, at *6
(Sackville, J.) (Austl. Fed. Ct Aug. 19, 1999) (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (citations omitted).
See also Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia, (1986) 161 C.L.R. 148, 1986 WL 590162, at
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In evaluating Souths' claims, the court determined that "there is a serious
question to be tried as to whether the giving effect to the 14 team term would
involve a contravention of [§] 45 of the [Trade Practices] Act. 242 Issues
concerning Souths' exclusionary provision claim that the court identified as
deserving of further investigation included whether News Ltd. and the ARL
were competitive with one another in supplying competition organizing
services to rugby league clubs;243 whether the fourteen-team provision in the
merger agreement had the purpose of preventing the supply or acquisition of
services to or from a particular class of persons; 244 and whether the fourteen-
team provision contravened sections of the Trade Practices Act pertaining to
exclusive dealing.245 As for Souths' breach of contract claim, the court
concluded that the club did not have "a seriously arguable case." 246  The
evidence presented at the hearing strongly supported NRL Co.'s categorization
of News Ltd.'s payouts to Super League clubs and South Juniors grants to
Souths. 247
After reviewing the substance of Souths' claims, the court considered the
balance of convenience in granting an interlocutory injunction in favor of the
club.2 48 The court noted Souths' precarious condition. The club was on the
verge of insolvency, which posed a real threat to its ability to pay damages if
the club ultimately lost the final hearing on the merits.249 Because of its dire
financial state, Souths had only four players and a head coach under contract
at the time of the hearing, though other players had agreed to play for the club
if it was admitted into the league. 250 Given that the 2000 NRL season was to
start in less than three months from the time of the hearing, the court was
uncertain as to whether Souths could assemble a competitive squad in such a
short time. 251 Though Souths would lose revenue from being excluded from
the NRL during the 2000 season if the exclusion proved to be wrongful, the
club could recover any financial losses as part of its relief at the final
*5-*8 (Mason, J.) (Austl. 1986) (discussing principles for interlocutory relief).
242. South Sydney, at * 15 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
243. Id. at *10-*I 1.
244. Id. at *13.
245. Id. at *15.
246. Id. at *17, *19.
247. South Sydney, at *16-*17 (AustLII.edu.au, Austi. Case Law) (discussing the evidence
regarding Souths' breach of contract claim).
248. Id. at *21-*22 (discussing the balance of convenience for interlocutory relief).
249. Id. at *20 (noting Souths' financial condition may hamper its ability to pay damages to
persons harmed by a grant of interlocutory relief).
250. Id. (discussing Souths' ability to field a team in the 2000 NRL season).
251. Id.
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hearing.252  On the other hand, the Court noted that Souths faced an
"appreciable risk" of not being "able to participate successfully in a year 2001
competition" even if it succeeded at a final hearing because of the losses in
revenue and fan support the club would likely sustain from not playing in
2000.253
With respect to other parties, evidence showed that the other clubs in the
NRL would lose revenues if Souths were granted the right to play in the 2000
season.254 Going from a fourteen-team competition to a fifteen-team schedule
would cause each club to play one less home game, resulting in significant
monetary loss. Souths' entry into the league would also likely reduce the
sponsorship income of some NRL clubs. Moreover, certain clubs had entered
into joint venture arrangements at considerable costs both monetary and non-
pecuniary on the basis that NRL Co. would license only fourteen teams for the
2000-04 seasons.255 Hence the court was "satisfied that there [was] a real risk
of substantial financial loss by the 14 clubs.., if Souths [was] compulsorily
admitted as a participant in the year 2000 competition, as opposed to the
competition being conducted on the basis proposed by NRL. 256 In addition
to the other clubs, NRL Co. could sustain damages from Souths' inclusion in
the league. Since "[i]t would be impracticable to make an order for Souths
participation in the year 2000 without it being entitled to receive the same
grants as other clubs," the court noted that an interlocutory injunction in
Souths' favor would have to include an order requiring NRL Co. to extend $2
million (Aud) to Souths for the upcoming season.257 If Souths lost the final
hearing on the merits, then NRL Co. would receive no benefit from its grant to
the club.258
Finally, the court noted that since the approval of the merger proposal in
December 1997, the NRL had been steadily marching towards a fourteen-team
league for the 2000 season.259 During this time, other clubs in the league had
taken steps to ensure their survival whether by merger or other means.
260
Souths, meanwhile, had rejected joint venture possibilities believing that it
252. South Sydney, at *21 (AustLII.edu.au, Austi. Case Law).
253. Id.
254. Id. at *22 (discussing effect of interlocutory relief on clubs admitted into NRL Co.'s 14-
team competition).
255. Id. (noting harm to joint venture clubs).
256. Id.
257. South Sydney, at*22 (AustLII.edu.au, Austi. Case Law).
258. Id. (noting the harm to NRL Co. if Souths were granted inclusion into the 2000 NRL
season, but ultimately failed on its claims).
259. Id. (noting the agreement to have 14 teams in the NRL by the 2000 season).
260. Id. (noting mergers of clubs in the expectation of only 14 teams in the 2000 NRL season).
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could meet the admission criteria as a stand-alone club. 261 Though Souths
objected to the reduction plan from its inception, the club had participated in
the process and only instituted legal proceedings challenging NRL Co.'s
actions after being omitted from the league. 262 Given all of the above, the
court concluded that "the balance of convenience [was] heavily against the
grant of the interlocutory relief sought no matter what sympathy one [felt] for
Souths by reason of its exclusion from a competition of which it [was] a
foundation member.. ."263 and denied Souths' request for interlocutory relief.
Despite the league's victory in the interlocutory hearing against Souths,
controversy over the NRL's reduction process continues. Souths is pursuing
its case in a full hearing on the merits.264 As a result of the reduction in the
number of clubs in the league, especially the decision to eliminate Souths from
the NRL, many supporters of rugby league are expected to switch their
allegiances to other sports.265 The extent of consumer backlash against the
NRL for its reduction decisions is presently unknown.
The fight between Souths and the NRL over the club's inclusion in the
2000 NRL season is all the more remarkable in light of the strong precedent in
Australia supporting the authority of a central competition organizer to select
clubs for membership in the league. Wayde v. New South Wales Rugby
League Ltd.2 6 6 involved a legal challenge by the Western Suburbs Football
Club (Western Suburbs) to the decision of the board of directors of the New
South Wales Rugby Football League Ltd. (NSWRL) to deny the club future
entry into the league.267 Western Suburbs' primary claim was based on then
section 320(2) of the Companies (NSW) Code.268 Section 320(2) provided:
If the Court is of the opinion
that the affairs of a company are being conducted in a manner that is
261. Id. (noting Souths' hope to remain in the NRL as a stand alone club).
262. South Sydney, at *22 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (noting Souths' activity during the
NRL rationalization process).
263. Id. at *22.
264. Greg Prichard, Traitors Who Sold Out Souths, SMH.COM.AU (Dec. 13, 1999) (reporting that
Souths is considering whether to pursue its case on the merits), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/league/news/1999912/13/13 league .html.
265. Malcolm Knox, They Are Gone But We, The Spectators, Will Be Back ..., SMH.COM.AU
(Dec. 10, 1999) (noting that many supporters of rugby league vowed not to watch a rugby league
match or to follow a club in a different sport, such as rugby union, after Souths lost their case for
inclusion in the 2000 NRL season), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/league/news/1 999912/10/1 Oleague6.html.
266. (1985) 180 C.L.R. 459, 1985 WL 514185 (Austl. Oct. 17, 1985).
267. Id. at *5.
268. Id. at *7.
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oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory
against, a member.., or in a manner that is contrary to the interests of
the members as a whole []
the Court may... make such... orders as it thinks fit .... 2 69
Western Suburbs argued that since the club was competitive on the
playing field and its inclusion in the league did not make staging the
competition between the clubs infeasible, the board of directors' decision to
deny it admission to the league was unfairly prejudicial. 270
The High Court of Australia disagreed. The Court noted that the NSWRL
had incorporated for the very purpose of creating a board of directors that
would promote the best interests of the league as a whole.271 The NSWRL's
articles of incorporation expressly gave the board of directors the power to
determine the clubs that would be permitted to play in the league.272 Western
Suburbs agreed to the incorporation of the league and at the time of
incorporation admitted that "it had no secure right to participate in the...
competition. ' 273 Since the board of directors made its decision "honestly in
pursuit of the object of fostering the game of rugby league and serving its best
interests," 274 the elimination of Western Suburbs from the league was not
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial in the statutory sense, despite the
considerable harm to the club from its exclusion. 275
Despite the clear holding of Wayde, the NRL could not implement its
reduction plans without fear of legal challenge from a disenfranchised club.
Though Souths did not allege an oppressive conduct claim under Australian
corporate law, the club's breach of contract claim was not dissimilar to
Western Suburbs' claim in Wayde. In both South Sydney and Wayde, the
excluded club challenged the central competition organizer's application of the
admission criteria to the club's particular situation. In Wayde, Western
Suburbs claimed that the prejudice to the club so outweighed the perceived
benefits to the NSWRL that the league's decision was oppressive.2 76 In South
269. Id. (quoting § 320 of the Companies Code (N.S.W. AcTs)).
270. Id. at *8 (discussing Western Suburbs' claim).
271. Wayde, 1985 WL 514185, at *8 (discussing the incorporation of the New South Wales
Rugby League).
272. Id. (noting the powers of the board of directors).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. (concluding that the board of directors' decision was not illegal).
276. Wayde, 1985 WI, 514185, at *8.
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Sydney, Souths flatly alleged that NRL Co. incorrectly applied the selection
criteria to the clubs seeking licenses.277 Though the courts in these cases gave
little weight to the excluded clubs' claims, the central competition organizers
were forced to expend substantial sums to defend their decisions.
Similarly, neither Wayde nor South Sydney precludes future conflicts over
club reduction issues since a club dispelled from the league can almost always
make a fact specific challenge to the application of the admission criteria. In
addition, the particular circumstances surrounding a league's reduction
decision is likely to give rise to specific legal claims. For example, Souths
could allege a Trade Practices Act claim because the NRL's reduction plan
was the product of a merger agreement between two rival competition
organizers, allegedly horizontal competitors for the supply of competition
organizer services. Rather than insulating a central competition organizer
from lawsuits contesting its decisions, Wayde and South Sydney teach the need
for a central competition organizer to be able to justify its actions that may
negatively affect individual clubs.
IV. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN AND AUSTRALIAN
TRADITIONAL PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES REDUCE THE QUALITY OF
THE LEAGUES' PRODUCTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF PURCHASERS
The quality of a traditional league's products depends upon the extent to
which the members of the league work together for the benefit of the
enterprise.27 8 Where league participants fail to cooperate adequately, the
reduction in quality of a traditional league's products harms not only the
league by reducing its revenues, 279 but also the purchasers of the league's
products. Fans suffer from higher prices for less entertaining games.280
Municipalities lose resources from franchise free agency. 281 Incompetent
league administration threatens a mega-media company's return on its
purchase of a league's television rights.282
277. South Sydney, at *8 (AustLII.edu.au, Austi. Case Law).
278. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A
Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 34 (1991) (noting that the cooperation among clubs in a
traditional professional sports league is a "form of quality control").
279. Mason & Slack, supra note 55, at 419 n.85 (noting that attendance in MLB dropped 20% in
1995 after the industrial dispute of 1994).
280. Ross, supra note 9, at 702 (noting that "fans are the primary victims of inefficient
management" of traditional professional sports leagues).
281. Leone, supra note 123, at 487 (noting the conclusions of economic reports on franchise free
agency).
282. Remarks of David Hill, Chairman and CEO, Fox Sports Television Group, at ANZSLA
Conference (Sydney, Australia Aug. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Hill remarks] (noting that incompetence of
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The most direct effect on a mega-media company from a traditional
league's mismanagement is that consumers will lose interest in the league and
consequently in the mega-media company's telecasts of the league's games.
The value of an established league's transmission rights to a mega-media
company is directly proportional to the attractiveness of the league's contests
to viewers.283 This relationship between the value of a league's transmission
rights and viewer interest is particularly significant to traditional network
broadcasters, whose revenues depend on the size and composition of the
television audiences they sell to advertisers.284 If ratings for the telecasts of a
traditional league are appreciably lower than anticipated, a network
broadcaster may have to reimburse advertisers with commercial time on other
shows.285
A traditional league's mismanagement of its affairs may affect a mega-
media purchaser in ways other than through a drop in ratings. At the extreme
is a mega-media company's involuntary loss of the league's product for an
extended period. Usually, this situation occurs when a traditional league is
involved in a labor dispute with its players. If the traditional league suffers a
work stoppage, then the mega-media company that has purchased the rights to
transmit the league's games loses its programming for the duration of the labor
unrest. Even if a mega-media company contracts only to pay the established
league for games actually transmitted, a mega-company is likely to be harmed
by the cancellation of games. Since mega-media companies generally plan
their programming schedules weeks in advance, the loss of a league's telecast
forces a mega-media company to scramble for alternative programming. In
addition, if a mega-media company depends on the sports programming to
attract viewers to its other shows, then loss of a traditional league's telecasts
may harm a mega-media company's overall ratings.
For example, prior to the start of the 1998-99 NBA season, the NBA
owners locked out the players while the parties negotiated a new collective
bargaining agreement. The National Broadcasting Company (NBC), a
commercial broadcast television network owned by General Electric Inc., and
league administrators is a great threat to a mega-media company's investment in purchasing
transmission rights) (notes on file with author).
283. Michael Hiestand, CBSLocks in College Hoopsfor $545M, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 1999, at
1C.
284. Id. (noting that broadcast networks pay large sums for the television rights to premium
sports events because of the large audiences for these shows).
285. Associated Press, NBC Taking Ratings Hit in Finals, ESPN.COM (June 20, 1999) (reporting
that FOX Sports was forced to provide advertisers with extra commercial spots on other shows
because of the low ratings for the 1998 World Series), at
http:/espn.go.comlnbalplayoffLfeatures/1999/990620/01316250.html.
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Turner Sports, a cable programmer and a subsidiary of Time Warner Inc., had
each purchased multi-year television rights for NBA games including the
1998-99 season.286 Under the terms of their contracts with the NBA, NBC
and Turner Sports were committed to paying "their entire $550 million
[(U.S.)] rights fees regardless of how many games [were] played. 287 Turner
Sports' agreement with the NBA, however, provided that Turner would be
repaid for the cancellation of any games it had scheduled to televise during the
lockout with extra games in the final years of its contract with the league. 288
In addition, FOX Sports Net, part of News Corporation, had purchased local
television rights to twenty-six of the twenty-nine teams in the NBA. 289 Most
of FOX Sports Net's contracts with the individual clubs required the company
only to pay for games that were played.290
Though it did not-unlike NBC and Turner Sports-have to pay rights
fees for cancelled games, FOX Sports Net was more adversely affected by the
NBA lockout than were the other two television channels. 291 This was so
because local NBA games were FOX Sports Net's highest-rated shows during
the winter months, while NBC and Turner Sports were not as heavily
dependent on NBA programming. 292 The loss of NBA telecasts also
threatened to lower the ratings for FOX Sports Net's flagship sports news
program, Fox Sports News, because it depended on NBA games to provide a
strong "lead-in" to attract viewers. 293 Regardless of the particular way each
was affected, NBC, Turner Sports, and FOX Sports Net all suffered from the
NBA lockout and were forced to find alternative programming to replace the
cancelled NBA games. 294
Since most contracts for the sale of a traditional league's transmission
286. Churchill, supra note 130 (reporting the details of NBC's and Turner Sports' contracts with
the NBA).
287. Josh Dubow, Fox Sports Net Takes Hit, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN Oct. 30, 1998, at C4,
available at 1999 WL 3629971.
288. Id. (discussing the effect of the NBA lockout on the mega-media companies that had
purchased rights to televise NBA games).
289. Id. (noting FOX Sports Net's contracts with individual NBA clubs).
290. Id.
291. Id. (noting that FOX Sports Net would be more affected by the NBA lockout than NBC or
Turner Sports would be).
292. Id. (discussing different effects of the NBA lockout on FOX Sports Net, NBC, and Turner
Sports).
293. Id. (discussing affect of the NBA lockout on ratings for FOX Sports Net's flagship news
show).
294. Page Three, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1998, at 3C (reporting that cable networks lost viewers
and advertising revenues from the cancellation of NBA games during the lockout and were forced to
find alternative programming).
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rights are multi-year agreements, upon purchase of such rights a mega-media
company has a long-term stake in the proper administration of the league.
Though a mega-media company can protect itself by contract against some
risks from league affairs or policies that threaten consumer interest in the
company's telecasts, unforeseen circumstances that dampen viewer
enthusiasm can arise in a league for which a mega-media company has no
short-term recourse. Because of the risk that traditional leagues will not
operate their affairs so as not to alienate viewers, mega-media companies are
increasingly taking steps to protect their investments in league products.
Mega-media companies and established leagues now talk of entering into
"partnerships" when they contract for the purchase of a league's transmission
rights.295
The current relationship between NBC and the NBA is illustrative of the
new "partnership" arrangements that are becoming more prevalent in the
media/sports industry. Dick Ebersol, chairman of NBC Sports, which outbid
CBS for the television broadcast rights to NBA games in 1989, and David
Stem, commissioner of the NBA, have a "very close personal friendship" and
speak to one another approximately three hundred days a year.296 This
arrangement reflects Ebersol's belief "in building partnerships with the teams,
leagues and properties that NBC telecasts, creating sports programming that is
closer to entertainment than to hard news."297 Stem, "who sees television as
the primary window on his sport," is also very much involved in the television
production of NBA games.298 Among other things, Stem negotiates minimum
production standards in the NBA's contracts with mega-media companies and
participates in the weekly meetings with NBC and Turner Sports about the
past and upcoming telecasts of NBA games.299
Though forging "partnerships' is now in vogue, recent events in the sports
programming world show that the ties between a particular mega-media
company and professional sports league are not permanent and that a league's
profits-not loyalty-often dictate the identity of its mega-media company
partner. A long-term relationship with a traditional professional sports league
does not guarantee a mega-media company the league's transmission rights in
the future. This principle is best demonstrated by the experience of CBS with
respect to obtaining rights to televise NFL games. In 1961, CBS was the first
295. Hill remarks, supra note 282 (noting that FOX Sports seeks to "partner" with an established
professional sports league to present the sport on television).
296. Schoenfeld, supra note 174, at 97.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 97-98.
299. Id. at 98.
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American network to purchase the NFL's national television rights and
continually televised NFL games for the next thirty-two years.300 In 1993,
however, the NFL terminated its relationship with CBS, primarily because the
FOX network, a subsidiary of News Corporation, outbid CBS for the league's
television rights.301 In 1998, CBS regained television rights to NFL games by
outbidding NBC, a network with a long history of televising NFL games. 302
Similarly, in November 1999, NASCAR, the American stock car racing series
and an increasingly valuable programming property, decided to award its
television rights to an alliance between NBC and Turner Broadcasting Station
(TBS) (a subsidiary of Time Warner, Inc.) and FOX Sports. 30 3 CBS, despite
providing the first live coverage of a NASCAR event and televising
NASCAR's premier event, the Daytona 500, every year since 1979, was not
granted television rights to any NASCAR races. 304
Mega-media companies, therefore, face many challenges in purchasing
transmission rights from established professional sports leagues. The price for
these rights continues to rise.305 Disruptions in league operations beyond a
mega-media company's control threaten to decrease the quality of a traditional
league's transmission rights, and consequently, a mega-media company's
return on its investment in these rights. Finally, a mega-media company is not
guaranteed the transmission rights of an established professional sports league,
even after establishing a long-term relationship with a particular league.
300. Ira Horowitz, Sports Broadcasting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS, supra
note 28, at 275, 283 (noting the first pooled rights contract between CBS and the NFL in 1961).
301. David Hill, The Impact of Technology and the Globalisation of Sport, FOX Sports History
(paper presented at ANZSLA Conference Sydney, Australia, Aug. 1999) (noting FOX Sports'
agreement with the NFL in 1993 to televise NFL games) (on file with author).
302. Michael Hiestand, Fox, NBC New Drivers in NASCAR, USATODAY.COM (noting that
NBC lost the rights to televise NFL games), available at
http://www.usatoday.comlsports/motor/nascar/smnaO 10.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 1999).
303. Id. (noting that NASCAR awarded its television rights to FOX and NBC, two mega-media
companies that had never before televised NASCAR races).
304. Id. (noting CBS's history of televising NASCAR events since 1979).
305. Hiestand, supra note 283 (noting that escalation in the price for the transmission rights to
popular sporting events is not likely to abate in the near future).
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CHAPTER THREE
MEDIA LEAGUES: AN ALTERNATIVE TO PURCHASING PRODUCTS FROM
TRADITIONAL LEAGUES
I. EXPLANATION OF THE MEDIA LEAGUE CONCEPT
A media league is the "in-house" production by a mega-media company of
a competition among professional sports teams. A media league represents a
mega-media company's vertical integration of content origination of
professional sports league programming into the other stages of
"broadcasting" production (e.g., content and service packaging, service
provision, infrastructure provision, and terminal vending). 30 6 By creating a
media league, a mega-media company becomes a producer, rather than a
purchaser, of the products of a professional sports league.
In a media league, a mega-media company controls every aspect of the
professional sports league. The mega-media company performs all the
functions of a central competition organizer, league office, and the individual
clubs in a traditional league and owns all the products that a professional
sports league produces, including the intellectual property and transmission
rights for the league and clubs. Though variations in organizational details are
possible, the following is an example of a "parent/subsidiary" media league.
In a "parent/subsidiary" media league, each individual "club" is a
subsidiary of the parent mega-media company. Each "club subsidiary" fields
a team that competes in the league. Another subsidiary of the parent mega-
media company acts as the "central competition organizer" that administers
and coordinates the league competition. Ultimate authority over all league
policies and affairs, however, rests in the parent mega-media company.
Though not a novel idea,307 single firm, and particularly corporate,
ownership of a major professional sports league is rare.308 The lack of
306. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERAION AND DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION AND
COMPETrnON ISSUES iN BROADCASTING IN THE LIGr OF CONVERGENCE, DAFFE/CLP (99)1, at 33-
34 [hereinafter OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE] (identifying and defining five stages of production
in broadcasting).
307. Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at 12 ("One might conceive of a different world in which a
single firm owned and managed all the teams. In that case, coordination of football would be nothing
more than a parent corporation's operation of its subsidiaries, and no joint venture would be
necessary.").
308. In both the United States and Australia, single firms, including individuals, own minor
professional sports leagues. Greg Boeck, Thomas Takes Major Steps: Ex-NBA Star Makes Big
Impact with CBA, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2000, at 14C (noting Isiah Thomas' purchase of the
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corporate ownership of professional sports leagues in the United States and
Australia is somewhat surprising given that there "is no inherent barrier 309 or
"legal impediment 310 to a league structure whereby a single corporation
operates the league and controls the teams. The reason typically given for the
absence of single firm ownership of a professional sports league is that the
common ownership of all the teams in the league creates the "appearance that
there is no real competitive rivalry among franchises." 311 It is argued that
corporate ownership of all the teams in the league may lead consumers to
believe that the competition between teams is not honest and the outcomes of
the contests are predetermined to serve the owner's financial well being.
312
To be sure, honest authentic rivalry among participating teams is critical to
the success of a professional sports league. For this reason, traditional leagues
in the United States and Australia carefully guard against any perception that
their contests are "rigged" or in any way influenced by outside sources,
especially those connected to gambling and organized crime. 313  An
association of independently owned or operated clubs, however, is not the only
structural format that can produce legitimate matches between teams
comprised of professional athletes. The structure of American and Australian
established leagues is as much a product of historical accident as it is of a
conscious decision on the part of league founders to create and preserve an
authentic competition among professional sports teams.314 Nothing in that
history precludes the creation and operation of a legitimate sports competition
by a single mega-media company.
Just like it creates and encourages rivalry among its divisions, subsidiaries,
or employees as a means of obtaining more efficient production,315 a mega-
Continental Basketball League (CBA), a minor professional basketball league in the United States);
Michael Cowley, Baseball: Storm Shortstop Has Buckley's of Forgetting Inning from Hell,
SMH.cOM.AU (Feb. 15, 1999) (noting David Nilsson's purchase of the professional baseball league in
Australia), available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/9902/1 5/sprot/sport27.html.
309. Roberts, supra note 30, at 237 n.56.
310. Id. at 263 n.155.
311. Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports League Revisited:
Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 729, 782 n.224 (1987).
312. Roberts, supra note 30, at 263 ("Because the attractiveness of the entertainment product
depends to a large extent on the appearance of, and fan identification with, honest interleague rivalry,
sports leagues always have structured themselves to foster it.").
313. DeBartolo Fined $1 Million, ESPN.COM (Mar. 15, 1999) (noting the $1 million fine the
NFL levied against Eddie DeBartolo, former owner of the San Francisco 49ers, for his association
with organized gambling figures), at http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/1999/990315/01163331 .html.
314. See supra notes 11-54 and accompanying text (discussing the development of American and
Australian established professional sports leagues).
315. Roberts, supra note 30, at 264. Roberts stated that:
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media company through proper planning can promote real, heated rivalry
between the club subsidiaries in a media league. To accomplish this, a media
league should have at least eight clubs, the number generally recognized as the
minimum for a professional sports league to succeed. 316 A mega-media
company can maximize attendance at games and viewing audience by locating
its clubs in major metropolitan markets since attendance at sporting events is
directly proportional to population317 and the large population centers in the
United States and Australia have a relatively large percentage of the television
households in these two countries. 318 Knowing the importance of creating an
honest and transparent competition between the clubs, the mega-media
company parent should not manipulate the outcome of games nor the
performance of players in an effort to increase ratings or audiences. 319
Though a mega-media company may promote the geographic rivalries
between its clubs and highlight the star players in the league, it should not
interfere with the internal operation of an individual club, such as dictating a
club's use of players in a game.320 Each "club subsidiary" should have total
control over its team with respect to "on-the-field" issues.
In addition to guarding club autonomy, the mega-media company parent
must treat each club impartially to preserve the integrity of its media league.
For example, a mega-media company must implement a player allocation
Partnerships and large corporations frequently create and encourage rivalry among their partners,
divisions, subsidiaries, or employees as a means of encouraging more efficient and productive
activity.... Ideally, this internal rivalry creates for the partner, division, subsidiary, or employee interest
and incentive to maximize the firm's interests. Such rivalry benefits not only the firm, whose profits will
be increased, but also the consumer who should see an increase in overall economic efficiency resulting
in lower prices or in more and higher quality products.
Id.
316. Ross, supra note 9, at 660-61 (noting that eight teams is likely the minimum number of
clubs for a professional sports league to succeed).
317. Roger G. Noll, Attendance andPrice Setting, in GoVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BusINEss,
supra note 28, at 115, 154 ("[T]here is a tendency for a team of any given quality to have greater
attendance if it is located in a big city."); DEMMERT, supra note 66, at 68 ("Population has a positive
effect on the demand for tickets, the more populous a market, the greater the demand for tickets.").
318. Rosenbaum, supra note 311, at 819-20 ("[T]he largest population centers comprise the
greatest share of the television viewing population."). See generally Rosenthal, supra note 81, at 429
(noting that "big city teams supply the fan base that makes valuable television contracts possible").
319. Robert Wagman, Baicher-Jair Trade Raises Ethical Questions About MiS Ownership,
SOCCERTIMES.COM (Aug. 17, 1999) (noting that the trade of players between two MLS clubs owned
by the same person which appeared to favor the team with a better chance of making the playoffs
raised concerns about the integrity of the league), available at
http://soccertimes.comlwagman/1999/aug17.htm.
320. Alan Deutschman, Sly as Fox, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1998 (Magazine), at 68, 70 (reporting
that News Corporation's FOX network may have tried to coerce the Chicago Cubs into playing a star
player in order to improve ratings for one of its broadcasts during the 1998 MLB season).
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scheme that distributes playing talent equally among the clubs. Despite
evidence that overall game attendance and revenues are increased by larger
market teams having a slightly higher winning percentage and more star
players than smaller market teams, 321 a mega-media company must resist the
temptation to skew the playing quality of its teams in favor of the larger
market clubs. Though favoring larger market clubs may maximize media
league revenues in the short-term, continual implementation of such a policy is
likely to erode consumer confidence in the league, damaging the long-term
prospects for a media league's success. 322
A mega-media company can choose from a number of different
arrangements to promote competitive balance in a media league. For example,
the parent company may grant each club subsidiary an equal amount of funds
with a fixed amount designated for signing players and another fixed sum to
operate the team. This scheme requires either the parent company or the
subsidiary central competition organizer to enforce a salary cap. With a salary
cap, a mega-media company is forced to expend sums to monitor and enforce
clubs' adherence to the cap. Alternatively, the parent company may allot each
club subsidiary a lump sum allowing each team to decide how much to spend
on players, coaches, and other expenses. Either option would substantially
eliminate any rich club-poor club disparity and produce a rivalry between the
club subsidiaries on the field and in the front office.
Another possible competitive balance arrangement would be for the parent
company to sign the players and then use a draft system to distribute the
players to the clubs. The mega-media company could create a tiered salary
structure based on players' skills and sign a certain number of players in each
salary category. Then each club would select a fixed "amount" of players. 323
A significant difference between this option and the schemes discussed
321. Zimmerman & Cox, supra note 74, at 2 n.4 (noting that league revenues are maximized by
large market teams having slightly higher winning percentages than smaller market teams); Noll,
supra note 317, at 154 (concluding that star players draw more fans in a large city than a small city);
James Quirk, An Economic Analysis of Team Movements in Professional Sports, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 42, 44 & n.4 (1973) (noting that though big city franchises have greater revenue
potential than small city franchises and that star players are thus valued more highly by the former,
there is an economic limit on the number of star players any franchise should sign).
322. Better Late Than Never, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 19, 1995, at 28 (noting that fans of
small market MLS teams are worried that the league, which has extensive control over player
allocation, will move their better players to large market clubs where they have a greater value to the
league), available at 1995 WL 12559364. See generally Hill remarks, supra note 282 (emphasizing
that "the consumer is keen" and that a firm involved with a professional sports league that ignores this
fact does so at its peril); supra notes 80-115 and accompanying text (discussing competitive
imbalance problem in MLB).
323. PETER FITZSIMONS, THE RUGBY WAR 67 (1996) (describing the World Rugby Union
Corporation's proposed gradated salary scale).
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previously is that the parent company, instead of the individual clubs, decides
how much to spend on a particular player. An advantage of clubs making the
player hiring decisions is that this arrangement gives the clubs greater
autonomy, which may provide consumers more assurance of club
independence. An advantage of the sign/draft proposal is that it eliminates the
need for a salary cap. Under either proposal, the mega-media company
ultimately controls the cost of hiring players.
To provide a further incentive for spirited competition between the clubs,
a mega-media company could allow the club subsidiary hosting a game to
retain a percentage of the gate revenues to encourage the club to build a
winning team.324 This approach would be particularly appropriate if each club
subsidiary is solely responsible for promoting the team in its geographic
area.325 In addition, the employees of a club subsidiary could be paid bonuses
based on the club's level of success.326
Thus by structuring its media league appropriately, a mega-media
company can ensure legitimate, honest contests between evenly matched
teams.
II. FACTORS FAVORING MEDIA LEAGUE FORMATION
Several indicators point toward the future formation of media leagues.
These are (1) the relationship between mega-media companies and
professional sports leagues and the effect of the integration of the media and
telecommunications markets on this relationship; (2) globalization of the
entertainment economy in general, and professional sports leagues in
particular; (3) a single firm's treatment under the American and Australian
antitrust laws; (4) a mega-media company's ability to innovate in response to
changing consumer preferences; and (5) the ready availability of players in the
United States and Australia.
324. DEMMERT, supra note 66, at 89. Demmert states that:
The integrity of athletic competition, and thus the primary attraction of sport, is insured when players are
clearly and explicitly motivated to win by direct and visible economic incentives. The interest of the fan
is directly related to the stakes of the game, and if these stakes are diminished the sport loses part of its
appeal.
Id.
325. Gary R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, The Rule of
Reason, and the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 943, 986 n.157 (1988) (noting
that each American established professional sports league allows each club to retain a majority of the
home gate receipts as an incentive for the clubs to market vigorously and to field a winning team).
326. Hank Hersch, Now the HardPart, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 31, 1994, at 6 (noting MLS's
incentive system of paying bonuses to winning teams), available at 1994 WL 13594123.
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A. The Relationship Between Professional Sports Leagues and Mega-Media
Companies and the Effect of the Integration of the Media and
Telecommunications Markets
1. Importance of mega-media companies to professional sports leagues
Establishing a relationship with at least one mega-media company is
economically essential for traditional American and Australian leagues.327
Traditional leagues rely on mega-media companies for a substantial portion, if
not a majority, of their revenues and for promotion of their contests on
national and local levels.328 A traditional league's failure to gamer the support
of a mega-media company is likely to limit severely its financial returns and
threaten its long-term survival. 329
2. Importance of professional sports leagues to mega-media companies
Though not necessarily critical to their survival, professional sports
leagues are important to mega-media companies. 330 Sports leagues provide
mega-media companies with valuable programming content. Telecasts of
professional sports events have the potential to attract a large viewing
audience with a relatively high percentage of young male viewers. 331 This
feature of a professional sports league is especially valuable to free-to-air
broadcasters, since many advertisers covet the attention of a young male
audience. Broadcasters routinely charge some of their highest fees for
advertising time during the telecasts of the most popular games of an
327. United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1353 (2d Cir.
1988) (noting that a television contract is the most vital requirement for a professional sports league);
BERRY & WONG, supra note 17, at 61 ("Television has been called the salvation of modem
professional sports."); Rosenbaum, supra note 311, at 803 ("[A] television contract [is] perhaps the
most critical measure of success in the highly competitive sports industry.").
328. The league obtains advertising from the mega-media company's promotion of its telecasts
of the league's contests during its other programming hours. This benefit is similar to the one the
league receives from news coverage of its competition. Neale, supra note 8, at 3-4 (discussing the
effect of news coverage on a league's revenues).
329. Rosenbaum, supra note 311, at 803 ("Without this essential commitment of network
broadcasting time, the USFL was destined to fail.").
330. WOLF, supra note 3, at 244 ("No premier network has ever survived without marquee sports
as a vehicle to attract male viewers.").
331. Harvey Araton, Bizball, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1998 (Magazine), at 59, 60 (noting the ability
of professional sports programming to "pull strong demographic groups"); FITZSIMONS, supra note
323, at 2 (noting that at the time News Ltd. started Super League, telecasts of top grade rugby league
were the most popular television shows among the 18-35 year-old male population in New South
Wales and Queensland).
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established league. 332
The recent experiences of CBS, one of the four major free-to-air networks
in the United States, with respect to its telecasts of NFL games demonstrate
the extent to which network broadcasters treasure the transmission rights to
major professional sports leagues. In 1993, News Corporation, which wanted
NFL transmission rights to boost the credibility of its fledging FOX broadcast
network, outbid CBS for the rights to televise NFL games.333 From 1994-97,
the years the network was without NFL programming, the ratings for CBS's
shows dropped considerably.334 In an attempt to break its ratings slump, in
1998 CBS paid $4 billion (U.S.) over eight years for the non-exclusive rights
to televise NFL games.335  Not coincidentally, shortly after regaining
transmission rights to NFL games, CBS's ratings climbed dramatically, its
viewership among young males increased substantially, and the network had
the highest ratings of any free-to-air broadcaster in the United States for the
1998-99 television season.336
Sports programming is also a major driver of subscriptions for a mega-
media company's fee-based services, such as cable or satellite television.
Rupert Murdoch's statement that News Corporation "'intend[s] to use sport[s]
as a battering ram in all [its] pay-television operations"' makes clear that
"sport is being used to drive the growth of pay television." 337  News
Corporation is following this strategy in establishing its English and
Australian pay-television services by acquiring the transmission rights to the
English Premier Football League and the top grade Australian professional
rugby league competition.338
332. Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner and
an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 65 (1995)
("[B]roadcasting companies use professional sports as their most important medium to sell
commercial time.").
333. Araton, supra note 331, at 60.
334. Id. at 61 (noting that CBS was a "slumping network" before it regained transmission rights
to NFL games in 1998).
335. Id. (noting that in making its deal with the NFL, "some media analysts said [CBS] was
banking its very future on football's power to draw male viewers back to the slumping network").
336. Id. (noting that CBS won the "ratings race" for the first two weeks of the NFL season in
1998, the first time the network had "led any week since ... 1993"); Mark Scheerer, Guy TV-
Networks Vying for Remote Control, CNN.COM (noting that CBS had "a jump in male viewership
ever since it paid an unprecedented $4 billion for the rights to televise NFL games"), available at
http:/www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/TV/9811/17/guy.tv.html (last visited May 27, 1999).
337. OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 33 n.4.
338. Id. (noting that News Corporation's acquisition of "the rights to Premier League football
turned BSkyB from a deadweight that nearly sank the Murdoch empire into the world's most
profitable satellite-television operator, and the dominant power in the pay-television business in
Britain").
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Finally, sports provide mega-media companies with a large number of
hours of programming that contrasts sharply with their regular fare of scripted
taped programming. 339 The recent transmission rights agreement between
MLB and Disney demonstrates the quantity of content a professional sports
league can provide a mega-media company that has multiple platforms from
which to transmit programming. "Each year from 2000 through 2005, ESPN
and ESPN2 [two of Disney's cable channels] will present more than 800 hours
of regular-season game and studio coverage, up from approximately 500 hours
on both networks in 1999.,,340 The agreement also increases the amount of
MLB content on Disney's ESPN Radio, ESPN Classic, and ESPN.com media
outlets.341
Because of the value of professional sports league programming, many
mega-media companies are willing to risk certain financial loss for the
transmission rights of an established league on the expectation that any loss
suffered will be offset by other benefits of sports content. For example,
though News Corporation lost $350 million (U.S.) on its $1.58 billion (U.S.)
purchase of free-to-air rights to NFL games in 1993, the value of its FOX
network increased by approximately $4 billion (U.S.) over its four-year NFL
deal.342 Even if one mega-media company decides that the loss from
purchasing the transmission rights of an established league is too great,
another mega-media company is often willing to take the risk of acquiring the
league's product. For example, in 1998 Disney agreed to pay $600 million
(U.S.) over five years for the National Hockey League's (NHL) exclusive
transmission rights, even though News Corporation had lost $155 million
(U.S.) over the preceding five years on its $150 million (U.S.) purchase of the
NHL's free-to-air television rights.343
339. Rudy Martzke, Sports in the 20e' Century: TV Brought Games Into Homes,
USATODAY.CoM (Feb. 15, 1999) ("'In the beginning, the TV stations had the time, and sports was
there to fill the hours."' (quoting Jim McKay, noted American sports journalist and commentator)),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/stues2.htm; STEVE GREENFIELD & GUY OSBORN,
CONTRACT AND CONTROL IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 171 n.8 (1998) (noting that
professional sports provide "multi-channel broadcasters with a cornucopia of content to fill many
programming hours").
340. ESPN, ESPN2 To Present More Than 800 Hours of Coverage, ESPN.coM (Dec. 6, 1999)
(reporting the details of the agreement between MLB and ESPN), at
http://espn.go.com/espninc/pressreleases/991206mlb.html.
341. ESPN Boosts Annual MLB Coverage, ESPN.cOM (Dec. 6, 1999), at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/1 999/1206/216862.html.
342. Araton, supra note 331, at 60-61 (noting the benefits of NFL programming to News
Corporation).
343. Deutschman, supra note 320, at 71 (noting that Disney bought the NHL's rights out of
desperation to reach young male viewers); Araton, supra note 33 1, at 61 (reporting the details of
Disney's and News Corporation's NHL deals).
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3. Convergence of the media and telecommunications markets
The media and telecommunications markets in the United States and
Australia are converging. Convergence is generally defined
as the process under which, due to underlying technological changes,
economies of scope increase to the point where two or more products
or services which were previously produced by separate firms are
produced within the same firm.... In other words, at root
convergence is related to the effect of technological changes on
economies of scope."344
"Economies of scope" are "'economies of joint production or distribution'
that result 'from the use of processes within a single operating unit to produce
or distribute more than one product or service."'
345
Convergence of the media and telecommunications markets is a result of
the following developments:
* digitalisation (which allows all form of information content,
including audio and video to be handled over the same networks in the
same manner);
* the fall in the price of computing (allowing the development of
sophisticated and affordable consumer equipment for
encoding/decoding signals and interacting with multimedia
information);
a reduced costs of bandwidth (and compression technologies which
allow existing bandwidth to be used more efficiently); and
telecommunications liberalisation (allowing new firms to enter
previously protected markets).346
These developments are leading to convergence in both market structure
and content in the media and telecommunications industries. With respect to
market structure, "the tendency [is] for both broadcasters and
telecommunications firms to offer high-bandwidth two-way communication
344. Id.
345. Eric NV. Orts, The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1947, 1957 n.29
(1998) (quoting ALFRED D. CHANDLER, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM 17 (1990)) (alterations omitted).
346. OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 43. The Telecommunications Act of
1996 was a major piece of legislation that helped spur the convergence of the media and
telecommunication markets in the United States. See also Marc L. Herskovitz, Note, The Repeal of
the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules: The Demise of Program Diversity and Television
Network Competition?, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 177, 207-08 (1997) (discussing provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
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services which simultaneously provide access to a number of different
channels of video programming, voice telephony and access to the
Internet. 347 In regard to convergence in content, "[t]he previously separate
markets for content for newspapers, television, film and Internet publishing
are overlapping and, to an extent, combining into a single market for
interactive content. '348 While convergence is causing "'a gradual increase in
the consumption of customised, interactive services,"' there remains continued
"'demand for uncustomised multi-channel entertainment.' ' 34
9
The convergence of the media and telecommunications markets is already
producing dramatic effects in the industry with respect to market structure, the
level of competition and product and service offerings. As expected with
increases in economies of scope, the market structure is changing through a
"very large number of mergers and alliances." 350  Horizontal mergers and
alliances are occurring between media and telecommunications firms, media
and Internet firms, and Internet and telecommunications firms.351 Vertical
mergers and alliances are also occurring between content providers and
Internet, media, and telecommunications firms.352  These mergers and
alliances are creating major multi-media conglomerates and making traditional
lines of business designations such as "telephone companies" and "cable
companies" obsolete. 353
Convergence is increasing the number of firms offering entertainment
content and the range of platforms from which entertainment content is
launched. "Old telecommunications firms" and new start-ups, such as Internet
firms, are joining traditional network broadcasters and cable operators in
offering programming directly to consumers. These firms offer content in
both passive (ie., one-way transmission) and interactive (i.e., two-way
communication) forms. New means of transmitting programming include
digital satellite and terrestrial television, fiber optic cable, asymmetric digital
subscriber line (ADSL),354 and high bandwidth mobile communication. 355
347. OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 43.
348. Id.
349. Id. (quoting DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (U.K.), REGULATING
COMMUNICATIONS: APPROACHING CONVERGENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 47 (July 1998)).
350. Id. at 46.
351. Id. (discussing horizontal mergers resulting from convergence).
352. Id. (discussing vertical mergers caused by convergence).
353. H. Peter Nesvold, Note, Communication Breakdown: Developing an Antitrust Model for
Multimedia, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 781, 851-52 (1996) (noting the effect of
mergers between media and telecommunication companies).
354. ADSL is a means to deliver full multimedia information over a copper wire. OECD PAPER
ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 37 (discussing ADSL technology).
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Consumers now have ready access to numerous passive "traditional television
channels" and a seemingly infinite number of interactive Internet sites.356 The
future promises an unlimited supply of "interactive television" once high
bandwidth Internet broadcasting becomes a reality.357
4. Convergence increases mega-media companies' demand for professional
sports programming
Firms participating in the converging media and telecommunications
markets are competing intensely for consumers.35 8 Audience measurements in
the United States "show that Web users already consumer [sic] 59 per cent less
television than average viewers." 359 As one commentator notes:
[One] relevant feature of television is that audiences are relatively
fixed. If anything, people are watching less television, presumably
because other forms of leisure and entertainment are competing with
television. Furthermore, there is little evidence that increasing the
number of channels or introducing pay TV channels increases average
viewing hours, although pay TV subscribers may watch more hours on
average than those who watch [free television] only. Therefore, as the
number of channels or stations increases, the same audience is spread
or fragmented among more channels. This means that, all things
being equal, the introduction of pay TV takes away from [free
television] broadcasters, and tends to reduce average audiences per
station or per channel.360
Given the vast proliferation of passive and interactive "channels" and
heightened competition for consumers, a key concern for mega-media
companies in the converging market is obtaining access to attractive content,
355. Id. at 36 (listing the various "High-Bandwidth Communications Links To The Consumer").
356. The market penetration of pay television services is substantially greater in the United States
than it is in Australia, though it is increasing rapidly in the latter country. Id. at 83 (noting that in
1995 approximately 70% of American television households subscribed to pay television services,
compared to 3% in Australia); See also Elizabeth Knight, Tuning Into View from the Couch,
SMH.COM.AU (noting that in Australia the television audience is migrating from free-to-air networks
to cable television), available at http://www.smh.com/au/news/9904/27/business/business8.html (last
visited Apr. 27, 1999).
357. OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 44 ("Digital satellite and terrestrial
television is expanding rapidly.").
358. FCC Approves Satellite TV Deal, USATODAY.COM (noting that satellite television
companies are the main competitor against local cable television companies), available at
http:/www.usatoday.comlmoney/mdsO3l.htm (last modified Apr. 1, 1999).
359. OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 49.
360. CENTO VELANOVSKI, PAY TV IN AUSTRALiA: MARKETS AND MERGERS 28 (1999).
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particularly professional sports league programming. 361  A mega-media
company, however, faces many challenges with respect to acquiring
professional sports content. The "increase in the number of bidders" for
professional sports league programming increases the price American and
Australian established leagues charge for their products. 362 For example in
Australia, "[f]or the first time, at least five major telecommunications
companies and broadcasters.., are fighting it out for the richest deal in AFL
history," which will double the amount the AFL currently receives for its
transmission rights.363  Convergence increases the likelihood that an
established mega-media company will be outbid for the transmission rights of
a professional sports league since many new firms will be eager to acquire
content. One new competitor may even be an established league itself, which
now has the capacity to transmit its own contests rather than sell its
transmission rights to a mega-media company.364 Moreover, not uncommonly
an established league divides its transmission rights into different platform
categories (e.g., free-to-air, cable television, digital television, and Internet
broadcasting rights) and sells the exclusive rights to each category to a
particular mega-media company.365 A mega-media company that fails to
purchase the exclusive rights to any category may find itself without
professional sports content that is critical to its programming needs.
5. Mega-media companies' attempts to secure access to professional sports
league content
a. Mega-media companies' ownership of individual clubs in traditional
professional sports leagues
In response to the high costs and uncertainty associated with buying
361. OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 49 (noting that access to sports content
is an important issue in the post-convergence market).
362. VELJANOVSKI, supra note 360, at 31-33 (noting that increasing the number of programming
bidders will increase the programs' prices).
363. Patrick Smith, TV Rights Battle Hots Up, THEAGE.COM.AU, available at
http://www.theage.com.au/daily/990820/sport/sportl3.html (last visited Aug. 20, 1999).
364. NBA Launches NBA.com TV, NBA.COM (announcing the NBA's creation of NBA.com TV,
"a new 24-hour television network" on satellite television that offers continuous coverage of the
league), available at http://www.nba.com/nbatv/nbatvlaunches.html (last visited Nov. 15, 1999).
365. Smith, supra note 363 (noting that in its next auction of transmission rights in 2001, the
AFL may sell its free-to-air, pay television and Internet rights separately), available at
http://www.theage.com.au/daily/990820/sport/sportl3.html; Churchill, supra note 130 (noting that
ESPN purchased the NFL's exclusive cable television rights), available at
http://www.theage.com.au/daily/990820/sport/sportl 3.html.
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professional sports league programming from traditional leagues, many mega-
media companies are purchasing individual clubs in these leagues. Mega-
media company ownership of professional sports clubs in traditional leagues is
increasing with the advent of convergence as these firms seek to secure access
to professional sports content. Mega-media company ownership of an
individual club, however, is much more common in the United States than it is
in Australia. Individual clubs in Australia are still primarily owned by non-
profit community organizations, though equity investment in Australian
leagues by both individuals and mega-media companies is increasing.
366
Examples of purchases by mega-media companies of individual clubs in
recent years in the United States include News Corporation's purchase of the
Los Angeles Dodgers in MLB and Time Warner, Inc.'s acquisition of the
Atlanta Hawks, Atlanta Braves, and Atlanta Thrashers of the NBA, MLB, and
NHL, respectively.367
A mega-media company receives many benefits from purchasing an
individual club in a traditional league. With ownership of a club, a mega-
media company acquires the club's local transmission rights and the club's
share of league revenues. 368 Additionally, a mega-media company buys
participation in the administration of the league and a voice in the league's
determination of how and to whom to sell its league-wide transmission rights
and other products.369  Synergistic benefits also flow to a mega-media
company from purchasing an individual club.370 For example, Disney named
366. Roy Masters, Singleton Bucks the Trend, Buys Broncos Shares, SMH.COM.AU (July 21,
1999) (noting that a Sydney businessman bought a share in the Brisbane Broncos, a publicly traded
NRL club, "with a view to becoming a majority owner when News Ltd." reduces its equity in the
club), available at http:llwww.smh.com.aulnews/9907/21/sport/sport6.html.
367. Joanna Cagan & Neil deMause, Bizbrawl, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998 (Magazine), at 66-67
(detailing mega-media companies' purchases of individual clubs in American established professional
sports leagues).
368. Stephen Ross, Anti-Competitive Aspects of Sports, 7 COMPETITION AND CONSUMER L.J.
125, 133 (1999) (noting that News Corporation's purchase of the Los Angeles Dodgers gave the fh-m
ownership of the club's "valuable rights to the revenue from sale of local television"); Matt
Rubenstein, Ballpark Figures: The Real Cost of Sports Broadcasting Rights, GILBERT & TOBIN 1, 6
(Apr. 1, 1998) ("'Owning the team is a way of making sure you don't lose the [transmission] rights."'
(quoting Peter Barton, former CEO of Liberty Sports)), available at
http://www.gtlaw.com.aultemplateslpublicationsldefault.jsp?pubid=1 19.
369. Cagan & deMause, supra note 367, at 66 (noting that one of the advantages News
Corporation sought from its attempt to purchase Manchester United, the world's most famous soccer
club, was bargaining power in its negotiations with the English Premier League for the league's
television rights).
370. Id. at 67 (noting the synergistic benefits mega-media companies receive from ownership of
an individual club in a professional sports league); Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d at 597 [hereinafter Bulls HI1] (listing the benefits superstation WGN
receives from telecasting Chicago Bulls' games).
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the NHL expansion franchise it acquired in 1993 after the fictional hockey
team in its 1992 movie "Mighty Ducks," whose "logo provided a key plot
point for the sequel, 'D2,"' released in 1994.371
Despite the benefits of club ownership, purchasing an individual club in a
traditional American or Australian league may not be a suitable means of
satisfying a mega-media company's demand for professional sports
programming. Though not generally the case, an established league may
prohibit a public corporation-which almost all mega-media companies are-
from purchasing an individual club. For example, the NFL effectively, though
not expressly, precludes a public corporation from owning an individual club
through extensive reporting requirements imposed on all club owners and an
"uncodified... prohibition against transfer of any interest of a member
franchise to the public." 372  William Sullivan, former owner of the New
England Patriots, sued the NFL over its prohibition on public ownership after
the league thwarted his plans to sell shares in the club to the public.373 At
trial, the jury found that the NFL's rule violated section 1 of the Sherman Act
and awarded damages to Sullivan.374 On appeal, the court held that Sullivan
"had presented sufficient evidence of harm to competition in sale of ownership
interests in NFL clubs" to support the jury's verdict, but reversed the judgment
in favor of Sullivan because of "several prejudicial trial errors." 375 The NFL
and Sullivan eventually settled the litigation out of court. No other owner or
prospective purchaser of a club has challenged the NFL's bar on public
ownership of franchises.
A mega-media company may not find club ownership a satisfactory option
for obtaining access to professional sports league content for other reasons.
Though it provides control over a club's local transmission rights, club
ownership does not assure a mega-media company of procurement of the
league's transmission rights. Owning a club may strengthen its bargaining
position, but a mega-media company must still outbid its competitors. The
degree of influence club ownership provides a mega-media company with
respect to negotiations for a league's transmission rights may be reduced by
another mega-media company's ownership of a club in the same league. For
example, one would not expect News Corporation to have much sway with
respect to MLB's auction of its transmission rights given that Disney and
371. Cagan & deMause, supra note 367, at 67.
372. Hartel, supra note 35, at 605.
373. Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1096 (lst Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1190 (1994).
374. Id.
375. Hartel, supra note 35, at 606.
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Time Warner, Inc. also own clubs.
The purchase price of an individual club may also deter a mega-media
company's foray into club ownership. The monetary value of franchises in an
established league has steadily climbed throughout the 1990s.376 The
purchase price for a club may seem particularly steep to a mega-media
company when it takes into account that it may lose the benefits of owning an
individual club by circumstances beyond its control such as a labor dispute.
Having more than one mega-media company owner may exacerbate collective
action problems since competing media owners may have difficulty
cooperating with each other.377
b. Mega-media companies' equity investment in playing facilities
As an alternative or complement to purchasing an individual club, mega-
media companies in the United States and Australia are making equity
investments in new state-of-the-art playing facilities as a means of securing
access to professional sports content.378 Ownership of a playing facility
allows a mega-media company to control physical access to the site and
ensures the proper production of the transmission of a club's games. By
owning a facility, a mega-media company also receives revenues from selling
the naming rights to the facility and tickets to premium seating such as luxury
suites. For example, through its forty percent equity interest in a new indoor
arena in Los Angeles, the Staples Center, News Corporation receives a share
of the $100 million that Staples, Inc., an office supply company, paid for the
naming rights to the facility.379
Where more than one team in a traditional league shares a facility for their
regular season home games, a relatively common situation in Australia, a
mega-media company's equity share in the facility may enhance its bargaining
376. GREENBERG & GRAY, supra note 82, at 15 ("The purchase price for sports fianchises has
continued to escalate throughout the 1990's in all four major sports leagues.").
377. Klapisch, supra note 88 (noting that it is "unlikely" that mega-media owners Time Warner,
Inc., Disney, and News Corporation can agree to greater revenue sharing that would help solve
MLB's competitive imbalance problem), available at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/features/01082162.html.
378. Rubenstein, supra note 368, at 3 (noting that an organizer of a professional sporting event
should have an equity stake in the venue "to make sure" it can secure appropriate access to the facility
to protect its ability to sell transmission rights), available at
http://www.gtlaw.com.au/templates/publications/default.jsp?pubid=l 19.
379. Cagan & deMause, supra note 367, at 66 (reporting the deal for naming rights to the new
Los Angeles arena, home of the NBA's Lakers and Clippers and NHL's Kings franchises);
Associated Press, Reports: Deal To Give Murdoch Bigger Stake in Kniks, Rangers, ESPN.CoM (Apr.
2, 1999) (reporting that News Corporation's buyout of Liberty Media's 50% interest in Fox/Liberty
Networks gives News Corporation a 40% interest in the Staples Center), at http://www.espn.go.com.
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position with the league in negotiations for the league's transmission rights.
The construction of Docklands Stadium, a new state-of-the-art outdoor facility
in Melbourne, Australia, is instructive on this point. The primary tenant for
the new stadium is the AFL, the most popular professional sports league in
Melbourne. The AFL pays $30 million (Aud) for a twenty-five year lease of
the stadium at the end of which term the league receives freehold title to the
facility.3 80 Five AFL clubs use the stadium as a venue for at least part of their
regular season home games. 381 The AFL also plans to sell its existing
headquarters to finance its new lease agreement and to move its offices to the
new stadium.382
"During the process to determine the developers of the Docklands
Stadium," Channel Nine, controlled by PBL, and Channel Seven, two
Australian national television networks, each aligned itself "in commercial
arrangements with consortia bidding to develop the new stadium."383 Not
coincidentally, Channel Nine and Channel Seven are also the two networks
that covet most earnestly the AFL's free-to-air television rights.
384
Ultimately, the consortium of which Channel Seven and News Ltd. were a part
won the right to develop Docklands Stadium. Benefits Channel Seven
receives from its $99.5 million (Aud) investment in the stadium include the
right to own and operate television studios within the stadium385 and a share of
the revenues from "the naming and external signage rights to the complex as
well as the ticketing rights" to events held at the stadium.386 Channel Seven
hopes that its involvement in developing Docklands Stadium enhances its
chances of acquiring the league's transmission rights in 2001 after the
conclusion of the current contract between the league and network.
387
Ownership of a playing facility does not, however, guarantee a mega-
media company the transmission rights to the professional sports league or
380. AFL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 20 (detailing the AFL's lease agreement with
Melbourne Docklands Authority).
381. The AFL at Colonial Stadium, AFL.COM.AU (detailing the AFL's lease of Colonial
Stadium), available at http://www.afl.com/au/lib/acrobat/cs-info.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 1999).
382. AFL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 20 (noting that the AFL is transferring its "equity
from Waverley Park to Docklands Stadium").
383. TV Rights, AFL.COM.AU, available at http://www.afl.com.au/insideafl/annual_5.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 1999).
384. Id. (noting that Channel Seven paid $20 million (Aud) to win the "very intense bidding"
with Channel Nine for the right to bid last for the AFL's free-to-air television rights).
385. Richard Hinds, TV Rights for Indoor Matches Still Up for Grabs, SMH.COM.AU (Nov. 18,
1999) (describing details of Channel Seven's investment in Docklands Stadium), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/9911/18/sport/sportl 0.html.
386. TV Rights, supra note 383, available at http://www.afl.com.au/insideafl/annual_5.htm.
387. Id.
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club that uses the venue. The venue owner controls physical access to the
facility.388 The hirer of the facility (e.g., the league or individual club) owns
the transmission rights to the event staged at the facility and may grant these
rights to whomever it chooses.389 Channel Seven's negotiations with the AFL
for the league's transmission rights reflect these principles. Despite its equity
share in Colonial Stadium, a facility at which the AFL plays at least thirty-five
matches a year, Channel Seven must still bid against other mega-media
companies for the AFL's transmission rights. For example, Channel Seven
paid $20 million (Aud) to outbid Channel Nine "for the right to bid last for the
AFL's free to air television rights for the year 2001."390 Thus, Channel
Seven's long-term relationship with the league and its status as one of the
AFL's new landlords does not ensure its acquisition of the AFL's transmission
rights.
6. A media league provides a mega-media company with advantages over
traditional means of procuring professional sports league programming
a. A media league reduces uncertainty costs associated with contracting
with traditional leagues for transmission rights
A media league may offer a mega-media company advantages over
obtaining the transmission rights to an established league by direct purchase,
ownership of an individual club, or investing in a playing facility.391 By
creating a media league, a mega-media company reduces the uncertainty costs
of buying sports programming on the market.392 Relative to contracting for
the transmission rights to a traditional league, a media league lowers the risk
to a mega-media company of a reduction in product quality from
circumstances outside of its control. 393 A mega-media company can direct the
resolution of any problems based on its costs and benefits-a more favorable
388. Rubenstein, supra note 368, at 3 (noting that the owner of the venue controls access to the
facility), available at http://www.gtlaw.com.au/templates/publications/default.jsp?pubid=1 19.
389. Id. ("Once the cooperation of the venue owner is secured, an event organiser... can feel
confident in granting whatever broadcasting rights it wishes to whoever [sic] it chooses.").
390. TVRights, supra note 383, available at http://www.afl.com.au/insideafl/annual_5.htm.
391. Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 433, 462-68 (1987) (explaining the benefits and costs of vertical integration).
392. Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at 14 ("The less certainty one finn has about others, the
stronger the case for self production.").
393. See generally Werden, supra note 391, at 463 ("The use of contracts also imposes
significant inherent limitations. One limitation inherent in the use of contracts is a very substantial
attenuation of control.").
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situation than being at the mercy of a traditional league. For example, a mega-
media company can control the negotiations with a players' association and
faces no threat of losing the transmission rights of its media league to a
competing firm.
News Corporation's recent experiences in obtaining the transmission
rights to premium rugby league and rugby union in Australia exemplify the
greater degree of control a mega-media company has when it produces, rather
than purchases, sports programming. As discussed in Chapter Two, in 1995
News Ltd. created Super League in order to obtain pay television rights to a
premium rugby league competition. 394 To create Super League, News Ltd.
had to procure all the necessary inputs for the league, such as players and
facilities. Despite an intense bidding war for talent with the ARL, News Ltd.
was successful in securing the services of a sufficient number of players to
start Super League.395
News Corporation's Super League experience sharply contrasts with its
involvement in the "Rugby War," another 1995 event. The Super League saga
involving the sport of rugby league profoundly affected the sport of rugby
union. After News Corporation started signing players for Super League,
PBL, owner of the pay television rights to the ARL, sought to counter News
Corporation's attempt to snatch rugby league programming away from it.396
In response to PBL's inquiries, two businessmen proposed the creation of the
World Rugby Corporation (WRC), a professional rugby union competition
involving teams from all over the world.397 The founders of WRC believed
that a global rugby union competition provided PBL a much more valuable
programming product than an Australian rugby league competition since
rugby union is played internationally while rugby league is popular primarily
only in a few Australian states and northern England. 398 Because it was
providing significant capital for the bidding war against News Corporation in
the Super League saga, PBL declined to back WRC at its inception, but
expressed interest in the idea if the WRC's leaders could sign sufficient
players for the venture.399
Simultaneously with WRC's development, the national Rugby Unions of
394. COLMAN, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing the beginnings of Super League).
395. Id. at 126-27 (reporting the details of the bidding war between News Ltd., PBL, and Cable
& Wireless Optus).
396. FITZSIMONS, supra note 323, at 3 (describing PBL's reaction to Super League).
397. Id. at 27 (describing the objectives of the WRC).
398. Id. at 4 (noting the strategy of using the WRC in response to News Corporation's Super
League).
399. Id. at 21-22 (noting PBL's initial reaction to the WRC concept).
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New Zealand (NZRU) and Australia (ARU), the governing bodies for the
sport in each country, were reacting to the possible effect the Super League
saga could have on rugby union.400 At this time, rugby union was "amateur"
in the sense that rugby union players were not officially paid, "though in
different parts of the world amateurism [was] honoured more in the breach
than the observance."40 1 Though "[a]mateurism ha[d] always made rugby
union vulnerable to the loss of star players to... professional rugby league
clubs," the national unions feared a massive switch of rugby union players to
rugby league in response to offers of large sums from either News Corporation
or the ARL.40 2
To combat the Super League threat, the NZRU and ARU made rugby
union professional (i.e., players were openly paid) and created the "Perfect
Rugby Product," the sale of which to a mega-media company would generate
revenues to fund player payments sufficient to dull any incentive to switch to
rugby league. 40 3 The "Perfect Rugby Product" was a "Super 12" competition,
consisting of teams from New Zealand, South Africa, and Australia, and a
"Tri-Nations" Test series, in which the national teams of South Africa, New
Zealand, and Australia played each other on a home and away basis.404 The
NZRU and ARU enlisted the support of the South Africa Rugby Football
Union (SARU) because they believed that a truly international competition
was a more attractive product than a competition involving only New Zealand
and Australian teams.40 5 The three national unions formed a new company,
SANZAR (South Africa New Zealand Australia Rugby), which sold to News
Corporation for $550 million (U.S.) the exclusive transmission rights for ten
years to the Super 12 competition and Tri-Nations series. 406
After announcing its deal with News Corporation, the officials of the three
national unions began recruiting rugby union players to play in the Super 12
and Tri-Nations competitions. Much to their surprise, these officials learned
that a majority of the best rugby union players in each of the three countries
had already signed contracts with WRC.407 WRC had promised the players
400. Id. at 15 (discussing the national Rugby Unions' response to Super League).
401. Braham Dabscheck, Trying Times: Collective Bargaining in Australian Rugby Union, 15
SPORTING TRADITIONS 25, 27 (1998).
402. Id.
403. FrrzSIMONs, supra note 323, at 18 (noting the national Unions' plan to combat Super
League).
404. Id. at 29-30 (describing the Perfect Rugby Product).
405. Id. at 17 (noting the NZRU's and ARU's desire to have South African teams in the new
competition).
406. Id. at 95 (detailing the agreement between SANZAR and News Corporation).
407. Id. at 160 (noting that a majority of the best players in Australia, New Zealand, and South
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very large salaries, more than the national unions were able to offer even after
signing the deal with News Corporation.40 8 The players' agreement with
WRC, however, contained an important provision-the contracts were not
binding unless WRC had secured either $100 million (U.S.) by November 22,
1995, or executed contracts with commercial enterprises sufficient for it to
meet its contractual obligations. 40 9 The NZRU, ARU, and SARU, therefore,
began a campaign to convince the leading players that WRC would not be able
to procure the necessary financial backing for its global league and to sign
contracts with SANZAR, which provided guaranteed player payments at the
time of contracting. 410 WRC, meanwhile, was in the process of trying to find
a mega-media company to finance its operations. PBL gave WRC limited
support, but was never wholly committed to the venture. 411 In fact, PBL's
main reason for supporting WRC at all might have been to gain leverage over
News Corporation in its battle for rugby league in Australia.412
Needless to say, News Corporation was not pleased to learn that it had
committed significant resources to obtain transmission rights to a premium
rugby union competition that was in danger of not having the top players in
the sport. Though SANZAR officials were having some success in enlisting
players, News Corporation viewed WRC as a real threat and moved to protect
its investment. According to reports, an executive in News Corporation called
Johann Rupert, the leader of M-Net, a leading South African media
company.413 M-Net, despite its long-term relationship with the SARU, lost
valuable programming of South African rugby union when SANZAR made its
deal with News Corporation and was earnestly negotiating with WRC for
transmission rights.414 In fact, WRC and M-Net were on the verge of closing
a deal, which would have led to PBL increasing its involvement in WRC,
when the News Corporation official contacted Johann Rupert.415 The News
Corporation official promised M-Net "sympathetic consideration" in the future
if the company dropped its negotiations with WRC.4 16 After being contacted
by News Corporation, M-Net terminated its discussion with WRC.417 With no
Africa had signed contracts with WRC).
408. Id. at 67 (detailing WRC's five-tiered salary scale).
409. Id. at 66 (noting these conditions in WRC's player contracts).
410. Id. at 239 (detailing the national Unions' efforts to sign players away from WRC).
411. Id. at 248 (noting that PBL was never fully committed to WRC).
412. Id. at 163 (noting reasons for PBL's involvement in WRC).
413. Id. at 206 (describing Johann Rupert and M-Net).
414. Id. at 207 (discussing M-Net's involvement in the Rugby War).
415. Id. at 236 (discussing the negotiations between M-Net and WRC).
416. Id. at 237.
417. Id. at 237 (noting that M-Net abruptly terminated its negotiations with WRC).
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alternative sources of funding, WRC failed to satisfy the conditions of its
players' contracts and never commenced operations.418 SANZAR secured the
services of the rugby union players and started its Super 12 and Tri-Nations
competitions in 1996.
The experiences of News Corporation in the Super League saga and the
Rugby War speak to differences between a mega-media company's producing
and purchasing professional sports programming. In each instance, News
Corporation's objective was to procure the transmission rights to a premium
professional sports league. In each situation, News Corporation obtained the
transmission rights of a new professional sports league. In the Rugby War,
News Corporation was aligned with the "establishment," while it was the
"rebel" or "rival" in the Super League saga. Interestingly, in the Rugby War,
though it contracted with the established rugby union competition organizers,
News Corporation faced the risk that the quality of the transmission rights it
had purchased would be significantly below its expectations at the time of
contracting. News Corporation's peril was caused by the national unions'
inability to guarantee that they could acquire the services of the leading rugby
union players. News Corporation was forced to aggressively protect its
investment in SANZAR. News Corporation's inability to rely on SANZAR to
fulfill its contractual obligations highlighted the uncertainty inherent in
purchasing professional sports programming on the market.
In the Super League saga, despite being the "rival league," News
Corporation's concerns about meeting its expectations in acquiring the
transmission rights to the new professional sports league did not hinge on the
actions of another party charged with creating the new sporting competition.
News Corporation had total responsibility for forming Super League. News
Corporation's swift signing of players for Super League contrasted sharply
with the initially passive approach of SANZAR officials in obtaining players
for its Super 12 and Tri-Nations competitions. In producing Super League,
News Corporation had greater control over obtaining transmission rights to a
new professional sports league than it did in contracting with SANZAR in the
Rugby War.
b. A media league enables a mega-media company to create multiple
brands ofprofessional sports programming according to its needs
A mega-media company can tailor a media league to fit its programming
needs. If the mega-media company desires professional sports programming
to generate large national audiences or drive subscriptions to a new pay
418. Id. at 294 (noting PBL's decision to withdrawal all support from the WRC).
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service, then it likely needs to create a "premium brand" media league. A
premium brand media league consists of evenly matched teams of high quality
with star players on their rosters. If the premium brand media league is a rival
league in the sport, then the quality of play in the media league should be at or
near that of the established league since consumers are generally most
interested in the league with the best and most exciting teams and players.
A premium brand media league that is a rival league may be a loss leader
for a mega-media company since the firm is likely to have to offer top players
salaries competitive with their current incomes to lure them away from the
established league. The actual cost for a media league of any brand depends
on a number of factors (e.g., costs of technical production, acquiring use of
playing facilities) though player payments are likely to be a mega-media
company's greatest expenditure.4 19 Even if creating a premium brand media
league results in financial loss, the extent of loss to a mega-media company
may be less than expected. Mega-media companies provide American and
Australian established leagues with a substantial portion of the monies they
use to pay players' salaries. Arguably, a mega-media company can use the
funds it currently spends on purchasing short-term transmission rights to an
established league to hire top quality players for a premium brand media
league. Of course, controlling costs of players' salaries depends on a mega-
media company conducting its premium media league in a financially astute
manner and not engaging in an intense bidding war with the established league
for talent. A mega-media company has the financial wherewithal to start and
operate a well-managed premium brand media league.420 As with content
production in general, once a mega-media company expends the sums to
create a media league, the marginal cost of making this programming
"available to another consumer is often close to or equal to zero." 421
If a mega-media company desires professional sports programming to
attract the attention of a niche consumer group or to fill hours on a specialized
sports channel, then it may not need to create a premium brand media league.
Instead, a "generic brand media league" may suffice. A generic brand media
league may be a second tier professional sports league in a sport with a major
established league, or it may be the only professional sports league in a sport
419. Ross, supra note 9, at 726 ("Sports leagues, however, are not subject to large fixed costs.
Their primary costs are player salaries.").
420. Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at I 10 (noting that "... a truly large firm such as General
Motors ... undoubtedly has the resources to develop a network of competing professional football
teams much like the NFL"); Associated Press, Fox Entertainment Stock Soars, USATODAY.COM
(Nov. 11, 1998) (noting that News Corp. "raised $2.8 billion (U.S.) by selling 18% of its
entertainment and sports empire to the public"), available at www.usatoday.com.
421. OECD PAPER ON CONVERGENCE, supra note 306, at 7.
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that is not widely popular among consumers. Since created for purposes other
than attracting a large audience or subscribers, a generic brand media league
need not have "star power." The actual costs of operating a generic brand
media league, therefore, are likely lower than the costs of a premium brand
media league.
The Extreme Games, or X Games, a creation of Disney, is an example of a
professional sports competition tailored to the needs of a mega-media
company trying to reach a particular consumer group. Disney has created the
X Games to reach the Generation X audience, a demographic group interested
in non-traditional sports, and to provide low cost programming for its ESPN
and ESPN2 cable sports channels.422 The X Games has an "Olympic" format
with athletes from all over the world competing in qualifying competitions for
a spot in the championship games. 423 The top athletes compete for gold,
silver, or bronze medals at the X Games competition. 424 ESPN has created
annual summer and winter versions of the competition.425 The X Games are
popular with consumers, especially the targeted audience, and very profitable
for Disney.426 In fact, the X Games generate a larger profit for Disney than its
exclusive telecasts of NFL games on Sunday nights on ESPN.427 Not
surprisingly, given Disney's success with its X Games, other mega-media
companies have created their own extreme sports competitions.428
c. A media league provides synergy to a mega-media company
In the post-convergence market, mega-media companies are seeking to
422. Sal Ruibal, X-tremely Overexposed?, USATODAY.cOM (June 23, 1999) (noting that
Disney annually receives 250 hours of "original, year-round X Games-oriented coverage" for its
network and cable television channels), available at http://www.usatoday.comlsportslccovwed.htm.
423. X Trials Dravs Top Athletes, Big Crowds in Louisville, ESPN.coM (discussing a qualifying
competition for the 1999 Summer X Games), at
http:lespn.go.comlxgameslsummerx99/genlnewsl1999/990524/01273785.html (last visited May 24,
1999).
424. Id. (noting participation of Andy Macdonald, 1998 Summer X Games silver medalist, in
qualifying trials for 1999 Summer X Games).
425. Id. (noting competitors in 1998 Summer X Games seeking to qualify for 1999 Summer X
Games).
426. Araton, supra note 331, at 63 (noting that the X Games have been "quite successful"
according to ABC/ESPN sports president, Steven Bornstein).
427. Sal Ruibal, In Focus, USATODAY.COM (noting the profitability of the X Games for
Disney), available at http://www.usatoday.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2000).
428. Ruibal, supra note 422 (reporting on NBC's creation of its Gravity Games), available at
http://www.usatoday.comlsports/ccovwed.htm; Damien Murphy, Xtreme? It's Over the Top,
SMH.CoM.AU (noting the first Winter Xtreme Games in Australia), available at
http:lwww.smh.com.aulnews/9908/23/nationallnational8.html (last visited Aug. 23, 1999).
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grow revenues by expanding their product and service offerings.429 Today, a
mega-media company is commonly involved in a number of entertainment
enterprises, such as film production, distribution and exhibition, book
publishing, and theme parks,430 and launches content from several different
platforms. 431 A primary objective of a mega-media company is to obtain
synergy from its various operations.432 A mega-media company hopes "that
all [its] products and the efforts behind them will mesh and contribute to a
chain reaction that creates more energy, awareness, and economic effect than
any single aspect might have done on its own." 433 In fact, many mega-media
companies believe that "diversification into holdings which have synergy with
their core business is part of a commercial vision and shareholder
expectation." 434
Developing a "brand" suitable for cross-marketing across its product lines
is an effective means for a mega-media company to obtain synergy from its
operations. 435  A media league offers a mega-media company several
opportunities to achieve synergy through branding. A mega-media company
may create a media league to further one of its existing brands or to start a new
brand upon which to promote its other operations. For example, Disney has
turned ESPN, generally regarded as the most popular sports channel in the
United States, into a brand. Disney has complemented ESPN with ESPN2, "a
younger, hipper version of the original ESPN" that features alternative sports
programming; ESPNews, a twenty-four hour sports news channel; ESPN
SportsZone, "the premier sports portal on the Internet;" ESPN The Magazine,
a national sports magazine; the ESPN Club, a facility at Disney World that
offers "visitors a chance to mingle with ESPN celebs;" and ESPN Zones,
entertainment centers with video games, batting cages, giant television screens
and a restaurant. 436  Disney has the X Games primarily to provide
429. WOLF, supra note 3, at 89 (noting that diversification into other industries is one of the
primary means for a mega-media company to increase its revenues).
430. Id. at xviii (noting the expansion of mega-media companies into a number of entertainment
enterprises).
431. Id. at 89-91 (discussing the increase in number of platforms and the number of products on
each platform).
432. Id. at 99 (noting that synergy is the driving force behind the numerous mergers of media and
telecommunications companies in the 1990s).
433. Id.at231.
434. PUBLISHING AND BROADCASTING LTD., SUBMISSION TO THE REVIEW OF BROADCASTING
REGULATION BY THE PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION 19, available at
http://www.indcom.gov.au/inquiry/broadcst/subs/sublist.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2000).
435. WOLF supra note 3, at 226 (noting that many firms use a successful brand to sell other
products and services).
436. Id. at 222-23 (discussing the ESPN brand).
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programming for ESPN2, but has maximized revenues from this popular
sporting competition by creating other X Games products and services that are
marketed under the ESPN brand and used and sold in other ESPN enterprises.
A mega-media company may achieve similar synergies by developing a
brand around a media league. Telecasts of the competition between the teams
may be shown from a mega-media company's different platforms (e.g., free-
to-air or pay television, or Internet broadcast). In addition to broadcasting
games, an Internet site devoted to the league may provide many benefits to a
mega-media company such as providing brand awareness, up-to-date
information on the league, its players, games, and events without the need for
coverage by other media companies, a means for fans to interact more closely
with players and coaches through chat rooms and email, and online sales of
tickets and league merchandise. 437 The Internet site may also sponsor fantasy
leagues (i.e., a fictional league of teams developed by fans who play against
each other based on the performances of players in actual games) based on its
media league and use its telecasts and coverage of the games to complement
its fantasy league operations.438  If a mega-media company develops
megaplexes (i.e., large entertainment centers with cinemas, retail shops, and
restaurants), 439 theme parks, or other entertainment venues, then it may
include a theme restaurant and retail clothing stores based on its media league
in these facilities. Players from the mega-media league may make
appearances and sign autographs at these retail outlets to attract consumers.
Players may also promote other products or services the mega-media company
produces such as appearing in cameo roles in other television shows or
endorsing particular products that carry the media league brand.440 If it has
film production capabilities, a mega-media company may produce a movie
based on events occurring in its media league.441
A mega-media company may obtain further benefits from selling its media
league brand to other firms. Since the main reason for creating a media league
437. Sharon Raboin, Caps' Owner Brings Sports into Net Age, USATODAY.COM (Dec. 28,
1999) (discussing Ted Leonsis', President of America Online Interactive Properties Group, and
majority owner of the NHL Washington Capitals, plans to use the Internet to build brand awareness
of his club), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/covtue.htm.
438. Michael Hiestand, Online Leagues of their Ovn, USATODAY.COM (Oct. 6, 1999)
(reporting on the exploding popularity of online fantasy leagues), available at
http:llwww.usatoday.com/sports/ccovwed.htm.
439. WOLF, supra note 3, at 9-11 (discussing megaplexes).
440. Id. at 223 (noting that at the ESPN Club consumers can buy clothing endorsing "Bristol
University of Football," a hypothetical university featured in ESPN commercials).
441. Michael Hiestand, Big Impact for Play Action, USATODAY.CoM (Dec. 22, 1999)
(reporting on the movie about a mythical professional football league based loosely on the NFL),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ccovwed.htm.
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is to secure a stable supply of professional sports league programming, a
mega-media company is unlikely to sell the transmission rights to another
mega-media company. A mega-media company, however, may deal such
rights to a product or geographic market in which it does not operate. News
Corporation's selling of the free-to-air rights to Super League in Australia to
PBL because it did not operate a broadcast network in that country is an
example of such a transaction.442 A mega-media company may enter into
joint ventures or alliances with other firms to produce products or services
based on the media league that it could not offer alone. For example, a mega-
media company and a financial institution may form an alliance to market a
credit card where purchases made on the card entitle the consumer to credit
towards tickets to media league games or merchandise. By creating a media
league, a mega-media company is not only an owner of a professional sports
league, but also "a sports/entertainment/media brand" developer and
manager. 443
B. Globalization of Professional Sports Leagues
Technological developments in the telecommunications, computer, and
transportation industries are reducing greatly the time and space constraints
that previously hampered international transactions. 444  Mega-media
companies and American and Australian professional sports leagues are
becoming more global. Entry into new geographic markets is a means for
both mega-media companies and established professional sports leagues to
increase revenues. 445
The globalization of economic markets in general, and professional sports
leagues in particular, promotes media league creation in at least two ways.
First, a mega-media company may use a media league to acquire programming
to help establish consumer interest in its products in a new geographic
market. 446 Since programming that focuses on local issues generally receives
442. COLMAN, supra note 5, at 315 (noting News Ltd.'s sale of the free-to-air rights to Super
League to PBL); See also FITZSIMONS, supra note 323, at 95 (noting that News Corporation's
contract with SANZAR allowed it to on-sell the rights to the Super 12 competition).
443. Raboin, supra note 437 (noting that Ted Leonsis views himself "as a
sports/entertainment/media brand manager" rather than a hockey team owner), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ccovtue.htm.
444. GERALD SUSSMAN, COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 137 (1997).
445. WOLF, supra note 3, at 89 (noting that in the future firms in the entertainment industry will
have to look to "global expansion into less mature markets" in order to grow revenues).
446. Id. at 28 ("In the emerging world economy... successful businesses need star brands to
bring consumers through the door.").
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the highest ratings in any given market, a mega-media company may find
beneficial the creation of a media league in a sport highly popular in the new
geographic market. 447 A media league may be comprised of teams staffed
primarily with players from the particular geographic area into which the
mega-media company is entering. If the sport is played internationally, then
the inclusion of star players from other countries may improve the quality and
attractiveness of the media league.
Second, with respect to sports that are popular internationally, a mega-
media company is well positioned to create a global professional sports
league. The concept of a global professional sports league is similar to the
"World Cup" competitions currently held in soccer, cricket, and rugby union
in which teams representing different countries play each other every four
years. Though several different formats are possible, a global professional
sports league at base features teams from countries on two or more continents
that play in an organized competition with a true "World Champion" crowned
at the conclusion of league play.
Global professional sports leagues, though a topic of much conversation,
are not yet in existence.448 The increasing popularity of the World Cups and
other competitions involving international teams, such as the Champions
League in European" soccer, foreshadows their creation. 449 The inclusion of
teams from each country participating in a global league provides an element
of local content to capture consumer attention across geographic markets. The
large potential financial return from a global professional sports league is an
incentive for a mega-media company establishing itself globally to undertake
such an enterprise. 450 Reports of mega-media companies exploring the
creation of international professional sports leagues show that these firms are
cognizant of the revenues such a product may produce.451
447. Id. at 290 (noting that despite globalization "a large part of the programming in every
country will be... local stories"); AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING AUTHORITY, DISCUSSION PAPER:
REVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONTENT STANDARD 24 (1998), available at
http://www.aba.gov.au/whatprogram/pdf/acdpfin.pdf. 1
448. Jeff Bradley, Continental Clash, ESPN.COM (Feb. 24, 1999) (noting that "there's plenty of
talk of a World League" in professional soccer), at
bttp://espn.go.com/espnmagazine/vol2no5bradley.html; Paul Kent & Steve Mascord, Non-rebels With
a Global Cause, SMH.COM.AU (July 9, 1999) (noting discussions about a World League for the sport
of rugby league), available at http:lwww.smh.com.aulleague/news/199907/09/91eague2html.
449. Man United Stuns Bayern 2-1, ESPN.COM (May 26, 1999) (reporting on Manchester
United's capturing of the Champions League title in 1999), at
http:l/www.espn.go.comlsoccer/news/1999/990526/0127757.html.
450. Deutschman, supra note 320, at 73 (noting that News Corporation transmits programming
to North American, Latin America, Europe and Asia).
451. Private Company's Super League Plans Rejected, CNNSI.COM (Aug. 25, 1998) (reporting
2002]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
C. Single Economic Entity Structure of a Media League Reduces the Threat
ofAntitrust Law Challenges to its Operations
Conflicts in a traditional league often manifest themselves in the form of
lawsuits alleging a violation of the antitrust laws. These lawsuits generally
involve two basic fact patterns.452 Individual clubs often file lawsuits against
the league and other clubs when a league rule precludes a club from taking a
particular action, such as relocating to a new geographic location, that the club
believes is in its best financial interests. Traditional leagues also face lawsuits
lodged by players challenging league rules that allegedly restrict their freedom
of contract. Under both fact patterns, the plaintiffs generally argue that the
traditional league is an association of independent economic entities and that
the rule at issue is unlawful because it is an agreement, contract, or
understanding which unreasonably restrains trade between horizontal
competitors (i.e., the individual clubs).
Whether a traditional league is a single economic entity for antitrust
purposes is an issue of much debate whose resolution is beyond the scope of
this paper. 453  American and Australian courts, however, predominantly
conclude that traditional leagues are not single entities, thereby exposing them
to judicial scrutiny under antitrust principles and, in Australia with respect to
restrictions on players, the common law doctrine of restraint of trade.454 As a
result, "virtually every league rule or practice" of traditional American and
Australian leagues is subject to "serious, unpredictable, and unavoidable
antitrust risk. 455
elite European soccer clubs' rejection of a mega-media company's plan to create a premium
international soccer league) (on file with author), available at http://www.cnnsi.com.
452. Drew D. Krause, Comment, The National Football League's Ban on Corporate Ownership:
Violating Antitrust to Preserve Traditional Ownership-Implications Arising From William H.
Sullivan's Antitrust Suit, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 175, 179 n.22 (1992) (listing cases involving
American traditional professional sports leagues).
453. Davidson, supra note 65, at 174 n.14 (listing articles discussing the single entity issue).
454. Bulls 111, 95 F.3d at 599 (noting that "most courts.., have preferred" to characterize
professional sports leagues as joint ventures rather than single firms); News Ltd, [1996] 870 F.C.A. at
* 106 (AustLlI.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (concluding that the ARL clubs competed against one
another for inter alia "spectators, sponsors, and television viewers"); Davidson, supra note 65, at 172
(noting that Australian courts have held leagues' restrictions on players' freedom to contract to be
illegal under the common law doctrine of restraint of trade). But see N. Am. Soccer League v.
National Football League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (arguing that a traditional professional sports league is a single economic entity for antitrust
purposes).
455. Roberts, supra note 325, at 968. See also id. at 1015. Professor Roberts contends that:
The decisions that apply section 1 of the Sherman Act to the internal rules and conduct of sports leagues
are so illogical, confusing, and inconsistent with one another that the rule of law has effectively been
replaced by the ad hoc rules promulgated by the individual court that happens to hear a particular case.
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An advantage of a media league relative to a traditional league is that its
structure enables a mega-media company to operate the enterprise with less
fear of antitrust challenge from member clubs or players. Since it owns all the
teams, a mega-media company "may assert full control at any moment" if a
subsidiary club fails to act in the best interests of the media league.456 In
addition, a mega-media company can structure its "rules, rewards, and
sanctions in such a way" that the agendas of the individual club subsidiaries do
not conflict with the objectives of the media league.45 7 Through these means,
a mega-media company can largely prevent a subsidiary club from taking a
particular action that is detrimental to the proper functioning of the media
league.
A mega-media company can act with little fear of antitrust challenge in the
United States or Australia because a media league is a single firm for antitrust
purposes. Under American antitrust jurisprudence, a parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiaries are deemed to be incapable of conspiring with
one another for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act.458 . The Australian
Trade Practices Act's prohibitions against a corporation from making or
giving effect to a contract or arrangement that has the purpose or likely effect
of substantially lessening competition and exclusionary provisions45 9 do not
apply to a contract or arrangement the only parties to which are related
companies. 460 That is, "the Trade Practices Act § 45 cannot be infringed by
any arrangements between the separate legal entities within [the same]
corporate umbrella." 461  Thus, avoidance of many of the legal challenges
common to operating a traditional league supports a mega-media company's
creation of a media league.462
Id. See also Rosenbaum, supra note 311, at 730 ("li]t is somewhat surprising that the precise law
governing the relationship between professional sports leagues and the Sherman Act is so noticeably
confused and unsettled.")
456. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984).
457. Roberts, supra note 30, at 266 n.163.
458. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771 (concluding that "a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary
must be viewed as... a single enterprise for purposes of §1 of the Sherman Act"); 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994) ("Every contract, combination.... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce... is
declared to be illegal."); Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (noting that § 1 only
proscribes unreasonable restraints on trade).
459. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 45(2); S.G. CORONES, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN
AUSTRALIA 202 (1990) (noting that an exclusionary provision under Australian law is analogous to a
group boycott under American antitrust jurisprudence).
460. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 45(8).
461. Warren Pengilley, ARL v. Super League: What Does it Mean for Sporting Organisations?, 5
COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 77, 98 (1997).
462. Edward Mathias, Comment, Big League Perestroika? The Implications of Fraser v. Major
League Soccer, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 237 (1999) (noting that the benefits of a single entity
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D. A Mega-Media Company's Ability to Innovate in Response to Changing
Consumer Preferences
The decentralized management structure of a traditional league hinders its
response to entreaties from consumers, broadcasters, and sponsors for
improvements in its products. 463 The collective action requirements in a
traditional league retard innovation for two reasons. First, "the entrepreneurial
skills and foresight of [league] members.., differ." 464  Unlike "[in] a
competitive environment, [where] only one skilled entrepreneur need perceive
an opportunity for innovation," a traditional league setting requires "each
innovative idea [to] appeal to some entrepreneurs of below-average vision and
ability. '465 Second, a league member may "hold out" from supporting a
proposal in an attempt to extract compensation from the league members
promoting the innovation.466 "As a result of these features, [established
leagues are] exceptionally conservative." 467
Mega-media companies are innovators since they must have a heightened
appreciation of consumer tastes and quickly react to changes in consumer
preferences. 468 Often a mega-media company is led by one individual who
has the ability to refocus rapidly the firm's operations based on a perception of
the future of the industry.469 Mega-media companies are willing to innovate
with respect to their involvement in professional sports. These firms continue
to introduce many innovations with respect to professional sports
programming, such as showing new perspectives from which to view the game
and expanding viewers' insight into the innermost recesses of sports.470
structure may spur the creation of new professional sports leagues).
463. Roger G. Noll, Major League Sports, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 348,
382-83 (Walter Adams ed., 6th ed. 1982) (discussing the attributes of a traditional sports league that
hinders its innovative abilities); COZZILLIO & LEVINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 33 ("It is very difficult for
[a traditional] league to alter its product significantly or to change the primary rules about how it
conducts its business.").
464. Noll, supra note 463, at 381.
465. Id. at 381-82.
466. Id. ("[A] team owner, if his vote is critical, may collect some bribe from the proponents of
change by initially holding out against the proposed change."); Hovenkamp, supra note 76, at 23
(noting that members of a joint venture may profit by retarding innovation).
467. Noll, supra note 463, at 382.
468. Hill remarks, supra note 282 (noting that firms involved in the professional sports industry
must remember that the "consumer is keen").
469. WOLF, supra note 3, at 119-50 (discussing media moguls).
470. Deutschman, supra note 320, at 73 (noting that News Corporation's innovations in
televising American professional sports leagues have made these "sports more lively and refreshingly
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Mega-media companies typically embrace emerging sports as they become
popular with consumers. Disney's promotion of the X Games and News
Corporation's first-time broadcast on national network television in the United
States of a professional fishing tournament show mega-media companies'
receptive attitudes towards new sporting ventures. 471
A mega-media company, understanding consumers' dynamic and diverse
tastes in sports,472 may prefer to satisfy consumer demands for changes in
professional sports administration and programming by creating a media
league instead of waiting for established leagues to develop or refine their
products. That is, "the introduction of a [media league may be] a response to
failure to change on the part of the established league[s]. ' '473 In a media
league, a single firm will establish the objectives of the enterprise and have the
power to direct the actions required to obtain these goals. The absence of
multiple firms in the management hierarchy of a media league will greatly
reduce the "below-average visionary" and "holdout" problems common to
innovation in traditional leagues.
E. Availability of Players for a Media League
Restrictions on player mobility and the player development systems of
established leagues are not likely to be significant impediments to media
league formation. In both the United States and Australia, players have
mounted successful legal challenges against restraints on their ability to shop
their services on the open market.474 The remaining restrictions on player
irreverent"); Thomas Kennedy, Comment, Will America's Pastime Be a Part ofAmerican's Future?:
An Antitrust Analysis that Enables Sports Leagues to Compete Effectively in the Entertainment
Market, 46 UCLA L. REV. 577, 606 (1998) ("[T]he Fox television network has veered from the
traditional format to broadcasting professional sports.").
471. Rudy Martzke, Fox Reels In Viewers for Fishing, USATODAY.coM (Nov. 8, 1999) (noting
that FOX's broadcast of the fishing tournament drew respectable ratings), available at
http:llwww.usatoday.com/sports/comment/colmart.htm.
472. Sal Ruibal, Adrenaline Fuels New Equipment, USATODAY.CoM (May 19, 1999) (noting a
study by the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association that participation in team sports declined in
the 1990s and is predicted to do so in the 21st century), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/milOO3.htm; Phil Derriman, Running Game not Running the Best,
THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 17, 1999, at 44 (noting studies showing that Australians'
interest in traditional sports has not risen in the 1990s); David Brown et al., The Games of the Future,
Sport by Sport, USATODAY.CoM (May 19, 1999) ("Competition might be timeless, but the look and
feel of your favorite sport will change in the next century."), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/mil008.htm.
473. Noll, supra note 463, at 382.
474. See, eg., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that
the NFL draft violated § 1 of the Sherman Act); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,
622 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the NFL's "Rozelle Rule" violated § 1 of the Sherman Act), cert.
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mobility in established leagues are mostly indirect restraints, such as salary
caps, and do not appreciably limit the supply of players to a mega-media
company.475 Though star players in established leagues now enter into longer-
term agreements than they have historically,476 a multi-year contract between
a player and an individual club may not prevent a player from switching to a
media league. "Clauses of personal service contracts that require an individual
to work for a single enterprise for a long period of time have limited legal
validity, as is demonstrated during periods of interleague competition, when a
team that loses a player rarely succeeds in obtaining a judgment from the
courts requiring him to fulfill his contract. '477 The present more open labor
market lessens the availability of players to new professional sports leagues in
some respects, however, since players now negotiate with all the individual
clubs in the established league rather than being restricted to playing for a
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (enjoining the NHL's enforcement of the reserve clause in players'
contracts that precluded players from signing with a rival league); Buckley v. Tutty, (1971) 125
C.L.R. 353 (Austl.) (invalidating under the common law restraint of trade doctrine restrictions on
players' mobility in the NSWRL); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)
(holding that the NFL's blacklisting of players who had played in a rival league constituted a
Sherman Act claim); Hughes v. Western Australian Cricket Assoc., (1986) ATPR 40-736 (Austl.
Fed. Ct.) (holding that WACA's blacklisting of players who played in "rebel" tours of South Africa
was illegal under the Trade Practices Act). See also Braham Dabscheck, Playing the Team Game:
Unions in Australian Professional Team Sports, 38 J. INDUJST. REL. 600, 605 (1996) ("[C]ourts [in
Australia] have rejected rules that seek to limit the ability of players to take up employment in
competitions not affiliated, or under the control of existing, or traditional, leagues.").
475. Alan M. Levine, Note, Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player Mobility Restrictions for
the Professional Sports Leagues, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 243, 268 (1995)
(noting that the NFL's standard player's contract allows a drafted rookie to sign with a rival
professional football league, but the drafting NFL team retains his rights for three years). In the
United States, a player mobility restraint is immune under the nonstatutory labor exemption from
antitrust attack if it is included in a collective bargaining agreement between the league and the
players' association. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979)
(applying the nonstatutory labor exemption). However, in Australia, a restriction on players'
mobility, though approved by the players' union and exempt from the Trade Practices Act as part of
an employment agreement, may still be challenged under the common law restraint of trade doctrine.
Warren Pengilley, Restraint of Trade and Antitrust: A Pigskin Review Post Super League, 6
CANTERBURY L. REV. 610, 622 & n.46 (1997) (observing that collectively bargained for employment
terms would be exempt under the Trade Practices Act, but subject to the common law doctrine of
restraint of trade).
476. Associated Press, New Football League Still a Work in Progress, ESPN.COM (noting that
young star players in the NFL now have longer term contracts with their clubs than they did when the
USFL was created) (on file with author), at http://www.espn.go.com (last visited May 29, 1998).
477. Roger G. Noll, The U.S. Team Sports Industry: An Introduction, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 28, at 1, 4. But see Hayden Opie & Graham Smith, The Withering of
Individualism: Professional Team Sports and Employment Law, 15 U.N.S.W.L.J. 313, 342-46 (1992)
(discussing Australian cases in which courts effectively enforced contract provisions requiring a
player to play exclusively for an individual club).
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single club. 478 Regardless of the effect of labor market restrictions in
American and Australian established leagues, the growth of professional
sports in the United States and Australia, as well as globally, has produced a
surfeit of playing talent.479 A mega-media company may further its recruiting
efforts by offering additional employment opportunities in the entertainment
industry, such as film and recording deals, to star players, who are increasingly
becoming popular icons in the United States and Australia.480 Thus, a mega-
media company is not likely to face difficulties in finding players for its media
league.
m. A MEDIA LEAGUE HAS THE CAPABILITY TO AVOID THE PROBLEMS
PLAGUING TRADITIONAL LEAGUES IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA
The attractiveness of a media league to a mega-media company as an
alternative source of professional sports programming is enhanced by its
ability to avoid problems present in traditional American and Australian
leagues. Further, a mega-media company can organize its league in a way that
corrects a significant ongoing problem in a traditional league in order to
publicize the benefits of its venture.
A. Single Entity Structure Allows a Media League to Avoid the Collective
Action Problems Associated with Traditional Leagues
Collective action problems prevalent in American and Australian leagues
are not likely to arise in a media league. Unlike the disagreement among clubs
in MLB, disharmony among club subsidiaries does not prevent a mega-media
company from devising a system to achieve competitive balance in the media
league. A mega-media company's control over the economic operations of the
enterprise reduces the ability of club subsidiaries to maximize their financial
478. New Football League Still a Work in Progress, supra note 476 (noting that free agency in
the NFL may reduce the number of players available to join a new football league), at
http://www.espn.go.com.
479. Rosenbaum, supra note 311, at 808 ("As a practical matter, there is a glut of qualified
players for most professional sports."); but see DEMMERT, supra note 66, at 88 (observing that though
there is a large surplus of athletes that can play professionally, there may be a shortage of star
players).
480. DEMMERT, supra note 66, at 51-52 (noting that players may prefer to locate in a market that
offers advertising and commercial advantages such as sponsorship and acting opportunities); Tom
Farrey, The L.A. Story: Opportunity, ESPN.CoM (Mar. 6, 1999) (reporting on the advantages athletes
have received in pursuing acting careers by playing for a professional sports team in Los Angeles), at
http://www.espn.go.com/otllactors/part3.html.
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returns in hopes of gaining an on-the-field competitive advantage. 481
Like it does for its other employees, a mega-media company can establish
the terms and conditions of employment for the players and other personnel in
its media league. Even where it has to negotiate with a players' association
with respect to employment terms, a mega-media company's bargaining
position in such negotiations is stronger than that of traditional leagues. In
dealing with a traditional league a player can threaten a lawsuit alleging an
unreasonable restraint of trade among competing employers. 482 A mega-
media company, on the other hand, can impose a player rule such as a
minimum age restriction without fear of such lawsuits.
Finally, a mega-media company can decide, with little fear of reprisal, the
number and geographic location of the club subsidiaries in its media league.
A mega-media company, like any other corporation, can determine the extent
of its business operations. A court is highly unlikely to force a mega-media
company to admit into its media league an individual club it does not own.
B. A Mega-Media Company's Ability to Address Problems Particular to
Traditional Leagues: Franchise Free Agency and Community Ownership of
Clubs in a Media League
To engender public support, a mega-media company may organize its
media league in a manner that addresses a significant problem common to
traditional leagues. For example, a mega-media company may find it
beneficial to implement features into its media league that would reduce the
possibility of team relocations since franchise free agency is a problem in
American traditional leagues that upsets many consumers.
483
A scheme that promises to solve franchise free agency is community
ownership of individual clubs in a professional sports league. 484 The success
of the Green Bay Packers of the NFL, the only community-owned professional
sports franchise in a major league in the United States, which has never
changed geographic locations despite playing in the smallest metropolitan area
of any NFL club, testifies to the efficacy of community-ownership in
481. Mason & Slack, supra note 55, at 420 (noting that a solution to the franchise free agency
problem is to have a league where one firm owns all the teams).
482. Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (holding that a players' association
has the option of either negotiating with a traditional professional sports league as a union or
decertifying its union status to allow an antitrust suit against the league).
483. See supra notes at 116-157 (discussing franchise free agency in the NFL).
484. Bast, supra note 142, at pt. 3 (arguing that community ownership of individual clubs in a
professional sports league is the best solution for franchise free agency), available at
http://www.heartland.org/sprtsstad.htm; Hartel, supra note 35, at 592 (proposing community-based
public ownership of NFL franchises as a means to eliminate franchise free agency).
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preventing franchise relocations. 485 Similarly, the movement of an individual
club to a new geographic location in pursuit of a sweetheart stadium deal is
relatively rare in Australia, where almost all the clubs are non-profit
community-owned corporations.486
A number of barriers reduce the likelihood of a dramatic increase in the
number of community-owned clubs in American traditional leagues in the near
future.487 Presently, the major American established leagues do not permit
non-profit public ownership of individual clubs48 8-the NFL grandfathered in
the Green Bay Packer's corporate structure when the club joined the league in
1921.489 Given the escalating value of professional sports franchises, many
communities are unlikely to be able to raise the monies needed to purchase an
individual club in an American traditional league. Finally, strong opposition
to community ownership of clubs is likely to come from current club owners,
stadium construction interests, and players that benefit from franchise free
agency.
A mega-media company has the resources to create community-owned
clubs. A mega-media company can offer members of the public the
opportunity to purchase an equity investment in the individual club in its
metropolitan area and a voice in any decision to relocate the club to another
geographic location.490 A mega-media company can choose from a number of
for-profit and non-profit organizational schemes to provide for community
ownership of individual clubs in a media league.
In a for-profit scheme, for example, a mega-media company can create
485. Bast, supra note 142, at pt. 3 (noting the "impressive results" that community-ownership of
the Green Bay Packers has achieved with respect to eliminating the harms associated with franchise
free agency), available at http://www.heartland.org/sprtsstad.htm; Hartel, supra note 35, at 595
(noting that Green Bay is the smallest market in the NFL).
486. Ross, supra note 368, at 133 (noting that for the North Melbourne Kangaroos, an AFL club,
to move to Sydney, the club's members would have to vote in favor of the relocation).
487. Bast, supra note 142, at pt. 3 (discussing the barriers to nonprofit ownership of individual
clubs in American professional sports leagues), available at http://www.heartland.org/sprtsstad.htm.
488. Hartel, supra note 35, at 592 (noting the proposed bill, "Give Fans a Chance Act," would
have prohibited American established professional sports leagues from banning public ownership).
But see Brian R. Cheffins, Sports Teams and the Stock Market: A Winning Match?, 32 U.B.C. L.
REV. 271, 278 (1998) (noting that "league rules do not pose as serious a problem [to public ownership
of clubs] as they might appear to at first glance").
489. Hartel, supra note 35, at 593 (noting that the NFL granted the Green Bay Packers an
exemption from its ownership rules).
490. Bast, supra note 142, at pt. 3 (suggesting that NBC and Turner Broadcasting, at the time
considering whether to start an American professional football league, should fund the development
of a professional league comprised of community-owned teams), available at
http://www.heartland.org/sprtsstad.htm.
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publicly listed club subsidiaries that offer two categories of stock.491 The
"investment tier" of stock is publicly traded with no restrictions on the amount
any person can purchase so that the mega-media company can retain a
majority of these shares. Shareholders of investment stock receive dividends,
but do not have any voice on whether to relocate the team to another
geographic location.
The other category of shares is "souvenir stock." The amount of souvenir
stock any one person can hold is limited so as to encourage widespread
ownership throughout the community. The souvenir stock does not pay
dividends and can only be resold to the mega-company at its original price.
Holders of the souvenir stock have the right to vote on relocating the club to a
new location. The articles of incorporation state the voting requirements for
moving the club. At the outset, a mega-media company can vest in itself the
right to move the club. The voting rights of holders of souvenir stock would
be suspended until a certain number of shares are sold. Hence, the mega-
media company maintains total control over the relocation decision until the
community provides sufficient support for the club. Once a community backs
the club to the desired level, a mega-media company has little incentive to
move the club to a new location. To encourage the sale of souvenir stock, a
mega-media company can offer additional benefits such as a personal seat
license (i.e., the right to purchase season tickets), discounts on club
merchandise, and the right to attend the team's awards dinner or to meet the
players at a special autograph outing. Since they receive little or no pecuniary
benefits from owning shares, the majority of purchasers of souvenir stock are
likely be those community members with a desire to keep the club in the same
geographic location.492
A mega-media company can also use a non-profit structure to establish
community ownership of clubs in a media league. Each individual club is a
non-profit corporation. A mega-media company sells stock in each non-profit
corporation on terms similar to that for the "souvenir stock" discussed
above.493 The holders of the souvenir stock are given the right to vote on
relocation issues. Like in a for-profit scheme, the mega-media company can
retain control over the relocation decision until the community demonstrates
sufficient commitment to the media league.
491. Hartel, supra note 35, at 597-600 (discussing a for-profit community-owned professional
sports franchise).
492. Id. (providing the details stated in the text with respect to organizing a for-profit
community-owned professional sports club).
493. Bast, supra note 142, at pt. 3 (discussing the details of the Green Bay Packers' non-profit
organizational structure), available at http://www.heartland.org/sprtsstad.htm.
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The community-ownership arrangement, if any, best suited for a mega-
media company depends on firm-specific factors such as its management
structure, its expertise in non-profit organizations, the extent of control it
wants over club relocations, and the tax advantages of creating a for-profit or
non-profit media league.494 Like with other organizational decisions in a
media league, a mega-media company has to decide whether the potential
benefits outweigh any losses from allowing members of the community to
have a voice in deciding whether to move a club to a new geographic area.
IV. OBSTACLES TO MEDIA LEAGUE FORMATION AND SUCCESS
Formation of a media league is not without difficulty. A mega-media
company is reasonably well equipped to meet pragmatic concerns such as
planning the structure of the league, acquiring personnel, staging games, and
transmitting the contests over its media platforms. Other obstacles implicating
various aspects of the legal regimes of the United States and Australia exist,
however, that deserve closer examination.
Government regulations, particularly anti-siphoning rules, on a mega-
media company's production, distribution, and exhibition of sports
programming may reduce the benefits of creating a media league. A mega-
media company may find it necessary to turn to constitutional law in both the
United States and Australia to protect itself from onerous anti-siphoning rules.
Depending on the structure of a media league, players may attack a mega-
media company's employment practices on antitrust, contract, or labor law
grounds. A mega-media company may also find itself engaged in legal
proceedings with respect to gaining access to playing facilities.
A. Government Regulation of a Mega-Media Company's Production,
Distribution and Exhibition of Sports Programming Over Multiple Media
Pla#forms
Government regulation of the converging media and telecommunications
industries may limit the synergy a mega-media company can derive from a
media league. A rule prohibiting a mega-media company from producing,
distributing and exhibiting professional sports programming bars media league
creation. The repeal in the United States of prohibitions on vertical integration
in the film and television industries indicates the unlikelihood of a
comprehensive restriction on a mega-media company's in-house production,
494. Mitten & Burton, supra note 9, at 141 (noting that a professional sports franchise may want
to limit public ownership to a minority interest in the club in order to reduce unwanted interference
with its operations).
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distribution and exhibition of a professional sports league. Anti-siphoning
rules, which mandate the transmission of sporting events on free-to-air
television, pose a greater disincentive to media league creation.
1. Restrictions in the United States on vertical integration of producing,
distributing and exhibiting programming content
A media league is analogous to situations where movie studios and
television networks vertically integrate the production, distribution, and
exhibition of programming content. The history of restrictions in the United
States on vertical integration by networks and movie studios teaches that such
government regulations are not likely to bar a mega-media company from
producing and disseminating a media league.
a. Vertical integration in the motion picture industry: Paramount Pictures
and its progeny
In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. ,495 the United States Supreme
Court upheld a trial court's finding that certain motion picture studios had
violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix the prices and conditions under
which feature films were distributed and exhibited throughout the country.496
Several movie studios had vertically integrated the production, distribution
and exhibition of feature films. 497 Though not illegal per se under the antitrust
laws, the Court was concerned about the effect of vertical integration in the
motion picture industry. 498 Hence, the Court remanded to the trial court to
"determine whether the vertical integration of the [movie studios] ... was
conceived with an intent to monopolize or... confer[red] a known monopoly
power."499
The trial court answered this question in the negative since the
government could not disprove that a purpose for the movie studios' vertical
integration was "to obtain an outlet for their pictures and a supply of film for
their theatres." 500 Despite this finding, the trial court held that the vertical
integration of the movie studios "in this particular case [was] illegal" because
495. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
496. Id. at 147 (concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's findings
with respect to a horizontal conspiracy among the movie studios).
497. Id. at 140 (discussing the movie studio defendants).
498. Id. at 174 (noting that the majority of the Court did not believe that a movie studio's vertical
integration was illegal per se).
499. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
500. Id. at 893.
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it was "a definite means of carrying out the [anti-competitive] restraints and
conspiracies" between the firms.50 1 The court thus ordered the movie studios
to divest themselves of any equity interest in motion picture theatres and
barred them from owning any theatres in the future.502
Forty years after being barred from owning theatres, a movie studio,
Warner Communications, Inc., moved the court for "permission to engage in
the business of exhibiting motion pictures." 503 Warner argued that changes in
the film industry since Paramount Pictures justified lifting the prohibition on
its purchasing theatres without prior judicial consent.50 4 In particular, Warner
noted. the proliferation and success of independent film distributors and
exhibitors and the influence of the "'aftermarkets' of television and
videocassettes," which had reduced market concentration and barriers to entry
in the film industry.50 5 The United States government supported Warner's
motion. The government "point[ed] out that there is nothing inherently
anticompetitive about a vertical merger" and that "the evolution of the motion
picture industry since Paramount Pictures makes it improbable that Warner
could or would endeavor to use its exhibition assets to stifle competition." 506
Due to the changes in the motion picture industry, the court granted
Warner's motion. The court agreed with the government that Warner's
ownership of movie theatres would be pro-competitive by improving its
"ability to compete with distributors not subject to the decretal restrictions." 50 7
Consequently, the court ordered the elimination of any restrictions prohibiting
Warner's present or future ownership and operation of movie theatres.50 8 This
decision marked the end of the prohibition on a movie studio vertically
integrating the production, distribution, and exhibition of films.509
501. Id.
502. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 30 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing consent judgments
governing movie studios' ownership of theatres). These "orders were once described as the greatest
economic victory ever achieved by the Department of Justice." Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia
Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 497 (1982) (quoting Walter Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement,
Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories ofAntitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1, 5 (1951)).
503. Loew's, Inc., 882 F.2d at 30.
504. Id. at 31 (reviewing Warner's arguments).
505. Id.
506. Id. at 32-33 (citing Fruehauf Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 603 F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir.
1979)).
507. Id. at 34.
508. Loew's, Inc., 882 F.2d at 34 (ordering the elimination of restrictions on Warner's right to
own and operate movie theatres).
509. Nesvold, supra note 353, at 840 n.362 (noting "Sony Corporation's vertical integration of
movie production, distribution, and exhibition since the 1989 Loew's, Inc. decision").
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b. Vertical integration of the production, distribution and exhibition of
television programming: FCC'sfinancial interest and syndication rules
In 1970, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the government
agency authorized to regulate "the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to
propagate communications signals," 510 adopted the "prime time access" and
"financial interest and syndication" ("fin-syn") rules. 511 The FCC enacted
these rules to rectify an "'unhealthy situation"' 512 in which the three major
television networks at that time, NBC, ABC, and CBS, controlled "the entire
network television production process from idea through exhibition," 513
including "'access to the crucial prime time evening television schedule."' 514
The concern behind the rules was that the networks, controlling as
they did through their owned and operated stations and their affiliates
a large part of the system for distributing television programs to
American households, would unless restrained use this control to seize
a dominating position in the production of television programs. That
is, they would lever their distribution "monopoly" into a production
"monopoly." 515
The prime time access rule prevented network affiliates in the top fifty
television markets from airing more than three hours of network programs
between the hours of 7 p.m. and 11 p.m.516 In practice, this rule opened up an
extra thirty minutes of prime time for television stations to buy first run
syndicated programming from non-network, independent producers or to
broadcast local programming. 517
The financial interest and syndication rules... forbade a network to
syndicate (license) programs produced by the network for rebroadcast
by independent television stations-that is, stations that were not
owned by or affiliated with the network-or to purchase syndication
rights to programs that it obtained from outside producers, or
otherwise to obtain a financial stake in such programs. If the network
510. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
511. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 474 (2d Cir. 1971) (discussing FCC's
adoption of prime time access and financial interest and syndication rules).
512. Id. at 475 (quoting FCC, Report & Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 7417-26 (May 7, 1970)).
513. Id. at 482 (quoting FCC, Report & Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 7417-26 (May 7, 1970)).
514. Id. at 475 (quoting FCC, Report & Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 7417-26 (May 7, 1970)).
515. Schurz Communications, Inc., 982 F.2d at 1045.
516. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc., 442 F.2d at 476.
517. Id.
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itself had produced the program it could sell syndication rights to an
independent syndicator but it could not retain an interest in the
syndicator's revenues or profits. 518
Through these rules the FCC intended to introduce more competition into
the market for television programs. 519
The United States Department of Justice also questioned the legality under
the antitrust laws of the television networks' programming practices. The
government filed a lawsuit against each of the three major television networks
alleging that their control "over the production, acquisition and exhibition of
television programs shown during the prime-time hours" violated the Sherman
Act.520 According to the government, each firm had "monopolized the trade
in commerce of production of prime-time television programming shown on
[its network of television stations]" and restrained trade through its "contracts
for the purchase of programs produced by independent producers." 52' To
avoid litigation on the merits, each network entered into a consent judgment
with the government. These agreements prohibited each network "from
acquiring syndication and other distribution or profit shares in television
programs produced by others"522 and restricted the number of hours per week
it could air television programs it produced.523
Akin to the waning over time of the legitimacy of the prohibition on
vertical integration in the motion picture industry, the FCC's prime time
access and fin-syn rules lost support in the years after their enactment.
Dramatic changes in the television industry after 1970 reduced the relevancy
of these prohibitions. The widespread acceptance of cable television and
videocassette recorders reduced the networks' percentages of purchases of
video and film programming, television advertising revenues, and prime-time
audiences. 524 The amount of competition in the television industry also
increased with the creation of a fourth major television network, News
Corporation's FOX Broadcasting Corporation, and the rise in the number of
independent television stations.525 Furthermore, critics exposed the fallacy of
518. Schurz Communications, Inc., 982 F.2d at 1045.
519. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc., 442 F.2d at 474 (citing the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rule
Making preceding the adoption of the prime time access and fm-syn rules).
520. United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
521. Id. at 1130.
522. Id.at 1131.
523. Id. (reviewing consent judgment between the government and NBC).
524. Schurz Communications, Inc., 982 F.2d at 1046 (discussing changes in television industry
since 1970).
525. Id.
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the "'leverage' theory, which taught that a firm having economic power in one
market would use it to acquire a monopoly of another market," upon which the
FCC's rules were based. 526 The increased concentration of non-network firms
producing prime-time programming after the adoption of the prime time
access and fin-syn rules suggested that these rules were not having their
intended effect of increasing competition among independent program
producers. 527
Based on these developments, the FCC reviewed whether to repeal the
prime time access and fin-syn rules. An internal staff study recommended that
the agency abandon these regulations. 528 In 1991, the FCC repealed the 1970
rules, but replaced them with "a revised set" of fin-syn rules.5 29 The 1991
rules, though much more complicated than the 1970 rules, were analogous to
the consent judgments between the government and the networks in that they
provided that "no more than 40 percent of a network's own prime-time
entertainment schedule may consist of programs produced by the network
itself. 530 The networks, believing that the evolution of the television industry
justified the abolition of all regulations on their production, acquisition, and
exhibition of programming, sought judicial review of the 1991 rules,
petitioning the court to invalidate them.531
The court granted the networks' petition. The administrative record
supporting the 1991 rules was insufficient to show that they were "a
reasonable response to a problem that the agency was charged with
solving." 532 Specifically, the FCC had failed "to consider the possibility that
the unrestricted sale of syndication rights to networks would strengthen the
production industry... and thereby increase programming diversity by
enabling a sharing between fledgling producers and the networks of the risks
of new production." 533 The agency neglected to analyze the risk its new fin-
syn rules posed to competition in the program industry though the Justice
Department had pressed this argument during the rule-making proceeding 534
526. Id. at 1047.
527. Id. at 1046-47 (noting that the FCC's rules had hindered, not helped, competition in the
production of prime-time programming).
528. Id. at 1047 (noting recommendation of "[a]n extensive staff study" to abandon the 1970
rules).
529. Schurz Communications, Inc., 982 F.2d at 1047.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 1048 (noting the networks challenge to the FCC's 1991 rules).
532. Id. at 1049.
533. Id. at 1051.
534. Schurz Communications, Inc., 982 F.2d at 1051 (noting the position of the Justice
Department during the rule-making process).
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and the consent decrees against the networks had expired in 1990.535 Because
the FCC's "articulation of its grounds [was] not adequately reasoned," the
court vacated the 1991 fin-syn rules.536
After the invalidation of the 1991 rules, the FCC changed its position with
respect to the need for regulating a network's production of television
programming. In 1993, the agency issued "a new set of modified fin-syn
rules" 537 that were much less restrictive than the 1970 and 1991 rules and were
to be phased out in two years.538 By 1996, the FCC had completely repealed
all of its fin-syn and prime time access rules. 539 The repeal of these
restrictions thus allowed a network to decide for itself without government
intervention the amount of in-house programming to produce and broadcast
and whether to retain and acquire syndication rights. 540
c. Absence of restrictions on a mega-media company's vertical integration
of a professional sports league
Because of the elimination of government restrictions in the United States
on vertical integration in the film and television industries, a mega-media
company has little reason to fear express prohibition of its production,
distribution and exhibition of a professional sports league.541 The United
States government's approval of mergers between mega-media companies
formed for the purpose of combining entertainment content operations with
distribution outlets further suggests that the government is not likely to
challenge a mega-media company's creation of a professional sports league.
In fact, the elimination of the fin-syn rules has promoted these vertical
mergers, such as Disney's purchase of ABC/Capital Cities.542
The Australian legal landscape is devoid of features analogous to
Paramount Pictures and the fin-syn rules. In Australia, a mega-media
535. Id. at 1050-51 (noting the expiration of the consent judgments against the three major
networks in 1990).
536. Id. at 1050.
537. Herskovitz, supra note 346, at 197-98.
538. Id. at 198 (discussing 1993 fin-syn rules).
539. Id. at 177-78 (noting FCC's repeal of prime time access and f'm-syn rules).
540. Id. at 181 (noting the freedom of networks to produce and broadcast as much in-house
programming as they wish).
541. BERRY & WONG, supra note 17, at 33 (quoting the testimony of the late Howard Cosell,
famous American television sports commentator, during Senate hearings discussing an antitrust
exemption for the NFL, that Paramount Pictures may preclude the NFL from owning a cable
television network on which all league contests would be transmitted).
542. Herskovitz, supra note 346, at 181 (discussing Disney's purchase of the ABC television
network after the repeal of the fm-syn rules).
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company's production and dissemination of a professional sports league face
the same scrutiny as vertical organizations in other industries. That is, a mega-
media company, in response to a government inquiry, only has to show that its
media league operations do not have the purpose nor the effect or likely effect
of substantially lessening competition. 543 A mega-media company can satisfy
this standard by showing the procompetitive aspects of a media league.
2. Anti-siphoning regulations
Government regulations of real interest to a mega-media company
creating a media league are anti-siphoning rules that restrict the amount of
professional sports programming that can be shown on pay television. Such
rules jeopardize the financial returns a mega-media company may receive
from a media league. Though anti-siphoning regulations currently do not exist
in the United States, the FCC has enacted them in the past and has evinced a
willingness to do so in the future. Australia has anti-siphoning rules that
extensively limit the amount of sports programming on cable television. An
examination of the challenges a mega-media company may make against the
application of anti-siphoning rules to a media league reflects differences in the
protection constitutional law provides free expression and private property in
the United States and Australia.
a. Review of anti-siphoning regulations
i. United States
With the growth of cable television in the United States in the late 1960s
came concern from members of the public and government that cable
television operators would outbid the free-to-air television networks for the
rights to popular programs resulting in these programs no longer being
available free of charge. 544 Sporting events, it was believed, were in particular
danger of being diverted, or siphoned, from networks to cablecasters. 545 The
543. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 47 (Austl.) (stating the elements of exclusive dealing).
544. M. Agnes Siedlecki, Note, Sports Anti-Siphoning Rules for Pay Cable Television: A Public
Right to Free TV?, 53 IND. L.J. 821, 821 (1978) (discussing the FCC's anti-siphoning rules).
"Siphoning is said to occur when an event or program currently shown on conventional free television
is purchased by a cable operator for showing on a subscription cable channel." Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
545. Siedlecki, supra note 544, at 822 (noting reasons for sports anti-siphoning rules); Ira
Horowitz, The Implications of Home Box Office for Sports Broadcasts, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 743,
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likelihood that specific sporting events (e.g., Super Bowl or World Series)
would be siphoned to pay television was thought to be higher than the
diversion of non-specific events (e.g. regular season games) because of the
greater inelasticity of demand for the former than for the latter. 546
In response to these concerns, the FCC, in 1975, issued anti-siphoning
rules designed to "prevent 'siphoning' of... sports material from
conventional broadcast television to pay cable."547
Under the rules, a "specific" event.., was denied to pay TV,
subscription, or cable, if it had been telecast on conventional TV
during any one year of the previous five years. "Nonspecific" sports
events, which could be divided into the four major categories of
preseason and regular season home and away games, became
available to pay TV on the following basis: (a) if fewer than 25
percent of the events in a given category were broadcast live over
conventional TV during that season among the preceding five years in
which the most events in that category were telecast, then the number
of events available would be the remaining events not telecast during
the highwater-mark season; (b) if, however, 25 percent or more of the
events in a given category were broadcast live during the highwater-
mark season, then only 50 percent of the remaining events may be
made available to pay TV. Additionally, any reduction in the number
of conventional telecasts from the highwater-mark figure would
require a proportionate reduction in the number of events available to
pay TV.5 48
In addition to the above restrictions, the FCC also prohibited "cablecasters
from devoting more than 90 percent of their cablecast hours to... sports
programs." 549
Members of the cable television industry, the Justice Department, and
other parties challenged the validity of the anti-siphoning rules.550 The Court
of Appeals in Home Box Office v. FCC held that the "rules exceeded the
FCC's jurisdiction over cable television," 551 were arbitrary and capricious and
753 (1978) (noting the unique characteristics of sporting events).
546. Horowitz, supra note 545, at 756 (discussing the siphoning of specific and non-specific
sporting events).
547. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 28.
548. Horowitz, supra note 545, at 749-50.
549. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 19.
550. Siedlecki, supra note 544, at 828 (discussing the suit attacking the anti-siphoning rules).
551. Id.
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unconstitutional under the First Amendment.552 The court started its analysis
by noting that the FCC's "regulatory authority over cable television [was] not
carte blanche."553  Rather, the FCC "[could] only exercise authority over
cable television to the extent 'reasonably ancillary' to the Commission's
jurisdiction over broadcast television."554 Because the FCC admitted that it
had "no statutory authority to dictate entertainment formats," 555 the court
concluded that the anti-siphoning rules were an ultra vires act of the agency. 556
According to the court, "[t]he very essence of the.., sports rules [was] to
require the permission of the Commission 'to commence... programming,
including program format services, offered to the public.' 557
Even assuming the FCC's jurisdiction over cable television, the court
determined that the anti-siphoning rules were illegal. Upon judicial review of
its orders, the Commission was required to demonstrate a "'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made."'558 Because the
administrative record was devoid of evidence supporting the FCC's assertions
that sporting events were migrating from free-to-air television to cable
television and that persons without access to cable would lose access to sports
programming if siphoning were to occur, the court concluded that the anti-
siphoning rules were arbitrary and capricious. 559
Finally, the court decided that the anti-siphoning rules violated the First
Amendment rights of cable television operators. Since the anti-siphoning
rules regulated the competition between broadcasters and cablecasters for the
same audience, the court subjected the regulations to the four-part test set forth
in United States v. O'Brien.560 To pass scrutiny under O'Brien, the anti-
siphoning rules had to "(1)... fall within the constitutional power of the
government, (2) further an 'important or substantial government interest,' (3)
be 'unrelated to the suppression of free expression,' and (4) impose no greater
restriction on First Amendment freedoms 'than is essential to the furtherance'
552. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 49.
553. Id. at 26.
554. Id. (citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)).
555. Id. at 31.
556. Id.
557. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 31 (quoting In re Deployoment of Policy re: Changes in
the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 859 (1976) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order)).
558. Id. at 35 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
559. Id. at 37, 39 (reviewing the administrative record supporting the anti-siphoning rules).
560. Id. at 47-48; Phillip M. Cox II, Note, Flag on the Play? The Siphoning Effect on Sports
Television, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 571, 578 (1995) (discussing Home Box Office, Inc.).
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of the governmental interest. ' 561 The court concluded that the anti-siphoning
rules were within the constitutional power of government and unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, since their narrow purpose of protecting the
viewing rights of those unable to obtain cable was content neutral.562 The
anti-siphoning rules, however, failed the second and fourth prongs of O'Brien.
The lack of evidence in the record showing that siphoning was actually
occurring made it impossible for the FCC to demonstrate that the anti-
siphoning rules furthered an important or substantial government interest. 563
The anti-siphoning rules were "grossly overbroad" since they precluded cable
operators from showing sports events that broadcasters would clearly choose
not to telecast.564
After Home Box Office until 1992, cable networks, and the amount of
sports programming they carried, proliferated dramatically. 565 In response to
concerns about increased siphoning of sporting events to pay television,
Congress in the 1992 Cable Act ordered the FCC to "'conduct an ongoing
study on the carriage of local, regional, and national sports programming by
broadcast stations, cable programming networks, and pay-per-view
services."' 566 Pursuant to this mandate, the FCC "sought information and
comment on a number of issues regarding the movement of sports
programming from broadcast to cable television"567 in order "to determine
whether any legislative or regulatory action" 568 was needed in this area.
The FCC found that the "number of sports events shown on cable
television" had dramatically increased since 1980.569 "[T]his increased cable
exposure," however, had not "led to a concomitant decrease in the number of
sports events shown on broadcast television." 570 Rather, the data showed that
there was "a tremendous amount of sports programming on broadcast
561. Cox, supra note 560, at 578 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-88).
562. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 48-49 (applying O'Brien); Cox, supra note 560, at 578.
563. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 50.
564. Id.
565. Cox, supra note 560, at 580.
566. In re Implementation of Section 26 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Inquiry into Sports Programming Migration, Interim Report, 8 F.C.C.R.
4875 1 (1993) [hereinafter Anti-siphoning Interim Report] (quoting Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385 § 26, 106 Stat. 1502 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. §521 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992))).
567. Id. 1.
568. Id. 3.
569. Id. 85.
570. Id.
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television" which was generally increasing. 571 "The 'marquee' events, such as
the Super Bowl... remain[ed] on broadcast television." 572 In addition, only a
nominal fraction of American television households did not have access to pay
television sports programming via cable or satellite technology. Hence, "the
consequence of migration [would not be] loss of access to sports
programming, but the need to pay a fee to acquire it."'573 According to the
FCC, the cost of subscribing to pay television to acquire sports programming
was not likely to be burdensome for the average consumer. 574 Upon final
review, the FCC concluded that there was "no evidence of migration" of sports
events from free-to-air to pay television. 575  Thus, the Commission
"discern[ed] no case for additional government intervention in the sports
programming market at this time." 576
Despite their current absence, anti-siphoning rules may return to the
United States. As the number of subscriber-based platforms offering
programming increases with advances in technology, more sports events are
likely to be shown on pay mediums.577 Whether significant migration of
sports programming from free-to-air networks to pay services will follow
these technological innovations is uncertain.578  The FCC's position is,
however, that it "shall not hesitate to act, consistent with its statutory
authority" if "any significant threat to... access" to sports programming
develops. 579
571. Anti-siphoning Final Report, supra note 90, 167. See also Cox, supra note 560, at 582
(noting that the FCC found that broadcasters aired "more sports programming than ever before").
572. Anti-siphoning Final Report, supra note 90, $ 167.
573. Id. 163.
574. Id. 164; Brett T. Goodman, The Sports Broadcasting Act: As Anachronistic as the Dumont
Network?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 469, 504-05 (1995).
575. Anti-siphoning Final Report, supra note 90, 173.
576. Id. 167.
577. Anti-siphoning Interim Report, supra note 566, 80 (discussing the effect of technological
advances on sports programming migration).
578. Horowitz, supra note 545, at 766-67 (arguing that the total migration of sports programming
to pay television is "unthinkable"). But see Cox, supra note 560, at 585 (noting that "many
lawmakers" sense an imminent threat of significant sports programming siphoning).
579. Anti-siphoning Interim Report, supra note 566, 180. Whether Congress or the FCC
should adopt anti-siphoning rules is a complex issue the resolution of which is beyond the scope of
this paper. Van Glish, supra note 29, at 79 (presenting arguments for and against anti-siphoning
rules); Anti-siphoning Final Report, supra note 90, $ 141-43 (summarizing positions of members of
the television industry for and against anti-siphoning rules); Horowitz, supra note 545, at 768
(concluding that anti-siphoning rules are not needed to obtain an optimal mix of sports programming
on free and pay television); but see Cox, supra note 560, at 573 (concluding that government action is
needed to ensure free access to the most popular sports programming). See also Stephen F. Ross, An
Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 464 (1990)
(arguing that a professional sports league's packaged sale of broadcast rights to free and pay
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ii. Australia
The introduction of cable television in Australia in 1995 raised fears about
a reduction of sports programming on free-to-air television. 580 In order to
prevent the migration of major sporting events to subscription television, the
government passed anti-siphoning legislation.581
Section 115 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 ("BSA") empowers the
Minister for Communications, the Information Economy and the Arts to list
sporting events that should be televised free to the general public. 582 As a
condition of holding a subscription television license, a licensee must not
acquire the rights to televise an event on the anti-siphoning list unless:
(a) a national [public] broadcaster 583 has the right to televise the
event; or
(b) a commercial television network covering greater than 50% of the
Australian population has acquired the rights to televise the event. 584
"In other words, a pay TV operator cannot acquire the right to televise a
listed event (even where such rights are limited to televising the event on pay
TV) until a national or commercial broadcaster has acquired the right to
televise the event. ' 585 "The rights acquired by the subscription licensee
must.., be rights not greater than the rights of the free-to-air broadcaster to
televise the event. ' 586 For example, the owner of the transmission rights to a
sporting event may not sell a commercial broadcaster the right to televise a
one hour highlights package of the event and a cable operator the right to
televise the event live.587 Under the anti-siphoning rules, "a subscription
broadcast licensee can never acquire exclusive rights to a listed event. ' 588
television firms is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of § I of the Sherman Act if the
agreement reduces overall viewership of the league's contests).
580. AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION'S DRAFT REPORT ON BROADCASTING 232 (Oct.
1999) [hereinafter BROADCASTING REPORT] (discussing basis for anti-siphoning rules in Australia).
581. Id.
582. Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, § 115 (Austl.) (authorizing the Minister to create anti-
siphoning list).
583. Australia has two public national free-to-air broadcasters, the Australian Broadcasting
Company (ABC) and Special Broadcasting Services (SBS).
584. Brendan Moylan, Media Policy and Anti-Siphoning, 16 COMM. L. BULL. 16, 17 (Winter
1997). See also Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, pt. 6, sched. 2, cl. 10(1)(e).(Austl.).
585. Moylan, supra note 584, at 17.
586. Nine Network Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Broadcasting Authority, (1997) 143 A.L.R.
8, 16 (Lockhart, J.) (Fed. Ct. Austl.), af'd, (1997) 143 A.L.R. 516 (Full Fed. Ct. Austl.).
587. Id. ("The right to televise highlights of a cricket match is not substantially the same as the
right to broadcast the match itself...").
588. Moylan, supra note 584, at 17.
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Free-to-air broadcasters, however, may acquire exclusive transmission rights
to a listed sporting event and then sell the pay television rights to a cable
operator.58
9
Pursuant to section 115, the Minister has created a comprehensive list of
sporting events. 590 A subscription television licensee may acquire without
restriction the rights to any sporting event not on the anti-siphoning list. An
event is "automatically delisted one week after [it] has occurred. '591 The
Minister may also delist an event if "the national and commercial broadcasters
have had 'a real opportunity to acquire, on a fair commercial basis, the right to
broadcast the event' and they have not done so 'within a reasonable time.' 592
The Australian anti-siphoning legislation is the subject of much criticism.
The anti-siphoning list is arguably too broad since it includes events never
before aired on free-to-air television and covers more events than the free-to-
air broadcasters can technically, or practically, telecast.593 According to some
commentators, the delisting procedure is so cumbersome that a subscription
television licensee cannot complete the process in sufficient time to arrange
for the live transmission of a scheduled event. 594 The anti-siphoning rules
effectively allow free-to-air broadcasters to prevent the live telecasts of events
on pay TV by not purchasing the transmission rights to listed events or by
acquiring the exclusive transmission rights to a listed event and not selling the
pay television rights to a cable operator.595 Nor do the anti-siphoning
provisions "actively encourage[] free to air broadcasters to exercise the rights
they have acquired. ' 596
The Australian government has enacted "anti-hoarding" amendments to
the BSA to respond to this last criticism.5 97 The anti-hoarding amendments
589. Id.
590. BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 580, at F.1-F.3 (quoting anti-siphoning list).
591. Id. at 233.
592. Id. (quoting Broadcasting Services Act, 1992, § 115(2) (Austl.)).
593. Moylan, supra note 584, at 19; Malcolm Knox, Alston's Tougher TV Rules to Give Sports
Fans a Fuller Picture, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 30, 1999, at 44 (noting argument of
cable operator "that 5,000 hours of sport were protected by anti-siphoning rules [in 1998], yet less
than 30 per cent of that was broadcast free-to-air").
594. BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 580, at 233 (discussing criticisms of the anti-siphoning
legislation).
595. Moylan, supra note 584, at 18.
596. BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 580, at 233. See also Sportsvision Australia Pty. Ltd.
v. Tallgen Pty. Ltd., (1998) 44 N.S.W.L.R. 103 (Bryson, J.) (New South Wales Sup. Ct. May 22,
1998) (AustLIl.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (unreported) (noting that the anti-siphoning laws do not
compel a commercial broadcaster to televise an event to which it owns transmission rights).
597. Broadcasting Services Amendment Bill (No.1), 1999 (Austl.) [hereinafter Anti-hoarding
Amendments], available at http://www.aph.gov.au.
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require commercial broadcasters to offer to the national public broadcasters
the right to purchase, for a nominal charge, the free-to-air rights to an event
they do not plan to transmit live.598 According to the Minister, the purpose of
the anti-hoarding amendments is to "'encourage free to air broadcasters to be
more realistic when acquiring broadcasting rights to major sporting
events."' 599  The effectiveness of these provisions at preserving the live
transmission of sporting events of national interest is questionable. 600 The
national public broadcasters need not accept the commercial broadcasters'
offer and free-to-air broadcasters are not required to sell any pay television
rights they hold to cable operators.601 Thus, the anti-hoarding amendments
"cannot guarantee that events will be shown live." 60 2
The Australian anti-siphoning legislation is due to expire on December 31,
2004.603 Nevertheless, the present rules may not survive until then. The anti-
competitive nature of the current legislation is generating many calls for
reform. "The anti-siphoning provisions are a direct limitation on competition
between free to air and subscription broadcasters-that is, they give the
commercial broadcasters a competitive advantage over the subscription
broadcasters." 60 4  Advocates for reform argue that a more equitable and
effective means of achieving the purpose behind the anti-siphoning rules is to
preclude free-to-air and subscription broadcasters from negotiating contracts
that exclude the other form of broadcasting. The Australian government is
currently considering this proposal.605
598. Id. § 146A.
599. Media Release, Senator Richard Alston, Better Coverage of Sport on Television (July 19,
1999) (quoting Senator Richard Alston, Minister for Communications, the Information Economy and
the Arts), available at http://www.dcita.gov.au/nsapi-graphics.
600. BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 580, at 233.
601. Id. But see Joanne Court, Media Policy and Anti-Siphoning-Part Two, 16 COMM. L.
BULL. 16, 18 (Spring 1997) (arguing that an economically rational free-to-air broadcaster would sell
any pay TV rights to a sports event it was not showing).
602. BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 580, at 233.
603. Rory Sutton, The Flaved Philosophy of Anti-Siphoning, 14 COMM. L. BuLL. 1, at 1
(Summer 1994) ("mhe anti-siphoning rules are designed to apply for ten years only... ."); Anti-
siphoning Rules for Pay TV and Sport (quoting anti-siphoning list expiration provisions), available at
http://www.dcita.gov.au/nsapi-graphics (last visited July 19, 1999).
604. BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 580, at 233.
605. Id. at 234 (noting that the Commission is "inclined" to recommend anti-siphoning
legislation reform); Plan to Pull Plug on Anti-siphoning, Sport Review, SMH.cOM.AU ("A Federal
Government task force has recommended the eventual relaxation of anti-siphoning laws to allow
major sports to be shown only on pay television."), available at
www.smh.com.au/news/9912/03/sportlsportl7.html (last visited Dec. 3, 1999).
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b. Constitutional law challenges a mega-media company may assert against
anti-siphoning rules applied to a media league
An important consideration for a mega-media company creating a media
league is whether to air its contests on free-to-air or pay television. A mega-
media company's programming mix depends on many factors such as the
estimated audience size for its media league telecasts, anticipated revenues
from advertisers and pay television subscribers, and the impact its
programming decision has on consumers' attitudes toward the league.
60 6 If
anti-siphoning rules preclude a mega-media company from implementing its
preferred programming strategy, then it may mount a legal challenge against
such regulations.
i. United States
Assuming the absence of jurisdictional and evidentiary defects similar to
those found in Home Box Office, a mega-media company has to resort to
constitutional law to challenge anti-siphoning rules in the United States. In
particular, a mega-media company may assert that anti-siphoning rules violate
its First Amendment rights to free speech. A mega-media company may argue
that anti-siphoning rules specifically regulating sports programming are
content-based regulations and thus "presumptively unconstitutional and
subject to strict scrutiny." 60 7 In the alternative, a mega-media company may
argue that anti-siphoning rules do not pass muster under the content neutral
test of O'Brien. The FCC believes that O'Brien provides the correct First
Amendment standard in this context.60 8 Given the precedent of Home Box
Office and the FCC's position, the O'Brien test is the First Amendment hurdle
that anti-siphoning rules must clear.
60 9
The anti-siphoning rules at issue in Home Box Office failed the second and
fourth prongs of O'Brien.6 10 The court in that case, however, intimated that
sufficient evidence of sports programming migration would provide the
606. Siedlecki, supra note 544, at 824 (explaining the pricing strategies for broadcasters and
cable operators); Horowitz, supra note 545, at 753 (discussing considerations for airing sports event
on free or pay television).
607. Anti-siphoning Final Report, supra note 90, $ 140 n.21 1.
608. Id.
609. Siedlecki, supra note 544, at 834 (positing that "[alny new sports anti-siphoning
legislation... will have to meet" O'Brien). A complete exegesis of the proper First Amendment
standard under which to analyze any future anti-siphoning rules must await enactment of such rules
and their particular application to a media league.
610. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 49-50.
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government an important and substantial interest for enacting anti-siphoning
rules.611 Hence, assuming an adequate record for future regulations, a mega-
media company's First Amendment challenge to anti-siphoning rules hinges
substantially on the fourth prong of O'Brien. That is, a mega-media company
has to show that the anti-siphoning rules, as applied to its media league
coverage, are more restrictive than what is essential to further the
government's interest in providing sports programming to those unable to
afford pay television. To make this showing, a mega-media company may
point to the unlikelihood of a competing free-to-air broadcaster airing its
media league contests. 612 Arguably, the application of anti-siphoning rules to
a mega-media company's programming of its media league "curtail[s] the
flow of programming to those served by cable and willing to pay for it, with a
consequent loss of diversity and unnecessary restriction of... First
Amendment rights. 613
If unsuccessful in using the First Amendment to block application of anti-
siphoning rules, a mega-media company may seek to recoup any financial
losses these regulations cause by asserting a regulatory takings claim under the
Fifth Amendment. A mega-media company has property rights, including
federal copyrights, to the accounts and descriptions of its media league games
as well as in the telecasts of the games it produces.614 The Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment states that "'private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation."' 615 By forcing a mega-media
company to provide free access to its media league programming, the
government arguably violates the Fifth Amendment.616
A mega-media company's success on a Fifth Amendment claim depends
on the effect the anti-siphoning rules have on its return on its media league
venture and the future direction of regulatory takings jurisprudence. To date,
the Supreme Court has not extended to holders of personal property rights the
same takings protection it has to holders of real property rights. 6 1 7 Under
611. Id.
612. Id. at 50.
613. Id.
614. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 494 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (holding
that a sports club has property rights in the "news, reports, descriptions, or accounts" of its games).
615. Paul W. Gamett, Forward-Looking Costing Methodologies and the Supreme Court's
Takings Clause Jurisprudence, 7 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 119, 120 (1999) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. V).
616. Mitten & Burton, supra note 9, at 137 (noting that a proposed federal law that would require
a professional sports club relocating to a new city to reserve its trademarks for the club subsequently
locating in the former host city raises "an intriguing Takings Clause issue").
617. Garnett, supra note 615, at 121 (noting that the Supreme Court has not applied in the non-
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present law, a holder of a personal property right is not likely to succeed on a
takings claim unless it can show that the government regulation deprives it of
all economic benefit from the property. 618 A mega-media company is likely to
have difficulty satisfying this test. Future anti-siphoning rules are unlikely to
prohibit a mega-media company from showing any games on pay mediums.
Even with a prohibition on all pay television telecasts, a mega-media company
receives an economic benefit from airing its media league games on free-to-air
television. Unless the Supreme Court increases takings protection for holders
of personal property rights, a mega-media company faces a tough task in
recouping from the government financial losses on its media league caused by
anti-siphoning rules.
ii. Australia
The Australian Commonwealth Constitution differs from its American
counterpart in that it does not have an express "Bill of Rights." 619 Though
recent decisions of the High Court have laid "the foundation for a judicially
constructed Bill of Rights," 620 the protection of individual freedoms from
government regulation is not as great in Australia as it is in the United
States.621 For example, freedom of expression receives less protection in
Australia than it does in the United States. In Australia, free speech extends
only to "freedom for Australian citizens to communicate on political and
economic matters." 622 A mega-media company, therefore, is not likely to be
able to mount a significant challenge to the validity of Australian anti-
siphoning legislation on freedom of expression grounds.
The Commonwealth Constitution contains "five 'individual rights'
land use context the "most recent tests for confiscatory regulations-essential nexus and rough
proportionality," which provide increased protection of property rights); Mitten & Burton, supra note
9, at 137 (noting that holders of personal property rights receive less takings protection than holders
of real property rights). See also John D. Echeverria, Revving the Engines in Neutral: City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 29 ENvTL. L. REP. 10682, 10682 (1999) (noting
that the Supreme Court has limited the "rough proportionality" test to the exactions context).
618. Gamett, supra note 615, at 128 (noting that the Supreme Court has upheld regulated rates
for common carrier rates that only provide a 'meager return' (quoting Fed'l Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 605 (1943)). See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)
("[L]oss of future profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender
reed upon which to rest a takings claim.").
619. PETER HANKS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 495 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing rights
and freedoms in Australian constitutional law).
620. Id. at 545.
621. Id. at 495 (noting that the Australian Commonwealth Constitution provides less protection
for fundamental freedoms than the American Constitution).
622. Id. at 545.
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clauses." 623 One of these is contained in section 51(xxxi) which "authorises
the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to... '[t]he
acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person in respect of
which the Parliament has power to make laws ... ."'624 Though it grants "the
Commonwealth Parliament with a legislative power of acquiring property,"
section 51(xxxi) also "provides the individual.., affected with a protection
against governmental interferences with his proprietary rights without just
recompense .... "625 The Australian "High Court has taken the view" that
section 51(xxxi) generally applies to "any Commonwealth law for the
acquisition of property. 626
Section 51(xxxi) provides a mega-media company with a possible means
to challenge the application of the Australian anti-siphoning laws to a media
league. 627 Whether the anti-siphoning rules constitute an acquisition of a
professional sports league's transmission rights on unjust terms is an issue of
first impression in that country. The anti-hoarding legislation states that the
amendments have "no effect to the extent" that they contravene section
5 1(xxxi) by authorizing the acquisition of property other than on just terms. 628
Though recognizing the possibility of an infringement of section 51 (xxxi), the
commentary to the anti-hoarding amendments concludes that resolution of this
issue is for the courts.629
A mega-media company would appear to have a viable claim under
section 51 (xxxi) to the anti-siphoning laws. "The concept of 'property' under
[§] 51(31) is very broad. '630 The section "extends to every species of valuable
right and interest including real and personal property, incorporeal
hereditaments such as rents and services, rights of way, rights of profit or use
in land of another, and choses in action."631 The transmission rights to a
623. Id. at 496.
624. Id. at 499 (quoting AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(xxxi)).
625. Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth, (1948) 76 C.L.R. 1, 349-50 (Dixon, J.)
(Austi.).
626. HANKS, supra note 619, at 500. Exceptions to the reach of§ 5 1(xxxi) exist, though they are
not relevant to the media league context. Id.
627. Media Release, Senator Richard Alston, Rugby League To Remain on Free to Air
Television (announcing that the anti-siphoning list includes the matches of News Corporation's Super
League as well as any future league resulting from the merger of Super League and the ARL),
available at http://www.dcita.gov.au/nsapi-graphics (last visited July 19, 1999).
628. Broadcasting Services Amendment Bill (No.1), 1999, § 146F(5) (Austl.).
629. Bills Digest No. 6 1998-99, Broadcasting Services Amendment Bill 1998, available at
http:/www.aph.gov.aullibrary/pubslbd/1998-99/99bdOO6.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2000).
630. Denis O'Brien, The One That Almost Got Away--The Constitutional Guarantee of Just
Terms, 5 PuB. L. REV. 7,7 (1994).
631. Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel, (1944) 68 C.L.R. 261 (Starke, J.) (Austl.), 1944
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mega-media company's sporting event in any medium are "property" under
this interpretation of the term.632
"[T]he acquisition of property referred to in [§] 51(xxxi) need not be an
acquisition by the Commonwealth Government-that is, if a law of the
Commonwealth is a law with respect to the acquisition of property for a
Commonwealth purpose, then the law is subject to the 'just terms'
requirement. ."... 633 "'It is immaterial whether the acquisition is to be made
by the Commonwealth or by some body authorised to acquire the property by
the Commonwealth.... "'634 For an acquisition to occur, an interest in
property must pass from the property holder to the Commonwealth or another
person.635
Applying these principles to the media league context, a mega-media
company which is not a commercial broadcaster may argue that the anti-
siphoning laws force it to pass the free-to-air television rights to the matches
of its professional sports league to commercial broadcasters. The anti-
siphoning regulations serve a Commonwealth purpose.636 The anti-siphoning
rules effectively require a mega-media company to transfer its free-to-air
television rights to the commercial broadcaster that offers the highest bid. The
anti-siphoning laws implicitly prohibit a mega-media company from selling or
using its pay television rights to a sporting event until after it sells the free-to-
air rights.
637
The "central limiting factor" in section 51 (xxxi) is the requirement of "just
terms."
638
In determining the issue of just terms, the Court does not attempt a
balancing of the interests of the dispossessed owner against the
interests of the community at large. The purpose of the guarantee of
just terms is to ensure that the owners of property compulsorily
acquired by the government... are not required to sacrifice their
WL 26029, at *21. See also Georgiadis v. Australian & Overseas Telecomms. Corp., (1994) 179
C.L.R. 297 (Austl.), 1994 WL 1725763, at *3 (affirming that choses in action are "property" for
purposes of § 51 (xxxi)).
632. Rubenstein, supra note 368, at 3 (noting that the broadcasting rights to a sporting event are
"purely contractual" under Australia law), available at
http://www.gtlaw.com.au/templates/publications/default.jsp?pubid=1 19.
633. HANKS, supra note 619, at 505.
634. Id. (quoting P. J. Magennis Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, (1949) 80 C.L.R. 382, 423
(Williams, J.) (Austi.)).
635. Id. at 508 (citing Georgiadis, 179 C.L.R. 297).
636. BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 580, at 234.
637. Id.
638. HANKS, supra note 619, at 511.
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property for less than its worth. Unless it be shown that what is
gained is full compensation for what is lost, the terms cannot be found
to be just.63 9
The generally accepted principle is that "the terms provided should reflect
the property's market value-'the price which a reasonably willing vendor
would have been prepared to accept and a reasonably willing purchaser would
have been prepared to pay for the property at the date of acquisition.' 640
"However, the property's particular value to the former owner must be taken
into account. '641  The terms of the acquisition may need to include
compensation for loss that flows from the transfer of property from the
original owner (e.g., loss of goodwill).642
Satisfying the "just terms" element of section 51(xxxi) requires a mega-
media company to show that the anti-siphoning laws reduce the return it
receives from the transmission rights to its media league. The government is
likely to argue that the property acquired under the anti-siphoning laws is the
free-to-air transmission rights to the listed sporting event. A mega-media
company arguably receives market value for these rights from the commercial
broadcaster that submits the best offer to buy them. This argument is not
persuasive. A showing by a mega-media company that a greater return is
possible from showing media league contests exclusively on pay television
than from adhering to the anti-siphoning laws supports a claim that it
sacrifices its property for less than its worth. Also, any differential between
the return from maintaining exclusive transmission rights and selling free-to-
air television rights and retaining pay television rights is another possible
measure of the loss a mega-media company suffers from the anti-siphoning
laws.643
Thus, a just terms claim provides a mega-media company with a stronger
challenge to the anti-siphoning rules in Australia than a regulatory takings
claim does against anti-siphoning regulation in the United States.
B. Players' Challenges to Restrictive Employment Conditions in a Media
League
Controlling costs is a concern for a mega-media company operating a
639. Georgiadis, 1994 WL 172563, at *10.
640. HANKS, supra note 619, at 512 (quoting Nelungaloo v. Commonwealth, (1948) 75 C.L.R.
495, 507 (Williams, J.) (AustI.)).
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Sutton, supra note 603, at 1 (querying whether the owner of a listed sporting event may seek
from the government any loss profits caused by the Australian anti-siphoning laws).
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media league. Since personnel expenses account for a significant percentage
of a media league's operating budget, restricting players' salaries is a means
for a mega-media company to reduce expenditures. A mega-media company
may also want to restrict the movement of players between club subsidiaries.
Restrictions of these types enhance competitive balance and stability in a
media league.
Traditional leagues in the United States and Australia, motivated by
budgetary and competitive balance concerns, have attempted to implement
unilaterally restrictive employment conditions on players' salaries and
mobility. Players in both countries, however, have successfully challenged
unfavorable employment restrictions. 644 Because of a media league's single
economic entity structure,645 a mega-media company is likely to face fewer
and less effective challenges from players to its restrictive employment terms
than traditional leagues encounter. Given the benefits of a single economic
entity structure for a professional sports league, a mega-media company is
likely to be wary of taking any action that may threaten loss of single entity
status. The current litigation between MLS, the premium professional soccer
league in the United States, and its players regarding the alleged single entity
structure of the league demonstrates the risk to single entity status by
decentralizing control over club affairs.
1. Single economic entity structure of a media league limits the legal bases in
the United States and Australia upon which players can challenge
restrictive employment conditions
a. United States
In the United States, section 1 of the Sherman Act is the legal basis upon
which players commonly challenge restrictive employment provisions (e.g.,
player drafts, reserve clauses) in traditional leagues. 646 Section 1 makes
illegal unreasonable restraints of trade between at least two independent
644. Krause, supra note 452, at 179 n.22 (listing cases in which American courts have
invalidated restrictions on players' mobility in traditional professional sports leagues); Warren
Pengilley, Sporting Drafts and Restraint of Trade, 10 QUEENSLAND UNIV. TECH. L.J. 89, 98 (1994)
(noting the "very low success" traditional professional sports leagues have had in defending
restrictive employment terms before Australian courts).
645. See supra notes 452-462 and accompanying text (discussing single economic entity
structure of a media league).
646. See, e.g., Smith, 593 F.2d 1173 (attacking the NFL draft under § 1); Mackey, 543 F.2d 606
(challenging under § 1 the NFL's rule requiring a club acquiring a free agent to compensate the
player's former club).
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economic entities. 647 Courts use "two 'complementary categories of antitrust
analysis"' to determine whether a restraint is unreasonable. 648 Concerted
action that has "no competitive benefits" (e.g., price fixing, group boycotts) is
unreasonable, and illegal per se.649 Agreements not falling within a per se
category are analyzed under a rule of reason test. A restraint is illegal under
the rule of reason if its anti-competitive effects outweigh its pro-competitive
benefits. 65 0
The restrictive employment conditions in a traditional league fall under
section 1 because separate clubs-competitors for the employ of players-
agree to them. Courts generally analyze traditional leagues' restrictive
employment terms under the rule of reason, rather than finding them per se
illegal.651  Courts typically invalidate under section 1 the employment
restraints of traditional leagues because their detrimental effects on the ability
of players to market their services to the individual clubs in the league are not
outweighed by pro-competitive justifications. 652 In particular, courts find
unpersuasive the leagues' arguments that restrictions on players' salaries and
mobility promote competitive balance between the individual clubs.653
Players cannot use section 1 of the Sherman Act to challenge restrictive
employment practices in a media league.654 A parent corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiary are a single entity for antitrust purposes.655 The
concerted action requirement for section 1 applicability is missing in the media
league context.
Though free from section 1 attack, a mega-media company may face
challenges to its employment policies under section 2 of the Sherman Act.656
647. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (noting the limited reach
of § 1 of the Sherman Act); Mathias, supra note 462, at 206 (noting the concerted action requirement
of§ 1).
648. Mathias, supra note 462, at 206 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)).
649. Id. (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 334 (1982)).
650. Id.
651. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 607 (applying the rule of reason to the NFL's "Rozelle
Rule").
652. See infra note 774.
653. Dabscheck, supra note 474, at 602-03; Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186 (rejecting NFL's
competitive balance justifications for its player draft).
654. Mathias, supra note 462, at 219-20 (noting that single entity professional sports leagues are
not subject to suit under § 1).
655. Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 776 (concluding § 1 does not apply to "the coordinated
[behavior] of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary").
656. Mathias, supra note 462, at 229 (noting that players may allege a § 2 claim against a single
entity professional sports league).
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Section 2 provides that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize,.., any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 657 Players may claim that a
mega-media company, by its restrictive employment terms, is abusing its
monopoly power in the labor market. Winning such a section 2 claim against
a mega-media company may be difficult.658 To succeed, players have to show
that the mega-media company has monopoly power in the relevant labor
market, and that it uses the employment practice at issue to maintain willfully
that power. 659 Given the large number of professional sports leagues in the
world today in the various sports, a mega-media company is not likely to have
monopoly power in the market for players. A player subject to unfavorable
labor conditions in a media league may seek employment in another league.
660
Where a mega-media company, however, creates a media league in a sport for
which there are no other professional leagues, players have a stronger section
2 claim.
By not being subject to section 1 attack, a mega-media company has the
ability to impose employment conditions more onerous than those currently
present in traditional leagues. Since players' associations are well organized
in the United States, a mega-media company is likely to have to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement with the players. A significant ploy players'
unions use in negotiations with traditional leagues is to threaten a lawsuit
under section 1.661 A players' association cannot weld this weapon when
dealing with a media league. Rather, a players' union must resort to labor law
protections and threats of labor unrest to exact concessions from a mega-media
company.
b. Australia
In Australia, the restraint of trade doctrine is the legal basis used to
657. 15 U.S.C. § 2(1994).
658. Mathias, supra note 462, at 229 (noting that players are less likely to win a § 2 claim against
a professional sports league than a § 1 claim).
659. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1996) (stating the requirements for a
claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act).
660. Mathias, supra note 462, at 230 (arguing that MLS, the American professional soccer
league, does not have monopoly power in the labor soccer market because of the presence of other
professional soccer leagues in the world).
661. Id. at 208, 237 (noting that threat of a § 1 lawsuit has increased the bargaining power of
players' associations vis-d-vis traditional professional sports leagues). After the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., players have to vote to decertify their union before they can
bring an antitrust suit to challenge the restrictive employment practices in a traditional professional
sports league. Brown, 518 U.S. at 250; Mathias, supra note 462, at 220 n.96 (discussing Brown).
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challenge restrictive employment practices of traditional leagues. 662 Under the
restraint of trade doctrine, "conduct that is in restraint of trade is prima facie
void unless it is reasonable, reasonableness being measured by reference to the
interests of both the parties involved and the public in general., 663 "A contract
is in restraint when it requires the restrained party to forfeit some choice
regarding their employment. '664 "Once the restraint is shown to exist ... the
restraining party... [must] show that the restraint is reasonable in the interests
of the parties."665 A restraint is reasonable in the interest of the parties, if it
"afford[s] no more than adequate protection to the restraining party," taking
into account "the legitimate business interests of the restraining party" and
"the interests of the restrained party to choose their employer and conditions
they work under." 666 If the restraining party carries its obligation, then the
onus is on the restrained party to prove that the restraint is unreasonable in the
public interest.667 The court determines whether the restraint offends public
policy, though "it is a very rare situation that a restraint that is reasonable in
the interests of the parties is unreasonable in the public interest. 668
Australian courts routinely invalidate under the restraint of trade doctrine
employment restrictions traditional leagues impose upon players.669 Though
they differ in detail, labor market controls of Australian leagues are similar to
those in American leagues in that they depress players' salaries and reduce the
off-field competition between the individual clubs for the employ of players.
Australian leagues, like their American counterparts, argue that these
restrictions are needed to achieve competitive balance among the clubs.670
Though they recognize parity among clubs as a legitimate concern, Australian
courts generally conclude that traditional leagues' employment practices such
as player drafts and transfer fee systems are unreasonable because they are
more restrictive than necessary to protect the leagues' business interests.671
662. Davidson, supra note 65, at 190-92 (discussing players' challenges under the restraint of
trade doctrine against Australian traditional professional sports leagues).
663. Id. at 189.
664. Id.
665. Id. at 189-90.
666. Id. at 190.
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. Id. at 172 (listing examples of the restrictive employment conditions Australian courts have
invalidated under the restraint of trade doctrine).
670. Id. at 190 (noting arguments of Australian professional sports leagues).
671. Id. at 191 (noting the conclusions of Australian courts reviewing restrictive employment
provisions in Australian leagues); Dabscheck, supra note 474, at 603 (noting that Australian courts
"have overwhelmingly struck" down labor market controls in traditional professional sports leagues
under the restraint of trade doctrine).
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Australian courts are very solicitous of an employee's "right to choose
between prospective employers" 672 and refuse to permit an infringement of a
player's freedom in employment given the paucity of evidence supporting the
utility of player restraints. 673
The restraint of trade doctrine is likely not to be available to players to
attack salary and mobility restrictions in a media league.674 A mega-media
company's allocation of players among its club subsidiaries does not
constitute an actionable restraint of trade.675 "An intra-enterprise restraint is
not a restraint that [an Australian court] will look at, nor one that could be
considered as unreasonable, as it is usual for a firm to be able to allocate its
employees among its departments as it desires without interference of restraint
of trade laws." 676
Players in either a traditional or media league cannot resort to the
Australian Trade Practices Act (TPA) because the legislation expressly
excludes from its coverage "performance of work under a contract of service"
(i.e., an employment contract).677 A well-settled principle of Australian law is
that an employee-employer relationship exists between a player and an
individual club in a traditional league.678 A mega-media company is likely to
structure its contracts with players so as to qualify for the "contract of service"
exception in the TPA. Even if a mega-media company creates a Australian
media league in a sport for which no other professional sports league exists, a
player cannot assert a misuse of market power claim under section 46 of the
TPA to challenge an unfavorable condition of employment. 679 In Australia,
672. Adamson v. New South Wales Rugby Football League, (1991) 31 F.C.R. 242, 267 (Wilcox,
J.) (Full Fed. Ct. Austl.), 1991 WL 1120857, at *30.
673. Pengilley, supra note 644, at 98 (noting that in cases involving player restraints courts have
held "in favour of individual freedom").
674. Interview with Braham Dabscheck, Associate Professor, School of Industrial Relations,
Univ. New South Wales (Sydney, Australia Nov. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Dabscheck Interview] (stating
that players would have difficulty using the restraint of trade doctrine to challenge employment
practices in a single entity professional sports league).
675. Davidson, supra note 65, at 173 (noting that the divisions in a single firm are incapable of
imposing a restraint among themselves cognizant under the Australian restraint of trade doctrine).
676. Id. at 192.
677. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 4(1) (Austl.). See also Adamson, 1991 WL 1120857, at *21-
*24 (concluding that a contract between a club in a traditional professional sports league and a player
is a "contract of service" and, ergo, is outside the Trade Practices Act); Davidson, supra note 65, at
193-94 (discussing the exclusion of players' contracts from the Trade Practices Act).
678. Opie & Smith, supra note 477, at 318 (noting that the Australian High Court has "put the
[employee] status of professional team athletes beyond doubt").
679. Maeve McDonagh, Restrictive Provisions in Player Agreements, 4 AuSTL. J. LABOUR L.
126, 144-47 (1991) (discussing the prospects of a player using the Trade Practices Act to challenge
employment restrictions).
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players must rely heavily on labor law principles and collective bargaining to
contest employment rules in a media league. 680
A unique Australian legal basis upon which a player may challenge a
restrictive employment term in a contract with a mega-media company is the
unfair contract provisions of the New South Wales Industrial Relations Act.681
This statute defines as "unfair" any contract "that is unfair, harsh, or
unconscionable, or [ ] that is against the public interest .... -682 Upon
application of any party to a contract, 683 the Industrial Commission, after
finding the contract to be unfair, may declare the contract "wholly or partly
void. 684  "The Commission may find that [the contract] was an unfair
contract at the time it was entered into or that it subsequently became an unfair
contract because of any conduct of the parties, any variation of the contract or
any other reason."685
A player may use this legal ground to obtain relief from the negative
effects of a particular action of a club or league. 686 For example, during the
Super League saga, the ARL established a policy not to select for international
representative matches players who had signed contracts to play in Super
League.687 Affected players petitioned the New South Wales Industrial
Commission to set aside the ARL's decision under the unfair contract
provisions. The Commission held in favor of the players because the ARL's
policy was an unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair.688 The Commission
ordered the ARL to consider Super League players for representative
selection.
The extent to which the unfair contract provisions can be used to combat
restrictive employment terms in a media league is limited. First, the
provisions apply only on a case-by-case basis to examine the specific contract
680. Dabscheck Interview, supra note 674 (noting that labor law is the principal recourse for
players in dealing with single entity professional sports leagues).
681. Industrial Relations Act, 1996, §§ 105-09A (N.S.W. ACTS).
682. Id. § 105(a)-(b).
683. Id. § 108(a) (listing "any party to the contract" as a person who may apply for an order from
the Commission).
684. Id. § 106(1).
685. Id. § 106(2).
686. Opie & Smith, supra note 477, at 348-49 (discussing player's use of unfair contract statute
to challenge his dismissal from the team where club failed to provide notice of the contract's terms in
negotiations).
687. Daley v. New South Wales Rugby League Ltd., [1995J N.S.W.I.R.C. 183 (New South
Wales Indust. Rel. Comm'n. Sept. 19, 1995) (AustLlI.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
688. Id.
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between a particular player and his employer. 689 They provide no basis upon
which to challenge a comprehensive employment scheme such as a player
draft or salary cap. Second, the unfair contract laws are unique to New South
Wales and are not present in any other Australian jurisdiction.690 Only
contracts between players and a mega-media company within the jurisdiction
of the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales are subject to this
statute.
2. Fragmented ownership of a media league may endanger its single entity
structure: Fraser v. Major League Soccer
A mega-media company should not take any action that may preclude a
media league from having single economic entity status. The lawsuit between
Major League Soccer (MLS) and players in the league demonstrates the risks
to single entity status by decentralizing control over individual clubs.
MLS is a limited-liability corporation. 691 MLS owns all the clubs in the
league, but sells stock in the corporation. 692 Investors can purchase two types
of stock. "Operator/investor" stock gives the purchaser the right to exercise
substantial control over the operations of an individual club in the league. 693
For example, operator/investors "are responsible for hiring general managers,
front-office personnel, coaches, the drafting and trading of players and local
marketing." 694  Investors may purchase the right to operate more than one
team.695 Currently in MLS, one investor manages three clubs, while two other
investors each operate two clubs apiece. 696 Operator/investors receive a
"'management fee,"' which is a percentage of a club's local revenues, 697 a
dividend from any MLS operating profits, and may realize any gain from
689. Adamson, 1991 WL 1120857, at *26 (noting the limited applicability of § 275 of the
Industrial Relations Act, an earlier version of the unfair contract provisions); Pengilley, supra note
644, at 112 (agreeing with the ruling in Adamson).
690. McDonagh, supra note 679, at 150 (noting that New South Wales' unfair contract laws are
unique in Australia); Dabscheck Interview, supra note 674 (same).
691. Mathias, supra note 462, at 221.
692. Id. (discussing MLS' corporate structure).
693. Rob Atherton, Note, Fraser v. Major League Soccer (MLS) The Future of the Single-Entity
League and the International Transfer System, 66 UMKC L. REv. 887, 899 (1998).
694. Id.
695. Mathias, supra note 462, at 222.
696. Id. at 222 n.108.
697. MLS Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Fraser v. Major League Soccer, No. 97-10342(GAO) (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 1998),
reprinted in 549 PLI/PAT 729, 821 (1999) [hereinafter PLI].
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selling their stock to outside buyers.698 Purchasers of non-operator/investor
stock are not involved in operating clubs and only receive a dividend from
MLS profits.699 "MLS retains all national television and merchandising
revenues."
700
Technically, MLS signs all players to employment contracts and assigns
them to clubs.70 1  The individual clubs, however, are involved in the
employment process. Each club notifies MLS of players it wants for its roster.
MLS then negotiates with the player, who will be assigned to the requesting
club if an agreement is reached. 702 Each MLS player contract contains a
reserve clause which "gives the league the unilateral right to renew the
contract. '70 3 MLS imposes a standard salary cap for each club.70 4
In Fraser v. Major League Soccer,70 5 the players allege that MLS'
restrictive employment practices violate the antitrust laws. In particular, the
plaintiffs claim that the league's player allocation system, reserve clause, and
salary cap constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.70 6 In making this claim, the plaintiffs argue that MLS is not a
single economic entity because the operator/investors are independent
economic actors. According to the plaintiffs, MLS's structure is a "sham"
designed solely to allow the league to escape review under section 1.707 The
plaintiffs argue that the operator/investors in MLS are economically
indistinguishable from the individual owners in a traditional American
league.708
MLS defends on the grounds that it is a single economic entity incapable
of violating section 1. MLS analogizes itself to corporations, such as General
Motors, which are undoubtedly single entities for antitrust purposes though
they sell different categories of shares.709 To distinguish operator/investors
698. Mathias, supra note 462, at 221.
699. Atherton, supra note 693, at 899.
700. Mathias, supra note 462, at 221.
701. Id. at 227.
702. Id.
703. Id. at 207.
704. Atherton, supra note 693, at 900.
705. 180 F.R.D. 178 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1998).
706. Memorandum of Law in Support of Class Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Fraser v. Major League Soccer, No. 97-10342(GAO) (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 1998), reprinted in PLI, supra
697, at 737.
707. Id. at 738.
708. Id. at 749.
709. Id. at 1003 n.18 (publishing MLS' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
2002]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
from franchise owners in a traditional league, MLS points to its control over
all league revenues, whether generated locally or nationally, its extensive
oversight of the clubs, and the commonality of interest among the
operator/investors caused by their ability to manage multiple clubs.
710
Though the trial court concluded that MLS is a single entity and granted
summary judgment for the league on the players' section 1 claim, 711 the single
entity debate in Fraser continues. 712 Fraser shows the potential for players to
challenge a mega-media company on section 1 and restraint of trade grounds
in the United States and Australia if outside investors assume substantial
control over the club subsidiaries in a media league. Selling minority equity
interests in the club subsidiaries to fans and investors is not likely to result in a
media league losing single entity status since the parent mega-media company
can still assert "full control" over the clubs' operations.713 Until further
guidance from Fraser or other developments in the law, the ability of a mega-
media company to relinquish a majority interest in the club subsidiaries and
maintain single entity status is uncertain.
C. Acquisition of Playing Venues for a Media League: The Essential Facility
Doctrine in the United States and Australia
Securing access to playing venues is a necessary part of operating a media
league. A mega-media company may have difficulty in obtaining access to a
playing facility in locales where an established league, or an individual club of
an established league, owns, or has an exclusive stadium lease agreement for,
the only venue suitable for hosting a professional sports league contest. In
such a situation, a mega-media company may have to resort to legal action
under the essential facility doctrine to gain access to the venue. The success
that a mega-media company may achieve with the essential facility doctrine is
likely to vary between the United States and Australia since the doctrine is not
identical in the two countries.
710. Id. at 813-24 (producing MLS' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment).
711. Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 142 (D. Mass. 2000).
712. Mathias, supra note 462, at 229 (concluding that MLS is a single entity); but see Atherton,
supra note 693, at 911 (concluding that "MLS is not a single-entity").
713. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771-72 (noting that a parent corporation "may assert full control"
of a subsidiary at any time).
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1. United States
a. Review of the essential facility doctrine
Though its origins trace back to 1912,714 the term "essential facility
doctrine" first appeared in American jurisprudence in 1977. In Hecht v. Pro-
Football, Inc.,715 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant, owner of the
Washington Redskins, a NFL franchise, violated the antitrust laws by refusing
to waive an exclusivity provision in its lease with the District of Columbia
Armory Board, the operator of RFK Stadium.716 According to the plaintiffs,
the defendant's refusal to renegotiate with the Armory Board prevented their
obtaining access to the stadium. As a result, the American Football League, a
rival league to the NFL at that time, rejected the plaintiffs' application for a
franchise in the Washington D.C. area.717
The court set forth the theory behind the plaintiffs' claims as follows:
The essential facility doctrine, also called the "bottleneck principle,"
states that "where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-
be competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be
shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the
scarce facility."... To be "essential" a facility need not be
indispensable; it is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be
economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe
handicap on potential market entrants. Necessarily, this principle
must be carefully delimited: the antitrust laws do not require that an
essential facility be shared if such sharing would be impractical or
would inhibit the defendant's ability to serve its customers
adequately.718
Since the plaintiffs had presented evidence that RFK Stadium was the only
suitable stadium for professional football in the Washington D.C. metropolitan
area and that joint use of the stadium with the Redskins was feasible, the court
714. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 842 (1989) ("The essential facilities notion is usually traced to the Terminal
Railroad combination case."); but see Werden, supra note 391, at 441-42 ("Which cases are essential
facility cases is subject to dispute. Terminal Railroad and three other cases could each be considered
the seminal essential facility case: Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, Inc., United
States v. Otter Tail Power Co., and Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc." Id. (citations omitted)).
715. 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
716. Id. at 985-86.
717. Id.
718. Id. at 992-93 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in not giving the plaintiffs'
jury instruction on section 1 of the Sherman Act based on the essential facility
doctrine. 719 Moreover, the court believed that "the essential facility doctrine
would also support an allegation that the Redskins' refusal to waive the
restrictive covenant constituted illegal monopolization under §2."720 The
court did not grant a remedy based on the plaintiffs' section 2 claims since
"Hecht... did not request an instruction to this effect."'721  The court
remanded for a new trial on plaintiffs' section 1 claims. 722
The evil that the essential facility doctrine seeks to prevent is the
suppression of "horizontal competition that might be of benefit to
consumers-competition that could survive if all firms had access to the
essential facility. ' 723 Based on this rationale, to prove an antitrust violation
under the essential facility doctrine in the United States, a plaintiff must
establish (1) control of an essential facility by a monopolist; (2) that a
competitor cannot practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3)
that denial of the use of the facility is to a competitor; and (4) that providing
access to the facility is feasible.724 The plaintiff may charge breach of section
1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act depending on the number of defendants
allegedly blocking access to the facility. 725
b. Application of the American essential facility doctrine in the media
league context
In a media league context, an essential facility doctrine issue may arise if
719. Id. at 993.
720. Hecht, 570 F.2d at 993 n.44.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 998-99.
723. Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 571 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
724. MCI Communications Corp., v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983)
(delineating requirements to prove an antitrust violation under the essential facility doctrine), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Werden, supra note 391, at 445 ("The most significant essential facility
case is... MCI Communications v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co."); id. at 452-58
(expounding on the MCI elements); Warren Pengilley, Hilmer and "Essential Facilities", 17
U.N.S.W. L.J. 1,21 n.74 (1994) (listing MClcriteria).
725. Hecht, 570 F.2d at 985-86 (noting plaintiffs' § 1 claim against Pro Football, Inc., and the
Armory Board, and § 2 claim against Pro Football, Inc.). "The essential facility concept, applied to a
single firm, must heed the conduct requirement-not just market power-necessary to constitute
monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The formula the Supreme Court has most
recently used is the 'willful acquisition or maintenance' of monopoly power." Areeda, supra note
714, at 845 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)). By definition, a
violation of section 1 requires two or more firms acting in concert to restrain trade. See also
Copperweld Corp., 467 U.S. at 768 (noting the joint action requirement of § I of the Sherman Act).
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an established league or one of its clubs denies a mega-media company access
to a playing venue. 726 The established league's or club's control over the
stadium may arise from its ownership of the facility or an exclusive lease
agreement with the stadium owner.727 To gain access to this facility using the
essential facility doctrine in the United States, a mega-media company has to
file a lawsuit against the established league or club alleging a violation of the
Sherman Act. Such a suit is likely to raise a number of complex issues
including whether the defendant has monopoly power over the facility,
whether the facility is essential, 728 and whether the defendant, by denying a
mega-media company access to the facility, is using its monopoly power to
suppress competition in a relevant market. 729 Resolution of these issues
depends on the facts out of which the lawsuit arises.
To support its position, a mega-media company can turn to precedent such
as Hecht and Fishman v. Wirtz. In Fishman, a prospective purchaser of the
Chicago Bulls, a NBA club, sought to negotiate a lease for use of Chicago
Stadium, the only venue in the city suitable for hosting professional basketball
games. The owner of Chicago Stadium, also a bidder for the Chicago NBA
franchise, refused to negotiate a lease agreement in order to damage his rival's
bid for the basketball club. The Court of Appeals, applying the essential
facility doctrine, held that the owner's conduct was a violation of the Sherman
Act.730
726. Noll, supra note 463, at 380 ("A final institutional mechanism that has been deployed to
forestall entry [of rival leagues] is the exclusive rental agreement to obtain a stadium.").
727. Werden, supra note 391, at 455-56 ("The MCI test uses the term control presumably to
include within the essential facility doctrine situations in which the essential facility is not owned by
the monopolist but is controlled by exercising particular contract rights.").
728. Donald B. Robertson, Government Business Enterprises and Access to Essential Facilities,
2 COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 98, 112 (1994) ("In Hecht, the court identified two characteristics
of an essential facility: (1) something to which a competitor or a potential competitor must have
access in order to compete in the relevant market. Denial constitutes a 'severe handicap'; (2)
something which cannot be duplicated; it is not economically feasible to do so." (quoting Hecht, 570
F.2d at 992)). "There must be some respect in which the facility is vital to the competitive viability of
the person seeking access." Id. See also Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539 (defining an essential facility as
one "that cannot reasonably be duplicated and to which access is necessary if one wished to
compete").
729. William Blumenthal, Three Vexing Issues Under the Essential Facilities Doctrine: ATM
Networks as Illustration, 58 ANTTRUST L. J. 855, 860 (1989) (discussing the analysis of the essential
facility doctrine); Ravi P. Kewalram, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Section 46 of the Trade
Practices Act: Fine-tuning the Hilmer Report on National Competition Policy, 2 TRADE PRACTICES
L.J. 188, 196 (1994) (noting that the monopolist inquiry is separate from the one concerning whether
the facility is essential).
730. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539-41 (discussing plaintiffs' §§ 1 and 2 claims based on the essential
facility doctrine). But see Werden, supra note 391, at 448 (noting line of authority refuting Hecht).
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2. Australia
a. Review of the essential facility doctrine
Despite precedent suggesting otherwise, 731 the essential facility doctrine is
a part of the Australian legal landscape following Parliament's enactment of
an administrative access regime for national facilities in 1995.732 Though its
theoretical basis733 and access criteria 734 are modeled after the American
essential facility doctrine, the Australian legislation differs both substantively
and procedurally from the American system of forced access to facilities.
Unlike in the United States, where generally a court is the legal body that
orders access as a remedy, the Australian statute establishes a regime under
which a government minister ultimately declares, at the conclusion of an
administrative proceeding, whether an applicant is entitled to access. 735  In
Australia:
There are three ways in which an applicant may be provided with
access to essential services: (1) ministerial declaration after
recommendation by the National Competition Council (NCC); (2) a
service provider giving an undertaking to the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC); and (3) an alternative, effective
access regime established by a State or Territory. 736
731. Kewalram, supra note 729, at 205 (commenting that it was "not entirely clear" whether the
essential facility doctrine was incorporated in Australian law); Pengilley, supra note 724, at 3 (noting
that "Australian courts have shown a 'strange reluctance' to embrace" the American essential facility
doctrine); Robertson, supra note 719, at 114 ("On the current authorities in Australia there is no
'doctrine' requiring the owner of an essential facility to grant access to that facility.").
732. The Competition Policy Reform Act, 1995 (Austl.); Trade Practices Act, 1974, pt. IliA, §
44 (Austl.).
733. Kewalram, supra note 729, at 189.
In any given industry, an 'essential facility' is a unique productive resource which cannot be practically
recreated but is vital for competition in that industry. Usually, this is because the facility is a link in the
productive chain so that 'upstream' or 'downstream' producers cannot fulfill their role without access to
that facility.
Id. See also id. at 206 ("[T]he main aim of the [essential facilities] doctrine.., has been to protect
consumers generally via protecting the competitive process.").
734. Warren Pengilley, The National Competition Policy Draft Legislative Package: The
Proposed Access Regime, 2 COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 244, 247-48 (1995) (noting that the
proposed legislation adopted the American criteria, but for the national significance requirement, for
determining whether a facility is essential and whether access should be granted).
735. Alsiter Abadee, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and the National Access Regime: A
Residual Role for Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act?, 5 TRADE PRACTICES L.J. 27, 38 (1997)
(writing on the Australian administrative access regime).
736. Id. at 38-39.
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Though "time-consuming and complicated," the first option is the
"avenue" of choice for most applicants.737
In addition to the basic essential facility criteria found in American law,738
an applicant has to prove other requirements for the NCC and a government
minister to recommend and declare access. In particular, an applicant must
show:
• access (or increased access) would promote competition in a
market (other than the market for the service);
0 it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to
provide the service;
* the facility is of national significance, having regard to its size, the
importance of the facility to constitutional trade and commerce, or its
importance to the national economy;
* that access to the service can be provided without undue risk to
human health or safety;
0 that access to the service is not already the subject of an effective
access regime; and
0 that access (or increased access) would not be contrary to the
public interest.739
A minister's declaration of access only provides the applicant "a right to
negotiate terms of access in good faith," not an "automatic right to access."740
If the "parties cannot agree on access or its terms, the dispute may be referred
to private arbitration or notified to the ACCC."' 74 1 An applicant may appeal a
minister's determination to the ACCC.742  The ACCC, in its access
determination, must consider a number of factors relating to "existing rights
and ownership of [the] facility" in addition to the aforementioned criteria.743
737. Id. at 39 (describing the "three-step procedure" applicants must perform under the first
option).
738. See supra note 724 and accompanying text (listing basic elements of the essential facility
doctrine).
739. Abadee, supra note 735, at 39. See also Trade Practices Act, 1974, pt. IIIA, §§ 44G(2),
44H(4) (Austl.).
740. Abadee, supra note 735, at 39.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. Id. Only the essential elements of the highly detailed administrative process are given in the
text. See also Pengilley, supra note 734, at 271-79 (using flowcharts to explain the legislation,
eventually enacted, proposing the administrative access regime).
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"Further appeals on questions of law can ... be taken to the Federal Court."' 7 44
b. Application of the Australian essential facility doctrine to the media
league context
The use of an administrative, rather than a judicial, process to determine
access issues is not likely to have a tremendous effect on a mega-media
company's efforts to secure playing facilities in Australia relative to the
United States. The active role of a government minister in the Australian
procedure, however, increases the political nature of the access determination
in that country compared to the United States. This feature of the Australian
access regime may benefit a mega-media company given its ability to voice its
position in the public forum.
Of greater importance to a mega-media company than the procedural
differences between the American and Australian access regimes is the
additional substantive criteria the Australian statute imposes to gain access,
most notably the national significance requirement. Though perhaps included
in the legislation "to avoid the situation in the [United States] where sports
stadiums and convention centres have been declared essential facilities," the
national significance requirement may not fully achieve this objective. 745
Certain sports venues in Australia (e.g., Melbourne Cricket Ground, Stadium
Australia) are arguably of national significance given their historical and
current roles in Australian sport, and their growing significance to Australia's
economy, especially given Sydney's hosting of the 2000 Summer Olympic
Games.746
The national significance requirement poses a more pressing problem
where a mega-media company desires access to a small regional facility
controlled by an uncooperative party. In fact, negotiating access to the only
suitable venue in a non-capital Australian city may be quite difficult if an
individual club of an established league has a strong following in the area and
exclusive rights to use the facility.747 In such a situation, a mega-media
744. Lynden Griggs, Access to Essential Facilities, 71 LAW INST. J. 40, 40 (May 1997).
745. Id. at 42 (citing sources). See also Kewalram, supra note 729, at 205 (suggesting that the
drafters included the national significance requirement because they only wanted to force parties to
deal when it was in the national interest to do so).
746. Griggs, supra note 744, at 42-43 (arguing that the Melbourne Cricket Ground and Stadium
Australia meet the national significance requirement); but see Pengilley, supra note 724, at 17 n.55
("[t]t is unlikely that any sporting stadiums-at least in Australian capital cities-would be likely to
be held to be an 'essential facility' even if the doctrine were to apply here. The greater range of
facilities available in Australian capital cities would, of itself, be enough to make the doctrine
inapplicable.").
747. COLMAN, supra note 5, at 189 (describing News Corporation's struggle during the Super
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company may find Part IIIA of the TPA to be of little use. Indeed, that the
administrative access regime by definition does not apply to local geographic
markets is one of the primary criticisms of the legislation.748
Surprisingly, the NCC's first decision under the new legislation
interpreted "national" very broadly. In that case, the Council held that certain
loading bays and hard stands at Sydney and Melbourne International Airports
were essential facilities to which the government owner may not deny access,
though numerous private companies had duplicated them.749 These facilities
were not of the type that the drafters of the legislation deemed of national
significance. 750 Under this precedent, the scope of the administrative access
regime is more expansive than its literal limits. This construction of the
statute greatly strengthens the argument that all sport facilities, and especially
the major Australian venues, fall under Part IIIA. However, given the
incongruence between the statute's terms and legislative history with the
NCC's initial decision, a mega-media company cannot rely too heavily upon
Part HIA to provide access to local playing facilities.
Because of the gap between the administrative access regime of Part IIIA
and the competition law provisions of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act,751 a
mega-media company in Australia may also be able to use judicial process to
obtain access to sports venues. 752 Though the legislative history of the
administrative access regime contemplates that Part IIIA is the exclusive
means to resolve access issues, the statute does not explicitly make this
point.753 In particular, the legislation is silent with respect to the use of
section 46 of the TPA, the misuse of market power provision,754 to obtain
League saga to obtain access to a stadium in Newcastle, New South Wales).
748. Pengilley, supra note 734, at 251-52 (criticizing the administrative access regime because it
fails to consider the misuse of market power in local markets); Kewalram, supra note 729, at 205
(criticizing the administrative access regime on the ground that Australian competition law is to
promote competition in all, not just national, industries).
749. Bob Baxt, Trade Practices and Shared Facilities, 13 COMPANY DIREcTOR 31, 32 (Sept.
1997).
750. Id. at 32 (commenting that the drafters did not support such a "flexible interpretation" of the
national significance requirement since they believed that only facilities akin to natural monopolies
were subject to the forced access regime).
751. Pengilley, supra note 734, at 250-51 (noting the "legislative lacuna" between the
administrative access regime and § 46 of the Trade Practices Act).
752. Griggs, supra note 744, at 43 n.21 (noting that sports organizations may try to use §§ 45 and
46 of the Trade Practices Act to obtain access to playing facilities).
753. Abadee, supra note 735, at 44 (noting that although Part IIIA does not mention § 46 of the
Trade Practices Act, the report recommending the legislation emphatically argued that the regime
"'should provide an exhaustive statement of access rights"' (quoting Report by the Independent
Committee of Inquiry, National Competition Policy (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter Hilmer Report])).
754. Section 46 of the Trade Practices Act is akin to § 2 of the Sherman Act. Pengilley, supra
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access to a facility in conjunction with, or instead of, Part IIIA.
Section 46 provides:
(1) A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market
shall not take advantage of that power for the purpose of:
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the
corporation or of a body corporate that is related to the
corporation in that or any other market;
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market;
or
(c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive
conduct in that or any other market. 755
Though open to debate, section 46 arguably incorporates the essential
facility doctrine. This argument is strengthened by the points made in the
Hilmer Report that:
(1) Where the facility is essential, the owner will always have a
'substantial degree of market power.' (2) A refusal to deal in this
context will constitute the 'taking advantage' of market power, since
in the absence of such power, access would be available. (3) A refusal
to provide access could occur for any of the proscribed purposes. 756
A mega-media company's use of section 46 to obtain access to a playing
facility ultimately depends on the pre-emptive force the Australian authorities
give to Part IIIA.757 If "[s]ection 46 and the [ ] access regime are both
applicable to essential facilities," 758 then a mega-media company may seek
access through both administrative and judicial channels. If Part IIIA
completely preempts section 46 on access issues, then the administrative
regime is the only option available to a mega-media company. Finally, section
46 and Part IIIA may co-exist with the former applying to access issues
regarding local facilities and the latter used to resolve access disputes
concerning facilities of national significance.
Of the three scenarios, the third one seems the most logical. The first
note 724, at 16 ("The two statutes [§ 46 of the Trade Practices Act and § 2 of the Sherman Act] may
have different wording, but they have the same economic and marketing thrust.").
755. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46(1) (Austl.).
756. Abadee, supra note 735, at 33 (internal quotations omitted). See also Kewalram, supra note
729, at 200 (matching the elements of § 46 with the MCI criteria); id. at 206 (concluding that at least a
"vague outline" of the essential facility doctrine appears in § 46 of the Trade Practices Act).
757. Pengilley, supra note 734, at 251 (describing three possible scenarios for the interaction
between Part IIA and § 46).
758. Id.
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scenario is irrational because "the possibility of courts granting what the NCC,
the Minister, the ACCC and the Competition Tribunal would not, seems
remote, especially when the laborious and expensive procedure [of Part
IIIA] ... is considered. ' 759 The second option is not sensible because it would
"involve some very significant backtracking in [Australian] competition law,"
most notably with respect to section 46 decisions. 760 "It is simply not true that
denial of access to an essential facility can occur only in the case of a facility
of national importance." 761  One commentator has suggested that the
inconsistency and uncertainty in coverage under Part IIIA can be remedied by
removing the national significance requirement from the statute and stating
expressly that the competition law provisions of the TPA are not applicable to
access disputes. 762 According to this commentator, such action is preferable to
the third scenario because having "two [] access regimes running in tandem is
highly unattractive. '763
Of course, the use of Part liA itself to provide access to playing venues is
dependent on the construction given the national significance requirement.764
If the relevant authorities construe narrowly the national significance
requirement to exclude all sports facilities from the administrative access
regime, then section 46 is the only legal basis on which a mega-media
company may challenge a venue owner's refusal to deal. To further read Part
IIIA to be the exclusive means to seek access rights would eliminate all
avenues of legal recourse to obtain forced access in the sports facilities
context.
CHAPTER FOUR
MEDIA LEAGUES ARE POTENTIAL RIVALS TO ESTABLISHED LEAGUES
Currently, in the United States and Australia there is one major
professional sports league in each sport. Heretofore, rival leagues have either
folded or merged weakly with the established league in the sport. According
to some commentators, rival leagues are not a threat to single league
759. Abadee, supra note 735, at 44.
760. Pengilley, supra note 734, at 251.
761. Id.
762. Id. at 253.
763. Id.
764. See supra notes 749-54 and accompanying text (discussing national significance
requirement).
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dominance. 765 Recent events in Australia, however, caution against accepting
this proposition. In particular, News Corporation's activities in Australia with
Super League suggest that media leagues are potential viable rivals to
established leagues. 766 Contrasting the histories of the United States Football
League (USFL) and Super League, the most recent major rival leagues in the
United States and Australia, respectively, provides insights on the difference
between past rival leagues and a media league.
I. TYPICAL RIVAL LEAGUE: UNITED STATES FOOTBALL LEAGUE
A. Development, Structure and Operation of the USFL
The USFL's founders believed that the NFL did not completely satisfy the
demand for professional football in the United States.767 The unique aspect of
the USFL's plan was to conduct its competition in the spring, a non-traditional
season for football.768 The USFL had a traditional American league structure
with a central league office and individually owned clubs. To achieve and
maintain competitive balance, each team had to meet financial criteria and adhere
to strict budgetary controls, including a salary cap. Franchises were located in
major media markets in order to increase the value of the league's product to a
national television network or cable company. Each team was encouraged to
sign a core of high profile coaches and players to improve the league's credibility
with the fans and the media.769 Profits were not immediately expected, with the
owners anticipating an estimated $2 million (U.S.) annual loss for three years
765. Noll, supra note 463, at 365 ("The possibility of a new league being organized is not a tight
check on the monopolistic position of teams and leagues."); Ross, supra note 9, at 706-07 (arguing
that the significant expansion by established leagues in recent years has reduced the likelihood of
rival league formation). But see BERRY & WONG, supra note 17, at x ("The prospects of a quick fix
through television revenues and the availability of players from established leagues, now that free
agency was more a reality, made new leagues feasible and infinitely more attractive. That many
dreams were ill-conceived has not deterred entrepreneurs.").
766. Angelo Veljanovski, The Superleague Cases and Statutoty Contract, 72 LAW INST. J. 57,
60 (Mar. 1998) ("There is no reason why all types of sporting competitions cannot be subjected to
challenge by rival competitions and rival sports."); Corones, supra note 65, at 156 (noting that there is
no reason why two independent and competing major leagues could not co-exist in the same sport).
767. David Dixon, the originator of the USFL, had a public opinion poll commissioned which
showed considerable interest in the idea of a spring football league. In his prospectus, however,
Dixon exaggerated the poll's findings to make the public demand for spring professional football
appear to be much greater than it actually was. JIM BYRNE, THE $1 LEAGUE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE USFL 8-9 (1986). Thus, the USFL, from its inception, was plagued with problems stemming
from a lack of strong central leadership.
768. Id. at 8.
769. Id. at 9-10.
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before breaking even.770
The USFL initially adhered to its founding principles. Most franchise
owners were wealthy individuals who could withstand the anticipated initial
losses.771 The first season of competition featured twelve teams, eight of which
were located in the top ten television markets. 772 A national television network,
ABC, and a cable company, ESPN, bought the USFL's television rights.773
Many teams hired well-known coaches and a sampling of players with name
recognition.774
Though the league had a very auspicious first weekend of play, attendance at
games and television ratings dropped over the course of the first season.775 By
the end of its first campaign, the USFL had lost almost $40 million (U.S.). 776
The losses were greater than expected for two reasons. First, many owners
exceeded the salary cap.777 Second, the USFL's contract with ABC gave the
network substantial control over the broadcast and staging of the league's games.
ABC made many decisions detrimental to the USFL.778 Many USFL owners
and the USFL Commissioner recognized these problems, but no one in the
league could control the owners' spending practices or obtain concessions from
ABC regarding the television contract.779 From its beginning, the USFL was
770. Id. at 19.
771. Id.atlO-11.
772. United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1351 (2d Cir.
1988) [hereinafter USFL 2].
773. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 17-19. ABC bought the free-to-air transmission rights for four
years and agreed to pay the USFL $18 million (U.S.) for each of the 1983 and 1984 seasons with
options of $14 million (U.S.) and $18 million (U.S.) for the 1985 and 1986 seasons, respectively.
ESPN agreed to pay the USFL $4 million (U.S.) in 1983 and $7 million (U.S.) in 1984. See also
USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1351.
774. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 46-48.
775. Id. at 52-55.
776. USFL2, 842 F.2d at 1351.
777. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 42-45.
778. Id. at 20. The detrimental actions included (1) the requirement that the USFL designate at
least two games to be played on Sunday afternoon with ABC having the exclusive right to televise
these games, though the network had the discretion to broadcast only one contest each Sunday; (2) the
lack of a "cross-feeding" requirement in the contract forcing ABC to broadcast another game into a
home team's market when the home team failed to sell out its game and the game was being
televised; (3) the lack of a requirement in the contract calling for ABC to televise all road games back
to the home team's market; (4) ABC's right to select any USFL game for its weekly coverage, which
effectively gave the network the power to force the movement of any game scheduled for Friday night
to Sunday afternoon, if the stadium was available for that day; (5) ABC's right to renegotiate the
rights payment to the USFL if the league failed to field a team in either New York, Los Angeles, or
Chicago, or if it lost franchises in two or more of its original top ten television markets; and (6) the
lack of a requirement that ABC blackout a team's home game when the game was not sold out.
779. Id. at 51, 64.
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hampered by its traditional structure and dependency on the financial support of a
mega-media company.
Change marked the USFL's second season. Four clubs moved locations. 780
More controversial was the decision to expand by six teams.781 The most
significant new development, however, was the introduction of Donald Trump as
the new owner of the New Jersey Generals.782 With Trump came talk about
taking on the NFL head-to-head by switching the USFL to fall play.783 Trump
also greatly exacerbated the bidding war with the NFL for players as he signed
many top NFL and college players, including signing NFL stars to "futures
contracts" to take effect after their NFL contracts had expired. 784  Most
importantly, it was Trump who first instigated discussions about a "merger
strategy" that would lead to at least some of the USFL clubs, particularly the
Generals, ultimately joining the NFL.7 85
By the end of the 1984 season, the USFL had completely abandoned its
original plan of being a financially astute spring professional football league. In
August 1984, the owners decided to play one more season in the spring and then
move to a fall schedule in 1986.786 This decision was made despite ABC's
warning that a move to the fall would violate the terms of its contract as well as
the contrary recommendations of a management consulting firm787 and the
USFL's director of operations and marketing.788 The move to the fall indicated
that Donald Trump had taken control over the league and had convinced a
majority of the other owners to pursue the "merger strategy." 789 In addition to
moving to a fall season to impair the NFL's television revenues, the "merger
strategy" consisted of continuing the bidding war for players, shifting USFL
franchises out of cities where NFL teams played and into possible NFL
expansion cities, and filing an antitrust suit against the NFL.790 Prior to the start
780. USFL2, 842 F.2d at 1351.
781. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 58-60. The USFL had originally planned to expand in its second
year, but after the exorbitant losses of the first year, many owners wanted to delay awarding new
franchises. Id.
782. Id. at 92.
783. Id. at 94.
784. Id. at 102, 116.
785. Id. at 160-61.
786. Id. at 205-06.
787. The USFL paid McKinsey & Co. $600,000.00 to consider the advisability of moving to a fall
season. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1352.
788. Id.
789. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 225.
790. Id. at 160, 222-24, 232-33. See also USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1351-52.
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of its third season, the USFL had taken each of these steps.791
The 1985 spring season saw the USFL barely surviving.792 The league now
had fourteen teams, the reduction in clubs due to the decision of several owners
to fold rather than switch to a fall season in 1986. 793 Game attendance and
television ratings fell throughout the season, continuing the decline from the
league's inaugural weekend of play.794 By the end of the third season, "several
owners had withdrawn financial support for their teams and... were no longer
meeting their payrolls." 795 Over three seasons, the USFL had lost almost $200
million (U.S.). 796 Despite the low ratings, ABC offered a new television contract
worth $175 million (U.S.) for four years of spring football starting in 1986 and
ESPN offered a contract worth $70 million (U.S.) over three years.797 The USFL
rejected these offers and instead rested its survival on recovering a large damage
award against the NFL in its antitrust suit.798
B. USFL v. NFL
The litigation between the USFL and the NFL "often is described as the
'television' case because the heart of the antitrust issues revolve around
whether one league prevented the other from obtaining a television
contract .... ,,799
In the suit, the USFL alleged that, in contravention of section 2 of the
Sherman Act, the NFL had monopolized "the relevant [product] market of major
league professional football in the United States, and a relevant [product]
submarket of network television broadcasts of major league professional football
in the Fall. '800 According to the USFL, the NFL had abused its monopoly power
791. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1352.
792. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 339.
793. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1345 n.5.
794. Id. at 1351-53. See also BYRNE, supra note 767, at 340.
795. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1352. See also BYRNE, supra note 767, at 326-27.
796. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 2.
797. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1352.
798. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 346-47.
799. Rosenbaum, supra note 311, at 803.
800. United States Football League v. National Football League, 1986 WL 10620 (S.D.N.Y. July
31, 1986), at *4 [hereinafter USFL 1]. Specifically, the USFL and 14 owners of USFL clubs sued the
NFL, the NFL Commissioner, and 27 of the 28 teams in the NFL. See also USFL 2, 842 F.2d at
1340-41. For the sake of simplicity, hereinafter the plaintiffs and defendants will be referred to as the
USFL and NFL, respectively.
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in a number of ways. The NFL had created a barrier to entry into professional
football by entering into multi-year television contracts with each of the
television networks. The NFL had also pressured the networks to abstain from
televising USFL games in the spring or fall and, by threatening not to renew its
television contracts, had successfully prevented any network from agreeing to
broadcast USFL games in the fall. In addition, the USFL argued that the NFL's
concern with the "dilution effect" USFL telecasts would have on advertising
during NFL games had motivated the established league to pressure the networks
not to televise USFL games.80 1 The USFL's "dilution effect" argument was
based on the hypothesis that if a network carried USFL games as well as NFL
games, then the increased amount of professional football on television would
force the networks to charge lower prices for advertising on NFL games. In
turn, the NFL would receive less money for its broadcast rights. 80 2
The USFL also asserted that the NFL had pursued the strategy outlined in
the "Porter Presentation" to bankrupt the USFL.80 3 The Porter Presentation was
an exposition by Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter to sixty-
five NFL executives that set out a strategy for the NFL to conquer the USFL.
The presentation suggested that the NFL: (1) co-opt powerful USFL owners
by offering them NFL franchises, (2) encourage ABC not to continue USFL
broadcasts, (3) pressure ABC to drop the USFL by giving it an unattractive
schedule for its Monday Night Football program, (4) target important USFL
players for signing with the NFL through means such as the NFL's
Supplemental Draft and an expanded roster, and (5) attempt to bankrupt the
weakest USFL teams by driving up USFL player salaries in order to diminish
the USFL's size and credibility. 804
The USFL accused the NFL of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act as
well.80 5 The USFL charged that the NFL had conspired to exclude all
competition within major league professional football, to control access to the
television networks, and to reinforce its monopoly power.80 6 In the USFL's
opinion, the NFL's contract with all three networks, annual rotation of the Super
Bowl among the networks rather than awarding the rights to the highest bidder,
excessively high rights fees, and implementation of the Porter Presentation
strategy had furthered the conspiracy. 80 7
801. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1355-57.
802. Id.
803. Id. at 1342-43.
804. Id. (discussing the Porter Presentation).
805. USFL 1, 1986 WL 10620, at *26.
806. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1343.
807. Id.
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In defense, the NFL argued that the correct relevant product submarket was
not network television broadcasts of major league professional football in the fall,
but rather entertainment broadcasting generally, a market in which the NFL did
not have monopoly power.808 The NFL denied that it had monopolized either the
market for major league professional football or the USFL's claimed television
submarket. The NFL's contracts with the three major networks were not
exclusionary since each one explicitly stated that the network was free to televise
the professional football games of another league. The USFL had failed to
secure a fall network contract because each network had judged the USFL's
product to be inferior to the NFL's product and of little market value. The NFL
had never threatened a network with non-renewal of its contract or an
unattractive slate of games. The Porter Presentation strategy was never
undertaken. Finally, its own mismanagement, not NFL action, had caused the
USFL's losses.809
At trial, the jury found a relevant product market existed in major league
professional football in the United States and that the NFL had violated section 2
by willfully acquiring or maintaining monopoly power in this market.810
However, the jury found that the USFL had only suffered nominal damages from
the NFL's unlawful conduct and, therefore, was entitled to only one dollar in
damages, trebled to three dollars under American antitrust law.811 With respect
to the crucial television claims, the jury found that the NFL had not willfully
acquired or maintained monopoly power in a relevant television submarket and
had not restrained trade in violation of section 1.812
The USFL appealed the unfavorable rulings on its claims. The appellate
court rejected the USFL's contention that by contracting with each network the
NFL had violated the antitrust laws.813 The court based its holding on the
808. Id.
809. Id.
810. Id. at 1353.
811. USFL2, 842 F.2d at 1341.
812. Id. at 1353. The jury did not clearly define the parameters of the relevant television
submarket, only noting on the verdict sheet that there was a television submarket in "broadcasting
rights." The jury did not specify whether these rights included rights to entertainment programming in
general or whether the submarket included independent television stations and cable companies as well as
networks. Id. at 1366-67. On appeal, the USFL argued that the ambiguity surrounding the jury's
definition of the relevant television submarket warranted a new trial on the section two claim. Id. at 1361.
The appellate court rejected the USFL's request. Id. at 1367. The court believed that the jury's lack of
clarity in expressing its definition of the relevant market was not prejudicial error since the jury had
rejected all of the plaintiff's television-based antitrust claims, including the section 1 allegations. Id. at
1366-67. The jury's conclusions on the ultimate issues showed that it did not believe that the NFL had
engaged in anti-competitive conduct with respect to the televising of professional football games,
irrespective of the proper definition, if any, of the television submarket. Id.
813. Id. at 1355.
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statutory language and legislative history of the Sports Broadcasting Act
(SBA).8 14  The SBA exempted from the antitrust laws "any joint
agreement.., by which any league ... sells.., all or any part of the rights of
such league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games...
engaged in or conducted by such clubs." 815  The SBA thus allowed a
traditional league like the NFL to sell the broadcasting rights of its member
clubs in a package and divide the revenue from such a sale among the clubs
without being subject to antitrust attack.816 According to the court, the
language of the SBA was unambiguous and neither stated nor implied that the
antitrust exemption for pooled-rights contracts was limited to a single contract
with one network.817 Furthermore, the legislative history provided no reason to
depart from the natural interpretation of the statutory language. 818  In
congressional hearings preceding the SBA's enactment, the Commissioner of the
American Football League, which later merged with the NFL, had expressed
concern that the SBA would allow the NFL to contract with impunity with each
national network in order to preclude a rival professional football league from
obtaining a national television contract. 819 To clarify the statute's scope, the
House report accompanying the SBA emphasized that no 'exemption from the
antitrust laws should be made available to a league or its members where the
intent or effect of a joint agreement is to exclude a competing league or its
members from the sale of any of their television rights.' 820 In addition, at the
time of the NFL/AFL merger, the NFL had candidly informed Congress that the
enlarged league would broadcast its games on at least two networks. 821 In
approving the merger, Congress had expressed no concern that such action might
fall outside the SBA antitrust exemption.
The court found many flaws in the USFL's "dilution effect" arguments.8
22
First, no "dilution effect" was present when the NFL's network contracts expired
and negotiations started anew. 823 At that time, each professional league was free
to compete on the basis of the quality of its product without regard to prior
814. Id. at 1353-55 (discussing the Sports Broadcasting Act).
815. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
816. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1353-55.
817. Id. at 1354.
818. Id.
819. Id. Seealso USFL v. NFL, 634 F. Supp. 1155, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
820. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1354 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1178 87-4 (1961)).
821. Id. (noting NFL's notice to Congress about having a contract with more than one television
network).
822. Id. at 1355-57.
823. Id. at 1356.
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contracts.824 With respect to the USFL's 1986 fall season, the NFL's network
contracts expired in 1986 so that, regardless of its magnitude in past years,
whatever "dilution effect" existed at that time could not have affected the
USFL's negotiations with the networks.825
Second, the USFL had assumed that the "dilution effect" was the same for
each network and calculated its losses solely on the "dilution effect" estimates
CBS had made in 1984.826 The USFL's assumption was erroneous, especially
with regard to the potential "dilution effect" suffered by ABC, the network with
which the USFL had the greatest probability of securing a fall television
contract.827 Since ABC only had the right to show NFL games primarily during
prime time on Monday nights, its "dilution effect" would have been considerably
less than the "dilution effect" of CBS or NBC, which televised NFL games on
Sunday afternoons. 828 Moreover, two ABC executives had testified that the
major cause for the diminished value of the USFL's product for 1986 was the
USFL's exodus from major television markets. 829
Third, the bargaining history between the networks and the NFL did not
support the "dilution effect" theory.830 If there was a "dilution effect," then the
NFL would have desperately wanted to reach an agreement with each network in
order to preclude the televising of USFL games. 831 Contrary to the USFL's
hypothesis, the NFL did not manifest a desire to lock up all three networks.832
During negotiations, the NFL commissioner often threatened a network that the
league would sell exclusive transmission rights to a competing broadcaster.833
More importantly, each NFL television contract allowed the network to broadcast
the games of a rival league. 834
Additionally, if the "dilution effect" theory was valid, then the last network
to enter into a contract with the NFL would have been in the best bargaining
position since it would have been a "holdout" with respect to the NFL's plan to
824. Id.
825. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1356-57. Mega-media companies generally begin negotiations with a
professional sports league for a new contract at least one year in advance of the expiration of the
league's current television deals. BYRNE, supra note 767, at 162-68.
826. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1356.
827. Id.
828. Id.
829. Id.
830. Id. at 1357.
831. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1357 n.19.
832. Id. at 1357.
833. Id.
834. Id. at 1348.
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monopolize the television market. 835 In the actual negotiations, the opposite
situation was true.836 In the last series of bargaining sessions in 1982, the NFL
had already entered into agreements with NBC and ABC before approaching
CBS.8 37 At trial, the President of CBS Sports had testified that the network had
considered itself in a very disadvantageous bargaining position by being the only
network without a NFL contract for the upcoming seasons.838 The contract CBS
ultimately signed with the NFL required it to increase its rights payments by
more than 100%, hardly the outcome for one with superior bargaining power.839
Even if the "dilution effect" theory was legitimate, the court believed that the
jury could have found that this factor had not caused the USFL's failure to
procure a network contract for fall 1986.840 Numerous events had occurred after
the 1984 study on which the USFL based its "dilution effect" argument. For
instance, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in NCAA v. Board of
Regents841 had dramatically increased the amount of college football on
television. 842  Throughout the 1980s, sports programming in general had
dramatically increased. By 1986, the USFL was simply facing increased
competition from other programming options.843  The USFL, through
mismanagement, had significantly damaged its product.844 In sum, the evidence
showed that the expected revenues from telecasting USFL games were so low
that a network could have reasonably decided not to purchase the league's rights
irrespective of any possible "dilution effect. 845
The USFL's hopes of success through litigation were thus dashed and the
league folded.
C. Epilogue
The USFL's experience was similar to those of past rival leagues in the
835. Id. at 1357.
836. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1357.
837. Id.
838. Id.
839. Id.
840. Id.
841. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
842. USFL 2, 842 F.2d at 1357.
843. Id.
844. Id. The USFL made numerous poor management decisions. The plethora of USFL franchise
relocations inhibited the building of a loyal fan following. The move to the fall created a major rift
between USFL owners. The USFL's abandonment of several major television markets decreased the
number of households advertisers were likely to reach during an USFL telecast.
845. Id.
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United States. The USFL's traditional structure proved problematic. The club
owners became divided over whether to pursue a merger strategy or adhere to
their original business plan. The lack of a strong central authority to direct the
league's focus promoted mismanagement. The USFL's chances of survival
were directly proportional to its ability to convince a mega-media company to
purchase its product. Once the USFL lost purchasers for its transmission
rights, its prospects for survival were negligible.
II. MEDIA LEAGUE AS A RIVAL LEAGUE: NEWS CORPORATION'S SUPER
LEAGUE
A. Collective Action Problem in the ARL and Developments in Australian
Media Industry Lead to Super League
The genesis of Super League was a 1988 decision by the ARL 846 to award an
expansion license to a group of investors for a new team in Brisbane,
Queensland. 847 The Brisbane Broncos were to become the only privately owned
team in the ARL.848
From the first day of the club's operations, the Broncos and the ARL
administration disagreed over a plethora of issues, particularly with regard to the
club's commercial dealings. 849 The ARL fined the Broncos for undertaking
marketing activities that conflicted with the league-wide sponsorship
agreements. 850 The Broncos and league argued about the club's adherence to the
salary cap.851 The Broncos continually accused the ARL administration of
partiality toward the Sydney-based clubs, while the ARL board chastised the club
for pursuing its financial interests rather than promoting the league as a whole.852
On several occasions, the ARL informed the Broncos that the club was free to
846. Professional rugby league in Australia has governing organizations at the national and state
levels. At the time of Super League, the ARL was the national body and the New South Wales
Rugby Football League, Ltd. (NSWRL) and the Queensland Rugby Football League, Ltd. (QRL)
were the respective state bodies. For purposes of clarity, the Australian established rugby league
competition organizer will be assumed to be the ARL, with the intricate relationships between the
national and state organizations ignored, unless otherwise noted. The NSWRL and QRL are still in
operation after the Super League saga.
847. ARTHURSON, supra note 5 1, at 181 (linking the beginning of Super League to the admission
of the Brisbane Broncos into the ARL).
848. RoY MASTERS, INSIDE OUT: RUGBY LEAGUE UNDER SCRUTINY 10 (1997).
849. COLMAN, supra note 5, at 25,47,52-53.
850. Id. at 46-47.
851. Id.at57-58.
852. ARTHURSON, supra note 51, at 184.
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start its own competition if it did not want to obey league rules. 853
The animus between the Broncos and the ARL reached its peak in 1993. In
that year, the league replaced the Broncos' chief executive officer, John Ribot, on
an important league committee, announced it was adding a second team in
Brisbane over the Broncos' objections, and rejected the Broncos' request to host
the 1995 Grand Final, the league's championship game.854 The last decision was
particularly upsetting to the Broncos since the club had guaranteed the ARL a
profit of $2.6 million (Aud) from hosting the Grand Final, significantly more
than the league usually received from the championship game, and the proposal
had the support of a number of other clubs.855 The ARL later awarded the city of
Brisbane the right to host a semifinal match, but the game was not to be played in
the Broncos' home stadium, a move that further sparked the club's ire.856 The
constant conflicts with the ARL led the owners of the Broncos to consider
seriously the prospects of acting on the ARL's taunt of starting a rival league.857
In 1994, John Ribot contacted News Corporation (News), a Broncos'
sponsor, about creating a new rugby league competition. 858 Ribot envisioned
News as the central competition organizer for the new league.859 Intrigued,
News decided to start "Super League." 860 News' plan called for an Australia-
wide competition (with one team from New Zealand) comprised of twelve
privately owned teams, four of which would be owned by News. 861 In addition
to its four clubs' share of the revenues, News would receive a fifteen percent
management fee for operating Super League. 862 News would also own the
league's transmission rights.863
853. COLMAN, supra note 5, at 47.
854. Id. at 45, 51.
855. Id. at 56-57.
856. Id.
857. Id. at 57.
858. Id. at 62-63.
859. Id.
860. News Ltd., 1996 WL 3310742, at *23.
861. Id.
862. Id.
863. Anthony Mclnerney, The Super League Litigation: Has Klor's Inc. v. Broadway Hale
Stores Come Down Under?, 25 AtsTL. Bus. L. REv. 384, 387 (1997).
News wanted to establish a Super League for two reasons. First, News would.., receive benefits such as
revenue from sponsorship, free-to-air and pay television rights, gate takings and merchandising....
Secondly, News wished to challenge the exclusive television rights to the League's competition held by
Channel Nine, a television station controlled by Mr. Kerry Packer....
Id. (internal quotations omitted). News had started a cable television venture with Telstra, the
government-owned telecommunications company.
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Because its primary objective was to increase subscriptions to its new cable
television system, News decided to make Super League the premium rugby
league competition in Australia. To achieve this goal, News believed that, in
addition to the services of the leading players, having certain ARL clubs join
Super League was critical because of their goodwill with consumers. 864 In an
attempt to avoid confrontation, News offered the ARL a subsidiary role in Super
League before approaching the ARL clubs about switching allegiances. 865
The ARL rejected News' overture and sought to preserve its league. The
ARL asked each club to sign a "Commitment Agreement."866  Under the
Commitment Agreement, a club was guaranteed entry for five seasons into the
ARL's competition in exchange for the club's promise to play only in an ARL-
approved league.867 Prior to this agreement, each club applied annually for
entry into the ARL.868 Though entry was almost always granted, no club had
an automatic right to participate in the annual competition and the ARL had
previously denied a club entry into the league.869 Eager to obtain guaranteed
admission to the established league, each of the twenty ARL clubs-including
the Broncos-executed a Commitment Agreement.870
News continued with its Super League plans.871 News executed "Super
League Confidentiality Deeds" with five ARL clubs.872 Under the agreements,
News promised to use its best efforts to persuade the ARL to participate in the
new league. Each club agreed to keep all information relating to Super League in
strict confidence, to participate for the next eighteen months only in an ARL or
News operated rugby league competition, and not to discharge any of its players
without the prior consent of News.873
In a final attempt to gain the ARL's support, News presented its Super
League proposal to a meeting of representatives of the ARL clubs.874 News
described Super League as a twelve-team national competition that was to be an
864. COLMAN, supra note 5, at 76 (describing News' strategy to recruit ARL clubs to Super
League).
865. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *25.
866. Id. at *24.
867. Id.
868. See supra notes 266-75 and accompanying text (discussing clubs' applying to play in
Australian rugby league competitions).
869. Id.
870. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *24, *26.
871. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *53-*54 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
872. Id.
873. Id.
874. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *28.
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integral part of an international competition. 875 The twelve Super League teams
were to be privately owned, but each ARL club was to receive an equity share in
a Super League club. 876 The ARL's twenty-team competition was to continue as
a minor league to the Super League competition. 877 The ARL was to run the
international test matches involving the Australian national team. 878 A board of
directors, on which News would have majority representation, was to control
Super League.879
The ARL clubs unanimously rejected the Super League proposal because it
removed control over professional rugby league from the ARL.880 After
rejecting News' proposal, each ARL club entered into a "Loyalty Agreement"
with the ARL.881 Under the Loyalty Agreement, each club reaffirmed that it
would participate exclusively in the ARL for the next five seasons (1995-
1999).882 In addition, each club agreed to maintain the services of its existing
and future-contracted players for the duration of the players' contracts in order to
prevent them from playing for Super League. 883 Furthermore, the clubs pledged
not to have any interest in or involvement with any other rugby league
organization that might undermine the quality of the ARL.884
Having failed to gain the ARL's support, News embarked on a new, more
aggressive plan to create Super League.885 News believed that it needed, at a
minimum, to sign enough ARL players to stock ten Super League teams.886
More ambitiously, News hoped to acquire sufficient ARL players, coaches, and
officials to decimate the ARL and force it to capitulate to Super League.887 In
March 1995, News started signing ARL players to contracts under which the
players agreed to play only in Super League. In exchange, the players received
salaries and signing bonuses much larger than they had previously garnered from
ARL clubs. Since many players were tied to their ARL clubs through the
Commitment and Loyalty Agreements, News also filed suit against the ARL
875. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *55 (AustLI.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
876. Id.
877. Id. at *50, *54-*56.
878. Id. at *55.
879. Id. at *53-*54.
880. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *53-*54 (AustLII.edu.au, Austi. Case Law).
881. Id. at *57.
882. Id.
883. Id. at *58.
884. Id. at *62.
885. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *61 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
886. Id.
887. NewsLtd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *34.
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alleging that these Agreements violated the Trade Practices Act.888
PBL, owner of the ARL's television rights, was very concerned about the
possible demise of the ARL. PBL rejected an offer from News to work
together in developing Super League. 889 Optus Vision, News' rival cable
operator in Australia, was also wary of Super League. Optus Vision had
contracted to carry ARL matches and was relying on this programming to build
subscriptions. The ARL successfully recruited PBL and Optus Vision to fund a
bidding war against News for players.890 In exchange for becoming the ARL's
hired gun, PBL/Optus Vision received a five-year extension on their television
contracts with the ARL, the right to bid first and last for the ARL's transmission
rights when the current contracts expired, and veto power over any change in the
format of the ARL's on-field competition.891 The ARL also counter-sued
alleging unlawful injury caused by News' actions in starting Super League. 892
News continued its attempts to sway ARL clubs to join Super League. 893 By
April 20, 1995, seven clubs had switched to Super League.894 For each "rebel
club," News created a Super League Franchisee, the entity that would play in
News' rugby league competition. 895 The Franchisee was the entity that
formally contracted with the players.896 Two documents, the "Head of
Agreement" and the "Club Deed," facilitated the transfer of the interests and
assets of each rebel club to an interest in a Super League Franchisee. 897 The
"Head of Agreement" established the relationship between News as the
competition organizer and the Franchisee as the team competing in Super
888. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *65 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
889. Id. at *63.
890. Id. See generally Corones, supra note 65, at 150.
The dispute had as much to do with the pay TV market as with the organization of a new rugby league
football competition. There are two major pay TV operators in Australia: Foxtel, ajoint venture between
News Ltd[.] and Telstra; and Optus Vision, a joint venture between Optus and interests associated with
Packer publishing group [i.e., PBL] which owns Channel 9 in each major urban center.
Id.
891. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *63 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
892. Id. at *64.
893. Id.
894. Id. These seven clubs were labeled the "rebel clubs," while the ARL clubs refusing to join
Super League were designated the "loyal clubs." Id. at *68.
895. Id. at 64.
896. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *65 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law). The standard
terms applicable to every player contract expressly stated that the relationship between the player and
the Franchisee was one of employee and employer, with the player to be a full time employee. Id. In
addition, the contract prohibited the player from playing for any team other than the Super League
Franchisee. Id. at *66.
897. Id. at *64-*65.
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League.898 The parties to the Head of Agreement were News, the Franchisee,
and Star League Pty Ltd. (SLPL), the wholly-owned subsidiary News created
to administer and run Super League. 899 The Agreement stated that News was
creating a rugby league competition as a rival to the ARL and that the Franchisee
was to field its best team to participate in Super League. 900 Under the agreement,
News granted each Franchisee a license to operate in a particular geographic area
and the right to use and license the team's name and logo.901
The "Club Deed" was a contract between News, a rebel club, and the
particular Super League Franchisee corresponding to that club.90 2 News gave
each rebel club an equity share in its respective Franchisee.9 3 The Club Deeds
freed the players from their ARL obligations so that they could play for a Super
League Franchisee.904 News agreed to indemnify each club and its officers and
directors from any liability incurred from a breach of the Commitment and
Loyalty Agreements. 90 5
On the eve of trial, three hundred seven players, ten coaches, and eight ARL
clubs were aligned with Super League.906 In addition, News had entered into
agreements with the rugby league organizers in Europe, New Zealand, and the
South Pacific for clubs in those areas to play internationally only in News-
sponsored events. 907  Through these international arrangements, News
effectively wrested control of international rugby league matches involving
Australian players from the ARE. 908 A player wanting to play in representative
matches for Australia, the highest reward in the sport, would have to join Super
League.
News had indeed mounted a serious challenge to the ARL and intended to
898. Id.
899. Id.
900. Id. at *64.
901. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *64 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law). Pursuant to the
1-lead of Agreement, News owned all intellectual property rights associated with Super League and
the Franchisees, except for the team names. Id.
902. Id. As with the Heads of Agreements, SLPL was also a party to the Club Deeds. Id.
903. Id.
904. Id. at *65.
905. Id.
906. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *66 (AustLII.edu.au, Austi. Case Law). By the time the
trial court's decision was appealed, the number of ARL players on Super League rosters was 300
because 7 players had their Super League contracts subsequently cancelled through agreement or
court decree. Id.
907. COLMAN, supra note 5, at 198-201 (detailing News' arrangements with the English and
New Zealand rugby league clubs).
908. Id. at 205.
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start Super League play in fall 1996.909 Contrary to the American USFL
experience, in Australia the established league, not the rival, was fighting for
survival. Losing in litigation over the validity of the Commitment and Loyalty
Agreements was the only barrier to News' obtaining significant control over the
sport of professional rugby in Australia.
B. News Ltd. v. ARL
News claimed that the Commitment and Loyalty Agreements contained
exclusionary provisions in violation of section 45(2)(a)(i) of the TPA.910 Section
45(2) provides:
A corporation shall not:
(a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding
if:
(i) the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding
contains an exclusionary provision .... 911
Section 4D of the TPA defines an exclusionary provision.
A provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding... shall be
taken to be an exclusionary provision... if:
(a) the contract or arrangement was made, or the understanding
was arrived at ... between persons any 2 or more of whom are
competitive with each other; and
(b) the provision has the purpose of preventing, restricting, or
limiting:
(i) the supply of goods or services to, or the
acquisition of goods or services from, particular persons or
classes of persons; or
(ii) the supply of goods or services to, or the acquisition
of goods or services from, particular persons or classes
of persons in particular circumstances or on particular
conditions;
by all or any of the parties to the contract, arrangement, or understanding. 912
909. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *67 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
910. NewsLtd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *77.
911. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 45(2)(a)(i) (Austl.).
912. Id. § 4D. To contravene section 45(2) of the Trade Practices Act, all elements of the
statutory definition of an exclusionary provision must have been present at the time the parties
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News alleged that each Agreement was a contract between the ARL and a
club, which competed against all the other ARL clubs, that had the purpose of
restricting the club from acquiring the services of a competition organizer
alternative to the ARL, from supplying its services to a competition organizer
alternative to the ARL, and from acquiring the services of players to play in a
rugby league competition alternative to the ARL. 913
The trial court first sought to determine if the ARL clubs were, at the time of
execution of the Commitment and Loyalty Agreements, in competition with each
other for the services that were the subject of the alleged exclusionary
provisions. 914 After reviewing the history, structure, and operation of the ARL
and the clubs, the court concluded that the clubs were not competitive with one
another in the required statutory sense.915 The court analogized the ARL to a
joint venture or partnership.916 Like the partners in a partnership, the league and
the clubs were cooperating with one another, not competing, to achieve
success.917 The Memoranda and Articles of Association of the ARL and the
clubs indicated that the clubs had given the ARL the power to determine which
teams would provide their services to the league. 918 At the time the Agreements
were executed, the clubs undoubtedly believed that the ARL controlled
admission to the league. 919 Though each club had to apply annually to play in
the ARL, admission was granted once the club met the league's objective
criteria.920 According to the trial court, the clubs were not competing for a
position to play in the ARL.921
In the opinion of the trial judge, the clubs obviously were not competing with
one another for the services of an alternative competition organizer since News'
services were not available to the clubs at the time the Commitment and the
entered into the contract, arrangement, or understanding. See also News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at
*77-*78.
913. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *77-*78.
914. Id. at *78. News did not allege that the clubs were in competition with the ARL. Id. at *78.
Consequently, the Commitment and Loyalty Agreements could contain exclusionary provisions if and
only if the ARL clubs were in competition with one another in acquiring the services of a competition
organizer, supplying their services to a competition organizer, or acquiring the services of players to
play in a league. Id. at *77-*79.
915. Id. at *78-*80.
916. Id. at *80-*82.
917. In making this analogy, the judge relied heavily on American precedent and sources that
characterized a professional sports league as ajoint venture. Id.
918. NewsLtd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *82.
919. Id. at*84.
920. Id.
921. Id.at*84.
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Loyalty Agreements were executed.922 Prior to signing the Agreements, the
clubs had pledged to play only under the auspices of the ARL and News had
assured the ARL and the clubs that any alternative league would be under the
ARL's control.923
Though the ARL clubs were competing with each other for the services of
players to participate in the ARL, the trial court held that the form of these
services took such competition outside the purview of the TPA.924 Section 4(1)
of the TPA explicitly states that the Act does not apply to services supplied under
an employment contract. 925  At the time the Commitment and Loyalty
Agreements were executed, the club and players were in an employer-employee
relationship. The clubs were not, therefore, in competition with one another for
services recognized under the TPA.926
The trial court also rejected News' exclusionary provision claim because
neither the ARL nor a club entered into the Agreements with the requisite
statutory purpose.927 The ARL's motive for entering into the Agreements was to
preserve the quality of its league by reaching long-term commitments with the
clubs, not to restrict the clubs from providing their services to News.928 The
clubs had a legitimate incentive for contracting with the ARL in order to secure
admission into the league for an extended period of time.929 The Agreements
facilitated the business operations of both the ARL and the clubs since each of
them had entered into long-term contracts with other firms (e.g., sponsors,
stadium authorities) based on the continued vitality of the ARL.930
Finally, the trial court ruled that News had failed to prove that the clubs had
reached a "meeting of the minds" sufficient to create a contract, arrangement, or
understanding between them.931 The Agreements were vertical arrangements
between the ARL and each club, not a horizontal contract between the clubs.932
Based on its findings and determinations, the trial court ordered News to stop all
922. Id. at *85.
923. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *85.
924. Id. at*88-*89.
925. Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 4(1) (Austl.).
926. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at *89.
927. Id. at *96
928. Id. at *95.
929. Id.
930. Id. The trial court further concluded that even if the ARL or a club had an anti-competitive
motive for entering into the Commitment and Loyalty Agreements, this purpose was not a
"substantial purpose" for making these contracts and thus did not meet the statutory requirement. Id.
at *96.
931. News Ltd., 1996 WL 33110742, at*101-*102.
932. Id. at *100-*101.
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activities in relation to Super League and not to interfere with the ARL's
operations for the term of the Agreements. 933
On appeal, the Full Federal Court reversed the trial court's judgment and
held that the Agreements contained unlawful exclusionary provisions.934
According to the court, the ARL clubs were competitive with one another with
respect to supplying their teams to, and acquiring the services of, a competition
organizer such as the ARL or News. 935 At least some of the clubs competed to
retain their position in the ARL since they vied for spectators and sponsors in
order to meet the criteria for annual admission into the league.936 The clubs'
execution of confidentiality agreements with News indicated that some of them
were competing for entry into Super League. 937 The clubs' contemporaneous
execution of the Agreements in response to the ARL's plea that they cooperate to
fend off Super League clearly showed a common understanding among them. 938
The testimony of high-ranking ARL officials that the ARL was trying to combat
News by locking all the clubs into the established league for five years reflected
the true motivation for the Agreements. 939 The court rejected the ARL's
contention that the Agreements were executed only with the desire to preserve
the quality of the league.940 Since a substantial purpose behind the Agreements
was to prevent the clubs from supplying their services to, and from acquiring the
services of, an alternative competition organizer, the intent element of News'
exclusionary provision claim was satisfied.94 1
Since the Agreements contained exclusionary provisions, they were void and
without effect under Australian law.9 42 The Full Federal Court reversed the trial
court's orders. News was now free to promote and operate Super League,
including contracting for the services of ARL players, coaches, and rebel ARL
clubs.
933. Id. at "122.
934. News Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at *116 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
935. Id. at * 110. The court did not resolve the issue of whether the competition between clubs
for the services of players to play in professional sports league fell under the purview of the Trade
Practices Act. The court, however, intimated that the Trade Practices Act applied to the competition
for players because there was a real chance that the clubs would engage players to play under an
agreement other than a contract of service, such as an independent contractor agreement. Id. at * 110.
936. Id. at* 106.
937. Id. at * 108-* 109. Contrary to the trial judge, the Federal Court considered News to be a
viable alternative competition organizer to the ARL when the Commitment and Loyalty Agreements
were executed. Id.
938. Id. at *110-*111.
939. Nevs Ltd., [1996] 870 F.C.A. at * 113 (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law).
940. Id. at*115.
941. Id.
942. Id. at * 116.
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C. Epilogue: Does Super League Provide Hope for Rival Leagues?
News and the ARL conducted parailel rugby league competitions in
1997.94 3 The two leagues competed fiercely for players, sponsors, and
supporters. Neither league fared particularly well during that year. The
bidding war for players dramatically increased the operating costs of each
league.944  Fans became disenchanted with the constant controversy
surrounding the two leagues and public sentiment for professional rugby
league dropped below its pre-Super League level. Following the 1997 season,
the ARL and News entered into a partnership to organize a single rugby league
competition-the National Rugby League (NRL).945
Though the ultimate outcome of the Super League saga was a return to the
traditional single-league state, the Australian experience speaks to the
possibility of future rival leagues. News' creation of Super League
demonstrates that a mega-media company has the resources to launch a
premium rival league despite opposition from the established league in a sport.
News' ability to continue operating and marketing Super League despite
escalating costs from the bidding war for players and negative publicity from
ARL-aligned media interests is a testament to the capabilities of a mega-media
company. News' vitality both during and after its head-to-head competition
with the ARL contrasts with the precarious condition of the USFL almost from
its inception.
The merger agreement between the ARL and News and the current status
of the NRL provide evidence that a media league may be an effective
challenger to an established league. When traditional professional sports
leagues in the same sport merge, the established league in the sport typically
dominates the rival league and dictates the terms of the merger. The structure
of the NRL shows, however, that in the ARL/Super League merger News is, at
a minimum, an equal to the ARL.
A six-member Partnership Committee governs the NRL. 946 News and the
ARL each appoint three members to the Partnership Committee. 947 The
chairman of the Partnership Committee rotates each year between a News
appointee and an ARL appointee. 948 News, arguably, has greater influence on
943. MASTERS, supra note 848, at 29.
944. Id. at 42.
945. See supra notes 187-265 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of the NRL).
946. Masters Interview, supra note 47; Proposed Merger Agreement, supra note 189, at 11.
947. Proposed Merger Agreement, supra note 189, at 9.
948. Roy Masters, Love Conquers All as Warring States Strike Deal, SMH.coM.Au (discussing
the aftermath of the litigation between the NSWRL and QRL over electing directors to the ARL),
available at http:/www.smh.com.au/news/9903/13/sportlsport2.html (last visited Mar. 13, 1999);
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policy making in the NRL than the ARL does. Since its only constituency is
its shareholders, News' appointments to the Partnership Board are concerned
solely with operating the NRL for the greatest benefit to News. The ARL, on
the other hand, represents the interests of a number of regional rugby league
associations, which not uncommonly have divergent objectives and disagree
with the ARL on issues. The ARL's selections to the NRL Partnership Board
often represent an attempt to placate various constituents and include
individuals who are not committed solely to furthering the ARL's agenda.949
The NRL is heavily dependent financially on News since the ARL expended a
large percentage of its monetary reserves fighting News in court and for
players prior to the merger. News' control over the NRL's financial policy
gives it substantial sway in deciding league matters.950 News also obtains
leverage from its 70% ownership of one NRL club, 50% ownership of two
clubs, and 40% ownership of a fourth club. 951 The ARL does not own any
NRL clubs.952 News' ability to obtain the ARL's agreement to reduce the
number of Sydney clubs in the NRL over the objections of influential ARL
supporters further reflects the influence the mega-media company has on the
partnership. 953
The financial terms of the merger are also favorable to News. The ARL
and News split equally the profits from the NRL.9 5 4 The merger agreement
gives News the free-to-air television and radio transmission rights to the NRL
for twenty-five years. 955 News has sold the free-to-air television rights to PBL
for fifteen years. 956 Currently, both Foxtel, a cable television venture owned
New South Wales Rugby League Ltd. v. Australian Ruby League, [1999] N.S.W.C.A. 9 (New South
Wales Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1999) (AustLII.edu.au, Austl. Case Law) (adjudicating dispute between New
South Wales Rugby Football League Ltd. and Queensland Rugby Football League Ltd.).
949. Masters, supra note 948 (reporting on disagreement between New South Wales Rugby
Football League Ltd. and Queensland Rugby Football League Ltd. over appointment of directors to
the board of directors of the ARL), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/9903/13/sport/sport2.html.
950. Roy Masters, The Year of Living Dangerously, SMH.COM.AU (noting that the NRL could
not survive without the money the clubs receive from News), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/9903/0 1/sport/sport3.html (last visited Mar. 1, 1999).
951. Masters, supra note 209 (describing News' ownership interests in NRL clubs).
952. Id.
953. See supra notes 187-277 and accompanying text (discussing the reduction of clubs in the
NRL); Steve Mascord, Court Win Renews Club Cuts Battle, SMH.COM.AU (reporting on efforts of
officials of the New South Wales Rugby Football League Ltd. to use their influence with the ARL to
stop the NRL's rationalization plans), available at
http://www.smh.com/au/league/news/199903/01/league33.html (last visited Mar. 5, 1999).
954. Proposed Merger Agreement, supra note 189, at 8.
955. Id. at 16.
956. Masters Interview, supra note 47.
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50% by Telstra and 25% apiece by News and PBL, and Optus Vision, own
pay television rights to the NRL.957 The NRL's pay television rights contracts
expire at the end of the 2000 season.958
An aspect of News' experience relevant to a mega-media company
contemplating the creation of a rival league is the harmful effect of a bidding
war for players. A bidding war not only dramatically increases the operating
costs for a media league, but also generates negative publicity for the new
venture. A mega-media company starting a rival media league in the future
needs to guard against engaging in a bidding war with the established league
in the sport. A bidding war can likely be avoided if a mega-media company
focuses on developing its media league over the long-term and undertakes a
financially astute player acquisition strategy.959
Though one professional sports league still dominates each sport in
Australia and the United States, the Super League saga shows that a media
league can be a significant challenger to an established league.
CHAPTER FIvE
HARBINGERS OF MEDIA LEAGUES
Many incidents in the United States and Australia foreshadow the creation
of media leagues. Mega-media companies are becoming more involved in
professional sports leagues in both countries. Many of the newest professional
sports leagues in the United States have a single entity structure.960 Of the
various indicia, three harbingers are particularly relevant since they speak of
the past, present and future of the media league concept.
I. PBL's WORLD SERIES CRICKET N AUSTRALA
In the 1970s, PBL, owner of the most popular broadcast television
957. Proposed Merger Agreement, supra note 189, at 16 (delineating ownership of NRL's
transmission rights); Finola Burke, PBL Snares $70m Fox Sports Option, NEWS.COM.AU (reporting
PBL's purchase of 25% of Foxtel from News), available at
http://finance.news.com.au/content.4350953.html (last visited Oct. 7, 1999).
958. Masters Interview, supra note 47.
959. Bast, supra note 142, at 15 and accompanying text (citing economic studies for the
proposition that long-term competition between rival leagues should lower, not raise, player salaries),
available at http://www.heartland.org/sprtsstad.htm. But see Neale, supra note 8, at 10-11 (predicting
that in a rival league situation competitive bidding for players will raise the costs of one league above
its revenues leading to its demise).
960. CozziLLIO & LEVINsTEIN, supra note 7, at 20 (noting the recent popularity of the single
entity structure for new professional sports leagues in the United States).
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network in Australia, wanted to purchase the exclusive free-to-air television
rights to Australian international Test cricket matches. 961 Despite receiving a
much higher offer from PBL, the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) refused to
sell exclusive transmission rights to the commercial broadcaster and instead
sold the non-commercial free-to-air rights to the Australian Broadcasting
Commission (ABC), a government-owned television network.962 Stymied by
its dealings with the ACB, PBL's alternative solution to acquire premium
professional cricket programming was to produce its own professional cricket
competition - World Series Cricket.963
World Series Cricket consisted of a series of matches primarily in
Australia featuring many of the top cricket players in the world.964 PBL's
teams played for substantial prize money for the winner of the matches. 965
PBL's matches were played during the Australian summer in direct
competition with the ACB's international Tests. 966 Many of the best cricket
players in Australia and the world joined World Series Cricket, despite the
threat of losing their places on their national teams if they contracted with
PBL.967 Since the wages for a professional cricketer were relatively low at
that time, PBL had little difficulty finding players willing to play for World
Series Cricket since it offered salaries up to five times greater than the amount
the players had been earning from their respective national cricket boards.968
PBL initially signed fifty-one players, enough to field four teams-two
Australian teams, a West Indies team, and a "Rest of the World" team.969
Though initially denied access by some cricket grounds aligned with the ACB,
PBL eventually gained entry into playing facilities across Australia.970
World Series Cricket was not an immediate box office success.
Attendance and television ratings for PBL's initials matches were low.971 As
its first season progressed, however, World Series Cricket gained public
support. By introducing a number of innovations into cricket, many of which
became staples of the game, PBL greatly increased its following. For
961. HENRY BLOFELD, THE PACKER AFFAIR 15 (1978).
962. Id. at 15-16.
963. GIDEON HAIGH, THE CRICKET WAR 35 (1993).
964. BLOFELD, supra note 961, at 22.
965. Id. at 23.
966. Id.
967. PETER MCFARLINE, A GAME DIVIDED 95 (1977).
968. CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, THE GREAT CRICKET HIJACK 27 (1978).
969. MCFARLINE, supra note 967, at 56, 90.
970. Id. at 56.
971. HAIGH, supra note 963, at 119-20.
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example, World Series Cricket popularized one-day cricket matches and night
cricket matches using a white cricket ball. 972 PBL revolutionized the
televising of cricket with interesting camera angles and placement of
microphones, which improved ratings for PBL's telecasts of World Series
Cricket.973 By the end of its first season, World Series Cricket was gaining
momentum as a legitimate, alternative cricket competition to the ACB's
international Test matches.974 World Series Cricket continued to grow in
stature during its second season with traditional cricket venues, such as the
Sydney Cricket Ground, granting PBL access, attendance increasing at
matches, and television ratings rising.975 PBL even organized a series of
matches in the West Indies in its second year.976
Though it originally decried PBL's competition as a "circus," 977 by the
end of World Series Cricket's second season, the ACB discovered that its
control over cricket in Australia was slipping.978 The ACB, faced with
waning public interest and lower revenues, approached PBL about a peace
accord. The ACB and PBL reached an agreement under which PBL received
the right to purchase the exclusive free-to-air television rights to the ACB's
international Test matches in exchange for discontinuing World Series
Cricket.979
World Series Cricket had the trappings of a media league. PBL owned
and controlled every aspect of World Series Cricket. The impetus for starting
World Series Cricket was PBL's desire to obtain premium sports
programming. Players were signed and allocated to a particular team. PBL
used its political ties and financial strength to negotiate access to playing
facilities. Though ultimately World Series Cricket was discontinued and the
ACB regained dominance in the sport, PBL showed its ability to produce a
successful rival competition. 980
972. Id. at 127-28.
973. Id. at 104, 172-73.
974. Id. at 174-75.
975. Id. at 224-29.
976. Id. at 265.
977. Id. at 317.
978. Id. at 279.
979. Id. at 289-90.
980. Philip Cornwall, From Gazza to Dazza, in NOTHING SACRED: THENEW CRiCKET CULTURE
55, 60 (Alastair McLellan ed., 1996) (noting that News Corporation's successful forays into
professional sports traces back to PBL's success with World Series Cricket).
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II. TURNER SPORTS' GOODWILL GAMES
Founded in 1985, with the inaugural games held in 1986, the Goodwill
Games is a creation of Turner Sports, now a Time Warner company.
981
Though not a media league, the Goodwill Games is a "media Olympics," with
a competition format analogous to that of the Olympic Games.982 The
Goodwill Games is a multi-day competition involving international athletes
competing in sports contested at the Olympics. The athletes compete for
"substantial" prize money based on performance. 983 Turner Sports stages the
Goodwill Games every two years with alternating summer and winter
versions. 984
Turner Sports' ownership of the Goodwill Games provides the mega-
media company with the transmission rights as well as other products of a
premium sporting event involving many of the world's best athletes. Turner
Sports receives a substantial amount of sports programming for its cable
channels from producing the Goodwill Games. For example, in 1986, Turner
Sports aired 129 hours of television coverage of the Goodwill Games on its
cable channels in the United States and made available almost 200 hours of
sports programming to television broadcasters in 66 countries. 985
Approximately 482 million television households watched the 1990 Goodwill
Games.986 According to Turner Sports, the 2000 Winter Goodwill Games
"averaged a 1.1 rating in prime time, about the same as ESPN's college
basketball. '987 The Goodwill Games also enables Turner Sports to fulfill
humanitarian objectives by promoting world peace and giving athletes an
alternative competition to the Olympics. 988 Turner Sports' continuation and
expansion of the Goodwill Games indicates that the mega-media company
981. Goodwill Games Organization, GOODWILLGAMES.COM, available at
http://goodwillgames.comlhtml/hm-orgCompany.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2000).
982. The Goodwill Games: Past, Present and Future, GOODWILLGAMES.COM, available at
http://goodwillgames.com/htmUhm-history.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2000) (describing the Goodwill
Games as an "international, multi-sport invitational event").
983. Goodwill Games Quick Facts, GOODWILLGAMES.COM, available at
http://goodwillgames.comihtml/hmquickFacts.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2000).
984. Goodwill Games Mission Statement, GOODWILLGAMES.COM, available at
http://goodwillgames.comlhtml/hmmission.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2000).
985. The Goodwill Games: 1986, The Inaugural Games, GOODWILLGAMES.COM, available at
http://goodwillgames.com/html/hm-history5.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2000).
986. The Goodwill Games: 1990 and Seattle, GOODWILLGAMES.COM, available at
http://goodwillgames.com/html/hm-history4.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2000).
987. Rudy Martzke, CBS Studio Team Calls on Ditka to Join Huddle, USA TODAY, Feb. 25,
2000, at 2C (citing a Turner Sports executive).
988. Goodwill Games Mission Statement, supra note 984, available at
http://goodwillgames.com/html/hm-mission.html.
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derives not insignificant benefits from owning this sporting event.
III. NBC's AND TIME WARNER'S PROPOSED PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL
LEAGUE IN THE UNITED STATES AND NBC's EQUITY INVESTMENT IN THE
XFL
In 1998, NBC and Turner Sports announced plans to create and jointly
operate a new professional football league in the United States to start play in
2000.989 NBC and Turner Sports made their decision in response to their
unsuccessful attempts to acquire television rights to NFL games following the
1998 NFL season.990 NBC and Turner Sports had televised NFL games for
thirty-three and eight years, respectively, prior to 1998.991 If created, NBC's
and Turner Sports' professional football league would have been the first
media league in the United States.
The working name of the proposed media league was the "Fans Football
League." 992 NBC and Turner Sports were to own the league, which would
have had between ten and twelve teams in major American cities. 993 The
league was supposed to play its games during the summer months, just prior to
the start of the traditional football season in the United States.994 Initially, the
league was to start playing in summer 2000,995 but its launch was later delayed
until at least summer 2001.996
NBC and Turner Sports cancelled their plans to create the Fans Football
League in December 1999. 997 In late 1999, NBC and Turner Sports purchased
the transmission rights to NASCAR, an automobile racing series in the United
States, for a combined $1.2 billion (U.S.) over six years in order to increase
989. NBC, Turner Go For New Football League, ESPN SPORTs ZONE, available at
http://www.espnsportszone.com (last visited May 29, 1998).
990. Id.
991. Id.
992. Rudy Martzke, Sweeps Give NBC Combo Long Break, USATODAY.COM, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/comment/colmart.htm (last visited June 14, 1999).
993. NBC and Turner Sports Plan Pro Football League of Their Own, NANDO.NET, available at
http://www.nando.net (last visited May 27, 1998).
994. Martzke, supra note 992, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/Comment/colmart.htn.
995. Rudy Martzke, No Sour Grapes for Costas, USATODAY.COM (reporting that NBC and
Turner were to announce in April 1999 whether their league was going to start in 2000), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/commentfcolmart.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 1999).
996. Rudy Martzke, Staying Alive: Dierdorf Returns to CBS, USATODAY.COM (noting that
2001 is the earliest possible launch of NBC's and Turner Sports' football league), available at
http:llwww.usatoday.com/sports/Comment/colmart.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 1999).
997. Rudy Martzke, NBC-Turner Race Deal Boots Football League, USA TODAY, Dec. 1, 1999,
at 2C.
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their sports programming in the spring and summer.998 The NASCAR events,
scheduled for Sunday afternoons in the summer, conflicted with the proposed
times for the Fan Football League games. 999 Despite finding interest in their
proposed league throughout the United States, NBC and Turner Sports decided
that due to their NASCAR commitments they no longer had the resources to
create a professional football league.1000
NBC's and Turner's decision not to start a media football league does not
foreclose the possibility of media league creation in the United States. In fact,
NBC has announced that it has purchased 50% of the proposed XFL, a new
single entity professional football league created by the World Wrestling
Federation. 100 1 The XFL is to commence play in February 2001 immediately
after the conclusion of the NFL season. 100 2 NBC plans to air games on
Saturday nights in prime time; UPN, a fledging commercial broadcaster is
slated to show games on Sunday nights; and the XFL is in negotiations for the
sale of its pay television rights. 100 3 NBC's equity investment in the XFL
illustrates the implementation of the media league concept in the United
States.
CONCLUSION
Technological innovations are greatly affecting American and Australian
societies. Television and professional sports, two pillars of American and
Australian life, are changing as a result of this latest technological revolution.
Mega-media companies are inventing services and products that are
redefining consumers' experiences with electronic media. A key ingredient in
building consumer acceptance of these new offerings is attractive
entertainment content. Since professional sports are highly popular in the
United States and Australia, mega-media companies covet professional sports
programming. The transmission rights to traditional American and Australian
professional sports leagues, however, are scarce. In addition, traditional
professional sports leagues in both countries suffer from collective action
problems that reduce the quality of their products. These two factors often
prevent a mega-media company from securing an optimal supply of
998. Id.
999. Id.
1000. Id.
1001. NBC Becomes Partner in XFL, at
http:/lwww.espn.go.com/moresports/news/2000/0329/452547.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2000).
1002. Id.
1003. Rudy Martzke, NBA Playoff Schedule Finally Could Do Some Favors for NBC, USA
TODAY, May 19, 2000, at 2C.
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professional sports content. In both the United States and Australia, mega-
media companies are undertaking measures, such as purchasing individual
clubs and investing in playing facilities, to improve their prospects of
obtaining the transmission rights of traditional leagues. These actions, while
beneficial, are not eliminating the risks associated with contracting with a
traditional league.
A mega-media company's in-house production of a professional sports
league is an alternative means of acquiring professional sports programming.
A media league differs from traditional American and Australian professional
sports leagues. A media league's vertical structure contrasts with the
horizontal arrangements between individual clubs in the major American and
Australian traditional leagues. The benefits from organizing a professional
sports league as a single economic entity explain the use of the limited liability
company model for new professional sports leagues in the United States. A
media league, consisting of wholly owned club subsidiaries of a parent mega-
media company, represents a sharper break with the horizontal structure of a
traditional league and gives the league organizer greater protection from legal
challenge than does the limited liability company organizational structure.
Media league creation, however, is not problem-free. A number of
interesting issues involving aspects of media, constitutional, labor, and
antitrust law arise from a mega-media company's formation of a professional
sports league in either the United States or Australia. Though not void of
complexity, these issues are not serious impediments to media league creation.
The prospects of media league creation cast doubt on the continuing
validity of the widely accepted principle that no more than one major
professional sports league can flourish in a sport. Experiences in Australia
show that mega-media companies have the resources to launch professional
sports competitions, often in the face of strong opposition. As distinguished
from the typical dismal fate of American rival leagues, the sporting ventures
created by Australian mega-media companies have an impressive record of
achieving equal stature with their established counterparts. Though a media
league has not yet been formed in the United States, at least one American
mega-media company is actively pursuing the concept at the present time.
Though the ultimate success of media leagues cannot be guaranteed, they
deserve consideration because of the role of sport and the media in the United
States and Australia. Americans and Australians are not soon to lose their
love for professional sports. Though the most popular sports of today may not
be the ones of choice tomorrow, the pursuit of athletic excellence is likely to
always occupy a significant societal position in the United States and
Australia. Americans and Australians are also certain to continue their
infatuation with electronic media as a source of entertainment and an outlet to
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spend leisure time and dollars. Whether in the form of radio, television,
Internet, or next-generation technology, multi-media devices and services are
mainstays for the attention and income of consumers in both countries. Since
content is an indispensable element of the entertainment mix, 1004 mega-media
companies are not expected to lose their insatiable desire for access to and
control of professional sports. Until these market conditions change
dramatically, a media league shall remain an important and timely item of
discussion in the United States and Australia.
1004. WOLF, supra note 3, at 54 (noting the importance of content in the burgeoning
entertainment economy).
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